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Abstract 
 
This qualitative study aims to understand Jordanian and Palestinian refugees’ 
perceptions of coexistence as well as the role of academia and the sociopolitical 
climate in shaping these perceptions.  Data collection and observations in Palestinian 
refugee camps and interviews with both Jordanian and Palestinian refugee university 
graduates are the focus of this inquiry.  Handala emerged from the observations and 
became the indigenous framework of this dissertation.  Handala demands attention 
and respect, all the while his back turned away from his audience and his people.  In a 
climate of disarray and hopelessness, Handala asks us to critically examine global 
refugee existence, Diaspora, and displacement.  As he adopted a transnational 
identity, I adopted him. And so, he begs the question: can we transcend warfare, and 
manifest peace? And finally, what could Handala’s face look like?  
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Introduction 
 
No region in the world harbors as many refugees as the Middle East (US 
Committee for Refugees-World Refugee Survey, 2005).  The Israeli Palestinian 
conflict reverberates throughout the Middle East and the world over.  Palestinians are 
a very significant group for two reasons; first, Palestinians are the largest single group 
of refugees, and second, the majority of Palestinians are refugees (American Friends 
Service Committee, 2004).  The fact that numerically Palestinians pose the largest 
refugee community in the world is noteworthy.  As of 2003, there are seven million 
worldwide (Badil Resource Center, 2006).  This staggering number means that 
approximately two thirds of the Palestinian people are refugees (Middle East Report 
22, 2004).  
Palestinian refugees are diverse in their experiences, and can be placed in five 
categories.  The refugees displaced in 1948 are the largest number.  The “1967 
displaced persons” (from the West bank, Eastern Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip) is 
another group and neither those from the waves in 1948 or 1967 are able to return, 
either by force or by fear. The remaining two are those who are internally displaced 
(who remain in what became the state of Israel in 1948, and the areas that became the 
West Bank, Eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) (Badil Resource Center, 2006).   
A key figure at the center of this global issue is Jordan; this country has 
provided more for Palestinians than any other country. As of March 31, 2005, Jordan 
harbors 1,780,701 registered Palestinian refugees, more than any other country 
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(UNRWA, 2005).  The total number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan is 2,700,000; 
fifty percent of the area’s population (US Committee for Refugees, 2003).  No 
country has extended as much effort, money, time and compassion to Palestinians as 
Jordan.   
Coexistence between Jordanians and Palestinians is embedded in the 
Jordanian national identity.  Many Palestinians have assimilated and consider their 
national identity to be that of Jordanian citizenship, no longer Palestinian.  Her Royal 
Majesty of Jordan, Queen Rania herself is Palestinian.  Economic power among 
Palestinians is not uncommon either (Reiter, 2004).  Although many Palestinians 
living in Jordan have been granted citizenship, they are still a political minority 
(Reiter, 2004).  Therefore, both societal integration and economic strength do not 
translate into political might.  Lynch (1999) argues “bitter battles continued over the 
ability of Jordanians of Palestinian origin to participate in politics” (p. 320). 
While many Palestinians have assimilated and continue to thrive in Jordanian 
society, some have not.  Poverty in the camps is not uncommon (Khawaja, 2003).  
Monthly salary for people in poverty ranges between 55 Jordanian Dinars (JD) for a 
single person household to about 120 JD for a family of nine living in the camps 
(Khawaja, 2003).  Within a family of nine, with each family member survives on 
about 160 JD per year, about less than half of the national poverty line of 313 JD per 
year (Khawaja, 2003).  Furthermore, about 27 percent of adults in the camps live 
below the poverty line (Khawaja, 2003).  The 27 percent poverty among camp 
dwellers is very high compared to the ten percent national poverty average even when 
taking into account inflation and household size (Khawaja and Tiltnes, 2002).     
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How is being a refugee and refugee culture reflected in Palestinian 
perceptions of coexistence with Jordanians? How do Jordanians perceive sustained 
Palestinian presence? What is the relationship between socio-politics and academia 
with Jordanian-Palestinian coexistence according to both Palestinians refugees and 
Jordanians? These are the questions I addressed in my study. 
Statement of the Problem 
 Much has changed in Jordan since attacks on the United States on September 
11, 2001, and the terrorist attacks in Amman on November 9, 2005.  King Abdullah, 
who had just recently been appointed King in 1999, was not the successor Jordan’s 
people would have chosen.  They also felt that he had large shoes to fill and could 
never do as good a job as his father, the late great King Hussein.  King Abdullah, a 
man who was educated outside the country, was viewed more as an British than king.  
Moreover, the last minute switch from Prince Hassan (King Hussein’s brother, who 
was also an unpopular candidate) made his appointment to the throne seem hasty and 
without merit.   
After the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Jordan was one of the 
first Middle Eastern countries to ally itself with the United States.  This move was not 
appreciated by the civilians of Jordan, who felt the king himself had become a puppet 
to United States and been too opportunistic; essentially, selling the soul of the 
Jordanian people to the enemy.  King Abdullah II found himself in the awkward 
position of allying with the United States, while simultaneously opposing a military 
strike on Iraq.  To the credit of the king, he also stated that the unresolved problems 
in the Middle East primarily had to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Ryan 
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(2004) argues that “Jordan’s seemingly unwavering support for the U.S. carried 
potentially severe domestic costs.  The rift between state and society was indeed 
wide, and steadily growing” (p. 54).   
A publicity frenzy from the kingdom ensued.  “Jordan First” became the new 
public relations slogan for the country. “Jordan First” (in Arabic, al-Urdun Awalan) 
applied not only to foreign policy but also to domestic politics (Ryan, 2004).  Soon 
after the terrorist attacks in the country’s capital in 2005, the people of Jordan banded 
together en masse to support the king.  Patriotism reached a climax and soon, citizens 
internalized “al-Urdun Awalan.”  
While the terrorist attacks in Jordan were carried out by Iraqis who snuck into 
Jordan to commit terrorism, not refugees per se, the general undertone among 
Jordanians decried the abundant number of refugees in Jordan.  Simply put, 
Jordanians view turmoil in their country as a direct result of Iraqis in their midst.  It is 
not a Jordanian problem (in other words, it was not the fact that Jordan has garnered 
unwanted attention for becoming too moderate, too westernized), but it was a 
problem of outsiders.  However, the reality was the terrorists were actually Iraqis who 
infiltrated Jordan with the purpose and intent of carrying out terrorism. 
Given the ever-changing sociopolitical climate, research conducted on either 
Jordanian or Palestinian experiences is dated and needs to be revisited (Al-Simadi & 
Atoum, 2000; Hart, 2002; Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002; Khawaja, 2003).  While there is 
ample research on Jordan, only a handful of studies deal implicitly with Jordanian-
Palestinian coexistence (Hart, 2002; Frisch, 2004, Reiter, 2004).  Moreover, much of 
the research on Palestinian refugees solely addresses their experiences and not 
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interactions and perceptions of their host country and vice-versa (Al-Simadi & 
Atoum, 2000; Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002; Khawaja, 2003; Nasser; 2004).  
 Little research has been conducted on the Palestinian refugee culture in 
Jordan, and even less has been done to investigate refugee education (Khawaja & 
Tiltnes, 2002; Khawaja, 2003; Nasser, 2004).  Much of the research and 
implementation is carried out from the top down; organizations such as the United 
Nations have implemented human rights objectives, but none take into account the 
voices of the refugees at the grassroots level (UNRWA, 2005).   
 At a national level, 58 percent of the people of Jordan have completed basic 
education or less, while 76 percent of refugee camp residents have not received 
education past basic schooling (Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002, p. 71).  Therefore, the few 
that make it to a higher education institution are a rarity.  However, according to 
Khawaja and Tiltnes (2002) the numbers are improving drastically. Among people 
ages 55-59, one in ten had completed basic school, among people age 25-29 and 30-
34, six times as many had accomplished the same level (p.72).  Moreover, one in four 
young adults have completed a post-secondary degree, due in large part to huge 
efforts made by UNRWA and Jordanian authorities (Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002, p. 72). 
While this research is valuable and integral, it predates the terrorist attacks in both 
Jordan and the United States.  Therefore the current situation requires building new 
data to further understand what, if any, implications the terrorist attacks in Jordan 
might have on the sociopolitical climate and how those implications are manifested in 
academia. 
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 Central themes that guided my study emanated from the previous research that 
I conducted. The first is Jordan’s spread of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, as well as 
the Jordanian national identity (Hart, 2002; Nasser, 2004). The second is Palestinian 
sub-communities in the refugee camps (Hart, 2002). The third is Palestinian youth 
becoming agents of change for generations before them that have failed to take back 
their homeland (Hart, 2002).   
The voices of Jordanian and Palestinian notions of coexistence are nowhere to 
be found in academic literature regarding the coexistence of these two groups.  What 
is the relationship between coexistence and education? What is the relationship 
between coexistence and the political climate? How do participants feel about 
coexistence? These questions were asked of Jordanian alumni and Palestinian refugee 
graduates from different public universities Jordan. 
Those that will benefit from this study are Jordanian and Palestinian educators 
at Jordanian universities, Jordanian and Palestinian peace activists, and organizations 
like the United Nations that could better understand where to allocate aid and 
funding.  Students and educators in all of the higher education institutions in Jordan 
can benefit, and researchers interested in comparative analyses of coexistence, 
transnational, and Diaspora studies will find this research of great value.  Moreover, 
participants in this study will gain a more critical understanding of their own 
perceptions of coexistence. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to critically examine coexistence of 
Palestinians and Jordanians from the perspectives of Palestinian refugee university 
graduates and Jordanian alumna.  Given the current global political climate, it is 
important to understand certain dynamics in the Middle East, one of which is 
coexistence.   
The intent of this study was to understand how university graduates process 
and interpret the role education and the political climate play in shaping the continued 
Palestinian presence in Jordan.  This qualitative study utilized critical ethnography to 
discover what it means for Palestinian refugees and Jordanians to coexist.  At this 
stage in the research, an understanding of refugee culture is important as well as 
university graduate students’ critical understanding of what it is like to share the same 
land.    
Research Questions 
 
 The questions below have never directly been explored previously.  The aim 
was to gain a heightened awareness of Jordanian-Palestinian coexistence.  These 
questions sought to understand and discover not only the Palestinian voice, but also to 
gain insight into how these two people come together to share the same land in times 
of war and conflict.     
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1. What are the experiences and perspectives of Jordanians regarding Jordanian 
and Palestinian coexistence? 
a. How does the sociopolitical climate contribute to Jordanian 
perspectives of coexistence? 
b. How do education and the “hidden curriculum” address coexistence? 
2. What are the experiences and perspectives of Palestinian refugees regarding 
Jordanian and Palestinian coexistence? 
a. How does the sociopolitical climate contribute to Palestinian 
perspectives of coexistence? 
b. How do education and the “hidden curriculum” address coexistence? 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 This qualitative study took take place within several theoretical frameworks: 
Freire’s (2003) approach to liberation through critical consciousness; anti-apartheid 
rights discourse; Omi and Winant’s (1994) war of position and war of maneuver as 
well as trajectory of racial politics and finally; Glenn’s (2002) notion of unstable 
equilibrium.  As Creswell (2003) states, the theoretical perspectives in ethnographic 
research “provide a ready-made series of hypothesis to be tested from the literature” 
(p. 131).  In other words, culturally based theories presented in the theoretical 
perspectives were tested out during my research in Jordan, while simultaneously 
positioning myself in this study.   
  Critical consciousness is the awakening of the soul that realizes its present 
state, and begins the journey to transform and transcend its current reality (Freire, 
2003).  The examination of refugee education through discourse and dialogue is 
9 
essential. Peoples’ understanding of the world and the ideals they are taught might be 
indicators of a future of hope or hopelessness, war or peace, suicide bombers or future 
leaders on the frontlines of justice for humanity.  Therefore, education and 
understanding the surroundings and perceptions of their realities may have direct 
implications for how individuals view their existence. 
Anti-apartheid Rights Discourse 
 Zreik (2002) explores the anti-apartheid rights discourse using the South 
Africa-Israel analogy in order to see whether or not Israel fits the apartheid model.  
Rights discourse: 
[B]elieves in its own power to effect social and political change….The 
basic idea is that the universality of rights creates a common ground 
allowing everyone—oppressors and oppressed—to find their place and 
participate in discourse.  Accordingly, while the struggle of the 
oppressed exerts pressure on the oppressor, at the same time it offers 
the possibility of a universal way out of the conflict: the quest for 
liberation by the oppressed creates the conflict and the solution to the 
conflict at the same time.  (p. 69) 
 
The purpose of the anti-apartheid rights discourse is to suggest an archetype for 
Palestinians in their quest for justice.  Zreik (2002) applies the anti-apartheid model to 
three Palestinians factions; refugees, Palestinians of the Occupied Territories, and 
Palestinian citizens of Israel.  While most social scientists would argue for 
Palestinians in Israel, the apartheid model is a hyperbole; the West Bank parallel is 
apropos.   
 Apartheid at its core is analogous to oppression and exclusion.  Zreik (2002) 
argues that anti-apartheid rights discourse has been instrumental in creating global 
solidarity and the defeat of the apartheid system.  However, it is simultaneously 
important to use caution when applying rights discourse in the Palestinian case, given 
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that the rights discourse does not take into account historical context.  The main 
difficulty in using the South African-Israeli model as a comparison is the 
fragmentation of many Palestinians.  Those who are refugees, those living in Israel, 
and those living in the Occupied Territories all have different realities and those 
realities shape the truths of these groups differently.   
Zreik (2002) contends the rights discourse does not correspond with the 
realities of refugees because by definition apartheid, “presupposes a presence within 
the country while being excluded from (being outside) the rights regime” (p. 71).  In 
South Africa while total dispersal took place, this dispersal was internal displacement 
as opposed to expulsion and exile.  Perhaps, however, the anti-apartheid rights 
discourse model applies to Palestinians living in Jordan because apartheid by 
definition means to officially segregate people politically, economically and legally.       
 As it appears, the rights discourse is too simplistic, and a comparison of the 
South African-Israeli case is an overgeneralization.  The historical context of the 
Palestinians is not only a link to, but a result of the entire ‘Question of Palestine’ in 
terms of repatriation and self-determination.  In other words, the history of the 
Palestinian struggle could never be excluded.  However, is the rights discourse 
applicable to Palestinians in the Jordanian context?  This is what I intended to find 
out.   
 Rights discourse, as highlighted by Zreik (2002) and Evans (2005), favors the 
legal aspect of discourse as opposed to cultural, economic, sociopolitical or geo-
political rights.  Implicit in the rights discourse is the assumption that international 
law—if executed correctly with universal, inclusive collaboration and creation of 
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global human rights institutions—ensures the dignity and welfare of people.  
However inherent flaws are present in the discourse that have already been addressed; 
among them the emphasis of legal rights, and the de-emphasis of the historical 
context. Moreover, while membership in the global community and discourse 
revolving around international rights is commendable, much of it is just that—
discourse.  According to Evans (2005) “When a state fails to respect human rights, 
international society has a responsibility to take whatever action is necessary to 
protect the rights of those threatened by tyrannical and illegitimate governments” 
(p.1047).  While the United States pays little attention to the Question of Palestine, 
the international community gives credence to the Palestinian question; however 
members of the international community could exert more pressure on Israel for 
oppression of Palestinians.     
Racial Formation: War of Maneuver and War of Position 
Racial formation is set up to keep people at odds, to keep one above the other, 
and to ensure the success of one over the exclusion of the other.  Labor and economic 
equality are modes of inclusion and exclusion, and citizenship and political 
engagements are others.   This critique will examine the harsh realities of racial 
formation; Omi and Winant (1994) provide a historical framework, and Glenn (2002) 
takes a look at the integration of race and gender politics into society.  The two major 
themes that arise are notions of war of maneuver and war of position and the 
trajectory of racial politics, more specifically the concept of unstable equilibrium.   
Race is central to social relations, and Omi and Winant (1994) contend that 
“[Race] is an unstable complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by 
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political struggle” (p. 55).  Race plays an integral role in defining and as such, 
categorizing inhabitants of the social world.  Glenn (2002) also argues that race plays 
a major role in the formation of society, while contributing the additional element of 
gender.  She integrates race and gender, and how they exist within society to oppress.  
Citizenship was one such mode of operation.  While both Omi and Winant (1994) and 
Glenn (2002) discuss these notions using race in the United States, it was my intent to 
see whether or not the same theories apply to biculturalism in Jordan. 
Omi and Winant (1994) discuss two wars; the war of maneuver and the war of 
position.  The war of maneuver describes subordinate groups and how they seek to 
maintain their territories.  It is a way in which these groups maneuver themselves 
around dominant society to maintain themselves and their identities.  Oftentimes this 
is done by creating a community within a community.  The authors define this war as 
“a situation in which subordinate groups seek to preserve and extend a definite 
territory, to ward off violent assault, and to develop an internal society as an 
alternative to the repressive social system they confront” (p. 81).   
War of position is another act of resistance (after all, both the war of 
maneuver and the war of position are acts of resisting the dominant culture), but it 
differs from the war of maneuver in that it necessitates political power and national 
recognition.  With that, a mini revolution stirs.  These actions cost lives, jobs, and 
rights, but nonetheless, political prowess is being learned. 
Omi and Winant (1994) argue that race is not an illusion; rather it is living, 
breathing and permeating this society.  Historically people have engaged in racially 
based social movements.  None of this can be done without political voice and in 
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time, more recognition.  In other words, this war of position enables people to take 
back what was theirs—their right, their identity, and the blood sweat and tears of 
generations before them.   
Arguably an oppressed community’s greatest fear can be assimilation, and 
groups resist through both war of maneuver and war of position; consequently they 
devote a substantial amount of energy to preserving their identities in the host society. 
Festivals, private schools, community centers, religion, and family are some of the 
vehicles used by communities to maintain their cultural identity. 
Trajectory of Racial Politics and the Unstable Equilibrium 
Before delving into the trajectory of racial politics, we must first take a look at 
how Omi and Winant (1994) define trajectory; it is, “the pattern of conflict and 
accommodation which takes shape over time between racially based social 
movements and the policies and programs of the state” (p. 78). Central to the 
trajectory are state and social movements.  The equilibrium of the racial order, they 
contend, is unstable as a result of a plethora of sometimes contradictory interests, 
seeped in racial, and according to Glenn (2002), gendered ideologies.  These 
ideologies, more often than not, reiterate the dominant racial method and go 
uninterrupted for many years.  Challenges of these ideologies result in a crisis at 
which point different techniques and plans are tested.  Ultimately, a new unstable 
equilibrium is created.  In a sense, the inclusion of a war of maneuver and/or a war of 
position is a large part of the trajectory of racial politics, and the continuous creation 
and recreation of an unstable equilibrium.  
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The concept of unstable equilibrium in the trajectory of racial formation can 
be seen in Glenn’s (2002) description of citizenship.  Through time the definition and 
notion of citizenship morphs and takes on new meanings, thus creating a new 
unstable equilibrium altogether.  Citizenship for centuries has been used to keep 
certain groups at bay, and it is no accident that certain rules and provisions are placed 
to rationalize and justify enslavement in the physical and psychological sense.   The 
rationalization of why certain groups can not be afforded citizenship takes on many 
forms.  In the Palestinian case in Jordan, for instance—people were granted 
citizenship and in some cases, as a result of assimilation, conceptually gave up their 
Palestinian nationality.  Lynch (1999, in O’Leary, Lustick, & Callaghy, 2000) 
furthers this argument: “[T]he Jordanian state actively sought to assimilate 
Palestinians into Jordanian citizenship and resisted any assertion of Palestinian 
nationalism” (p. 321).   
In the past five years, we can take a look at new immigration laws in the 
United States, and provisions for citizenship, and indeed there is an exclusionary 
trend after September 11, 2001.  Many Arabs can not enter this country, gain 
citizenship and are under severe scrutiny from the social and political order.  This is a 
new unstable equilibrium- one we must live with until another is born.  What we are 
seeing, therefore, is that those who are citizens (previously white males in Glenn’s 
[2002] case) are speaking and voting on behalf of the “dependent,” “incapable,” and 
“needy” subordinates. 
Citizenship is slowly taking on a new meaning, and does not have to do with 
only issues of legality.  It is also a way of manipulating the psyches of oppressed 
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groups of people, by telling them, whether subliminally or overtly, that they are not a 
part of, or included in any substantial decision making process.  Glenn (2002) attests 
“citizenship is not just a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging, 
including recognition by other members of the community” (p. 52).    
The unstable equilibrium has shifted, and now there is a new norm.  It is 
through social and political movements that the trajectory of racial politics can make 
strides.  As mentioned earlier, Palestinians are more or less excluded from the 
political realm in Jordan and hold no political might (Reiter, 2004).  However, it is 
possible that vis-à-vis inter-communal organizations, cross-societal and cross-cultural 
activism, as well as inter-societal coordination, Palestinians might negotiate these 
realities.   Moreover, Palestinians have been granted full citizenship in Jordan—the 
only country to do this for its Arab counterpart.  While citizenship in this context is 
not meant to exclude bur rather to ensure assimilation, political exclusion might 
indeed lead to segregation, thus creating a new unstable equilibrium and trajectory of 
politics. 
Omi & Winant (1994) and Glenn (2002) offer theoretical and historical 
frameworks that allow me to understand the birth of this nation as well as Jordan, the 
values they hold dear, and the way ends justify social, economic, and political means.  
History and theory offer a solid foundational basis, and when we begin to understand 
our country’s mistakes, it is only then that we as educators can begin to set out and 
teach truth.  It was my intent to study how war of maneuver, war of position, 
trajectory of racial politics and the unstable equilibrium applied in Jordan in the case 
of Palestinians as members in a host country and Jordanians as the dominant society. 
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Limitations of the Study 
While I recognize that I could have looked at only one academic institution in 
Jordan so as to offer an acute analysis of a specific institution, it was not the intent of 
this study; the intent was to provide a comparative analysis of varying institutions 
from the perspectives of both Jordanian and Palestinian refugees from institutions 
Jordan-wide. Moreover this study took into account the perceptions of six 
participants.  This is by no means an attempt to make generalizations, but rather to 
explore the perceptions of the participants that were selected, and agreed to 
participate.  The intent at the onset of this study was to petition males and females as 
well as Christian and Muslim participants to include diverse experiences.  Jordanian 
and Palestinian refugee community members who were not university graduates were 
also asked to participate.  It was my opinion this kind of study is not quantifiable; 
therefore this study does not have a quantitative component. 
This study is conducted in Jordan, and conclusions cannot be generalized to 
include all Arabs or Arab countries; pan-Arab inferences would oversimplify the 
Palestinian refugee problem.  Also, Palestinians are not the only refugees in Jordan; 
there is an influx in the presence of Iraqi refugees as a result of the US led war, and a 
presence of Lebanese refugees, as a result of the Hezbollah-Israeli war; the notions of 
non-Palestinian refugees and their perceptions of coexistence were not explored in 
this study.  Palestinian refugees attend higher education institutions throughout the 
Middle East and their experiences are all diverse.  Jordanian notions of coexistence 
might not translate (nor are they intended to) all Jordanian students or Arabs 
throughout the Middle East.  Community members are representing their own truths 
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and realities, not the realities of all Jordanians, Palestinian refugees, or Arabs en 
masse. 
Several limiting factors precluded this research from reaching its full 
potential;  Namely, the role of mukhabarat (secret police), Palestinian refugee 
mistrust as a result of pervasive fear, and the responsibility (and guilt) of 
documenting and properly conveying the perspectives and voices of participants.  
Consequently challenges emanated on all fronts of this research agenda.  Further 
methodological and ethical challenges were posed while conducting the study in 
Jordan, which will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
Significance of the Study 
 
This proposed study relates to a practical problem: there is an immediate need 
to understand Jordanian and Palestinian refugee coexistence on both the geographic 
and global level.  First, on the local scale, this phenomenon is relevant to neighboring 
Arab states as it affects internal politics and external diplomacy.  Second, this study 
plays a fundamental role the United States’ and European Union’s handling (or 
mishandling) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  It is central to the Palestinian 
question, which is continuously dealt with by the United States, the European Union 
and other global entities. This study’s agenda advances anti-hegemonic processes.  In 
essence, this study and its far reaching implications cross transnational boundaries.  
The Middle East has received a lot of coverage mainly because of the Israeli and 
Palestinian situation. This study aims to contribute to the greater understanding of 
Jordanian-Palestinian refugee coexistence from the perspectives of Jordanians and 
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Palestinian refugees themselves.  Making these perceptions explicit is important in 
peaceful and sustained coexistence.   
Scholarly work in this arena is, at best, limited.  Stereotypes and false 
assumptions abound in public discourse regarding Palestinian refugees, and refugees 
in general for that matter.  The findings of this study may shed light on a corner of the 
world which is neglected, under-funded, and marginalized.  By engaging in 
meaningful discourse with the inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps, Palestinian 
refugee and Jordanian university graduates, we could gain a greater, more critical 
understanding of the social, educational, political, and overall human underpinnings 
of coexistence, specifically in the Jordanian context. This study may provide a 
platform for both refugees inhabiting the camps and Jordanians and Palestinians who 
inhabit the power structures.  This study may also have great implications for 
peaceful coexistence in other places, all over the world. 
The subject of coexistence has global significance bearing in mind the degree 
to which immigration, migration, and forced displacement have accelerated.  The 
consequential uneasiness and growing xenophobia in most places about being forced 
to tolerate and coexist with the “other” further highlights the importance of 
addressing a more sustainable relationship between dominant and “other.”  Emergent 
trends in forced displacement and migration necessitate immediate attention in order 
to facilitate and foster meaningful and authentic communities.  Scholarly discourse 
regarding dominant and marginalized communities is integral to breaking down 
current cycles which enable and perpetuate inequalities. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Cone and Foster’s (1993) “funnel approach” is critical in any literature review 
and crucial to this one in particular because an extensive history in the Middle East 
provides a very essential historical framework.  The funnel approach in a literature 
review begins with the natural progression going from “the general to the specific” (p. 
109).  Therefore the formation of the Israeli state, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and 
the Palestinian Diaspora to Jordan must be covered, as well as the role that the United 
States plays.  Next, it is important to examine the role of the United Nations in 
Jordanian refugee camps.  What is their main objective? How is education overseen?  
These questions will be addressed in the review of literature.   
Simultaneously I was learning of programs in Palestine/Israel that were 
forming in schools to teach students the language of the “other” in order to aid in 
peace and liberation education.  The most notable one is Neve Shalom/Wahat al-
Salam, the School for Peace (Feuerverger, 1997).  When I read about this school, a 
light bulb went off in my head (and spirit).  Surely, if students were learning 
languages of the “other” in times of warfare and systematic hatred, Palestinian human 
rights and refugee education were not impossible. Discussion revolving around 
Jordanian and Palestinian refugee coexistence could and should be addressed. 
To date, only a handful of studies specifically investigate the refugee camps in 
Jordan, especially education in the camps (Al-Simadi & Atoum, 2000; Hart, 2002; 
Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002; Khawaja, 2003).  Therefore it was important to look at 
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different models of education.  In this review of literature, models of peace education 
will be critically examined.  
This process of research has been very cathartic; I am witnessing the 
resuscitation of my own critical consciousness and conscientization (Freire, 2003).  
As a Jordanian-Armenian (and American) I am ashamed of the world as I know it, 
and I am humiliated by my generation for sitting passively as their world turns to 
ruins.  At the same time, however, with little global education or civic participation, I 
understand it.  I am beginning to love again—love this subject matter.  I had to put it 
away for a while, before realizing that I could make a significant contribution to 
research in Jordan.   
I used to feel hopeless because I felt that Anti-Arabism and hatred from the 
West would never cease.  I realize now that my research can provide a framework for 
peace and that because this study by nature has activist and critically ethnographic 
methods in nature, that I too have the power to change things. Now, after much 
reflection, I feel reborn, and ready to tackle this topic with peace education and more 
importantly, with hope.  So, here I go—delving into the abyss.   
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Formation of the Israeli State and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Fall of the Ottoman Empire circa early 1900s-Balfour Declaration, 1917 
 When the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is inputted in “Google” 14,300,000 
search results are available.  While sifting through the sites looking for something 
authentic, something worthwhile, the sense is overwhelming confusion because to 
really understand the current state of how the Palestinian/Israeli peoples came to live 
in war, day in and out, we must take a look at its history, and not through the 
dominant lens.  I will do my best to give a scholarly account of the conflict, while still 
very aware that things in Palestine/Israel are changing every single day. 
Dating back to 1516, the Ottoman Empire had taken hold of most of the 
Middle East.  Not until the 1880s did Arabs begin to see the establishment of Arab 
nationalism (Said, 1980).  Simultaneously, in the 1880s, the Zionist movement began 
which maintained that Jews had a right to their own state.  It is important to take a 
quantitative look at what the Palestinian population looked like at the time.  Said 
(1980) provides this information: 
Despite the steady arrival in Palestine of Jewish colonists after 1882, it 
is important to realize that not until the few weeks immediately 
preceding the establishment of Israel in the spring of 1948 was there 
ever anything other than a huge Arab majority.  For example, the 
Jewish population in 1931 was 174,606 against a total of 1,033,314; in 
1936, Jewish numbers had gone up to 384,078 and the total to 
1,366,692; in 1946 there were 608,225 Jews in a total population of 
1,912,112.  In all these statistics, “natives” were easily distinguishable 
from the arriving colonists.  But who were these natives? (p.11).    
 
These numbers are crucial as they put the ratio of Arabs to Jews in perspective.  The 
overwhelming majority were Arabs.  And the occupiers of the land were also 
representative of the numbers as well.  Also, as the numbers indicate above, circa 
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1880 to the post World War II era, there existed a huge leap in the number of Jews in 
Palestine.  Meanwhile, Jews possessed a desire to form a Jewish national identity, as 
well as the appeal of Palestine because of “a 2,000 year old dream of returning to the 
biblical land of their ancestors” (Caplan & Eisenberg, 1998, p. 5).  The presence of 
Zionism (Jewish nationalism) in the Muslim Arab world created conflicts at its birth, 
and continues to do so as I write.   
What takes place between 1880 and post World War II era?  In 1880 we begin 
to see the formation of small Jewish communities, and in November of 1917 a 
landmark event takes place, the Balfour Declaration, by the British government in a 
letter to Lord Rothchild (a major supporter of the Zionist movement towards 
Palestine).  Although the British did not even control Palestine, and it was not 
Britain’s to give away, the declaration promises Palestine as a national homeland for 
Jews (Said, 1980).  What is important to note here (aside from British colonialism), 
and Said (1980) does so very eloquently is the absence of Palestinian permission and 
the presence of European states dictating the future of non-European land.   
The Balfour Declaration is monumental in the crumbling of the native 
Palestinian spirit, because it takes the form of a promise- a promise that outlines a 
new land for a foreign group, thus making it a national home for the Jewish people 
(Said, 1980, 16). Here a tug of war takes form by pinning native groups of 
Palestinians against non-native European/Western culture.   Before 1918, Palestine 
was a province of the Ottoman Empire, and after 1918, it “officially entered Britain’s 
sphere of influence” (Said, 1980, p. 19). 
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      What transpired next was the formation of two very distinct identities—the 
Palestinian identity and the Israeli identity. The Palestinian identity became clearly 
one opposed to both British and Jewish colonization.  Meanwhile, the Jewish identity 
became one of re-establishment of Palestine into a national home for the Jewish 
people (Said, 1980, pp. 12-13).    
The notion of re-establishing Palestine necessitated the reconstruction and 
rebuilding of Palestine, which resulted in “780,000 Arab Palestinians [that] were 
dispossessed and displaced in 1948 in order to facilitate the “reconstruction and 
rebuilding” of Palestine” (Said, 1980, p. 14).  Palestinian refugees were born—now in 
the millions.  
The Role of the Holocaust 
The United Nations (2005) dedicates a website to “The Question of 
Palestine.”  In its historical overview it states: 
During the years of the Palestine Mandate, from 1922 to 1947, large-
scale Jewish immigration from abroad, mainly from Eastern Europe 
took place, the numbers swelling in the 1930s with the notorious Nazi 
persecution of Jewish populations. Palestinian demands for 
independence and resistance to Jewish immigration led to a rebellion 
in 1937, followed by continuing terrorism and violence from both 
sides [emphasis added] during and immediately after World War II. 
Great Britain tried to implement various formulas to bring 
independence to a land ravaged by violence. In 1947, Great Britain in 
frustration turned the problem over to the United Nations. (United 
Nations, 2005, url:http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html)  
 
In short, the Nazi Persecution led to two diverging notions; (a) the notion that Jews 
needed a national home after the Holocaust, and that they could immigrate to 
Palestine, (because of biblical references) and (b) the world would sit back and form 
collective synthetic guilt (if it were genuine guilt they could have helped the Jews 
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during the Holocaust) and allow this new settlement to take place.  The institutional 
powers did not seek permission or input from the Palestinian people because no one 
looked to Palestinians as people who mattered. The main objective was to cleanse 
Europe of its horrific implicit and explicit recent actions.   
The removal of indigenous inhabitants of Palestine was a necessary evil in 
order for Jews to begin to form their own national identity.  In essence, the birth of 
the Jewish national identity implied the death of the Palestinian one.  Many assumed 
the “Palestinian problem” would just go away.  Many were exiled, persecuted, but 
many fought (and still fight) for the cause, and this is why not only has the “Question 
of” Palestinian not gone away, but it grows in strength and numbers.  Zionists 
underestimated the Palestinians because of Palestinian willingness to sell Jews land.  
This lead Zionists to take lightly the pain that drove Palestinian determination.   
 The Holocaust necessitated urgency for the Zionists, and this urgency 
necessitated a permanent residence in Palestine (Caplan & Eisenberg, 1998, p. 7).  It 
is noteworthy to state that although many felt that they could not touch the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict after the Nazi persecution, it was made easier to ignore it because 
of the perception of Palestinians as villagers, terrorists, and barbarians.  In other 
words, they became not just the “other,” but a less important population as a while.  
This made it even more feasible to turn the other cheek. 
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Perceptions of the Palestinians at the Time of the Jewish Settlements 
Forced exiles, persecution, and hundreds of thousands of refugees overnight 
are much easier to ignore if the perception of the people involved is that they are less 
than human.  This has been occurring for numerous decades with Arabs of the Middle 
East, and even Arabs in the United States.  A resurgence of this mentality reached 
epic proportions after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  Said (1980) 
contends that “No matter how backward, uncivilized, and silent they were, the 
Palestinian Arabs were on the land” (p. 9).  Therefore, no matter what the portrayal of 
the Arabs in Palestine, it does not negate the fact that they inhabited the land.  
However, the assumption remained that if there were degradation, people would be 
less likely step in and step up for the Palestinian cause.  This denial of humanity, a 
very systematic mode of oppression on behalf of the new Israeli state, with the help of 
Europe and the West, is echoed in Freire’s (1994) notion of the price one pays for not 
fitting into the dominant ideology. 
…-[T]heir need to deny the humiliating truth, a truth that humiliates 
them precisely because they introject the dominant ideology that 
sketches them as incompetent and guilty, the authors of their own 
failures. And yet the actual ‘why’ of those failures is to be found in the 
perversity of the system. (Freire, 1994, p.56) 
 
Here the once oppressed Jews become the oppressors. This portrayal once 
again allowed Jews to settle in a land that was not theirs under the premise that the 
Palestinians were too savage to maintain their own land anyway, and “It is precisely 
this kind of thinking, almost to the letter that informed the Zionist slogan formulated 
by Israel Zangwill for Palestine toward the end of the century: a land without 
people, for a people without land [emphasis added]” (Zangwill in Said, 1980, p. 9).  
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Arab nations took in Palestinian refugees, rare among host countries, but because the 
atrocities were so damaging and dehumanizing, the refugees were able to find safe 
harbor in Jordan and other neighboring countries.  
How was it possible to remain silent when inalienable human rights were 
being taken away, murdering the souls of the indigenous peoples of Palestine? Simply 
by persuading people that a new civilized nation would serve the world better than 
villagers ever could.  Said (1980) asserts that “No liberal would be found silent 
championing the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union, or Chile, or Africa.  Yet 
when it comes to similar matters in Israel, there is almost total silence” (Said, 1980, p. 
42).  It is no wonder then, that out of this “culture of silence” (as Freire [1994] 
identifies it) martyrdom and suicides are born and bred.  When people are faced with 
such calamity and hopelessness, what ensues? 
Jordan 
Transjordan and the Hashemite Kingdom 
 Jordan represents a neocolonial monarchy; its borders were drawn by the 
British.  The Emirate of Transjordan was a political division of the British Mandate of 
Palestine that came into effect in 1921 (“The Hashemites,” 2006).  It is 
geographically equivalent to the present day Kingdom of Jordan.  The borders and 
territory of Transjordan were not drawn until the Mandate came into effect.  The 
Hashemite, Abdullah I, was appointed to the throne of Transjordan (“The 
Hashemites,” 2006).  The Hashemites are said to be direct kins of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  It is worth mentioning the arbitrariness of the creation of Jordan; an 
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artificial creation with the intent of appeasing the British Empire and yet viewed as 
distinct and possessing power.   
Sharif Husayn, member of the Hashim clan and descendant of the Prophet 
Mohammad, sent his son Abdullah, to the British for aid against the Turks in 1914, 
upon finding out Ottoman intentions of “extending the Hijaz railway to Mecca” 
(Smith, 2004, p. 59).  And so, the relationship between the British and the Hashemites 
(future leaders of Jordan) strengthened.  The history of the Middle East with its 
beautiful sights and smells, holy places and intelligentsia, is simultaneously 
connected to European interests, arrogance, and willful ambivalence.  Smith (2004) 
contends in his discussion of Zionism and British presence in Palestine that, “Here 
Zionism melded with British assumptions of their right to deal with the territories as 
they saw fit.  Zionism was also “right” because it was part of a European 
experience—the persecution of the Jews—that had to be redressed” (p. 85). This 
theme of false entitlement seems threaded in the tragic history of the Arab world.   
King Abdullah I ruled Transjordan for thirty years, turning the nomadic 
society into a well-run, functioning state.  Gradually, the British eased up on their 
control and in 1946, Transjordan gained its full independence and became a Kingdom 
(“The Hashemites,”2006).  The parliament of Transjordan proclaimed the Hashemite 
Abdullah the King and formally changed the name from Transjordan to Hashemite 
Kingdom of Transjordan (and in 1949, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) (“The 
Hashemites,” 2006).  King Abdullah’s role was not an easy one; he served as the 
liaison between a European power and local social structures (Wilson, 1987).  His 
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role as mediator between the British and the Arabs in Transjordan often translated to 
puppetry, leaving Britain to make the moves.   
Controversy surrounds King Abdullah I.  During a secret meeting in 1947 
with Ben Gurion (leader of the Zionist Movement), the king agreed to thwarting a 
Palestinian state.  Although prior to 1937, the king was never really interested in 
Palestine, he began to pay more attention when Britain “suggested that Palestine 
might be partitioned between Arabs and Jews and that Abdullah might rule the Arab 
part” (Wilson, 1987, p. 38).  Britain wanted to find a go-between in Palestine to 
remove the nationalist elite and in this quest, Transjordan (being a British ally) 
seemed the obvious candidate.  This deed raised many questions regarding the 
intentions of Transjordan, and in essence lay the groundwork for suspicion and 
distrust in the years to follow. 
This pattern emerged in Abdullah’s time and is still with us today 
despite the 1967 war.  It is set by the common interest of both 
countries [Britain and Transjordan] in containing Palestinian 
nationalism.  It is the pattern that is threatened by the claim, among 
some in Israel and the United States today, that Jordan is Palestine. 
(Wilson, 1987, p. 41) 
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Right-sizing Jordan 
“By ‘right-sizing’ we refer to the preferences of political agents at the centre of 
existing regimes to have what they regard as appropriate external and internal 
territorial borders” (O’Leary, 2001, p. 2).  
 
When Britain became too overwhelmed with the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in 
1947, the matter was handed over to the United Nations.   
Britain did not wait for the debate in the General Assembly that was 
scheduled for November.  On September 26 it declared that the British 
would withdraw from Palestine, ending the mandate unilaterally and 
handing the matter over to the United Nations. (Smith, 2004, p. 189) 
 
After much deliberation, the General Assembly passed a partition plan (thirty-three to 
thirteen, ten abstentions), giving the Jews an independent state in Palestine (Smith, 
2004).  The global community gave legitimacy to Jewish self-determination.  Smith 
(2004) acknowledges that while this was a landmark event, “Amidst the wild 
celebrations in New York, Tel Aviv, and the Jewish sectors of Jerusalem, both Arabs 
and Jews prepared for war” (p. 190).   
The synchronized Arab attack under the Arab League auspices of Israeli 
forces in 1948 was significant because Arabic countries came together (although 
‘together’ in this sense is used loosely) to defeat Israelis.  The Arab League in its 
entirety could not compete with Israeli manpower and military prowess.  The distrust 
of Transjordan’s King Abdullah I emanated here: 
All rightly suspected Jordan’s Abdullah of seeking to acquire control 
of the area allotted to the Palestinian Arabs under the partition plan in 
order to incorporate it into his kingdom, thereby enlarging his country 
and defeating the mufti in the process (Smith, 2004, p. 196). 
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This was the first of many Arab-Israeli wars to come which resulted in Israel taking 
over land the UN declared Palestinian territory, and the Gaza Strip fell to Egypt and 
the West Bank to Jordan (Caplan & Eisenberg, 1998, p. 7).   
It is difficult for anyone to confront the realities of their own country.  I have 
internalized the public relations slogan, “Jordan First” from King Abdullah II.  
However, I am coming to realize that countries the world over (Arab countries 
included) exploit the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause, merely using it as a 
bargaining chip, and in essence stripping the people of their legitimacy.  Arab leaders 
have and continue to respond (however disingenuously) to popular support for the 
Palestinian cause among their people.  However, in negotiations regarding the good 
of the people, versus the good of the country—it is the people that suffer.    
The violence began to take a very catastrophic turn for the worst.  Fighting 
ensued for years, and in 1967, Israel captured large territories from Egypt and Jordan 
(the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem).  Although Jordan lost the West Bank 
territory to Israel in 1967, Jordan contended that the attempt to take control over it 
was fundamental to its foreign policies.  This began what Smith (2004) calls a 
“marriage of convenience” (p. 229) between Arafat and King Hussein.  In the years to 
follow, Jordan and Palestine would endure a contentious relationship: Jordan’s 
mistrust of Arafat and the PLO, and Palestinian mistrust of Jordan’s handling of the 
Palestinian question.   
In February, [1985] King Husayn and Yasir Arafat reached agreement 
on the terms of a dialogue and their objectives.  They called for a 
Palestinian state on the West Bank that would include East Jerusalem, 
but this “state” would exist in confederation with Jordan, whose ruler 
would have final authority over it…Jordanian officials said that Arafat, 
by accepting inclusion in a confederation with Jordan, was implicitly 
31 
abandoning the 1928 PLO Charter that called for Palestinian statehood 
in what was now Israel.  This means acceptance of Israel’s existence, 
to be acknowledged openly if a settlement were reached. (Smith, 2004, 
p.396) 
 
This accord, though seemingly progressive, was riddled with drawbacks; both would 
have preferred autonomy over the West Bank without the other.  These unresolved 
conflicts simmered beneath the surface and gave way for the intifada.  Everything 
was coming to a head for the people; they grew increasingly tired of being spoken for 
in the international community, refusal to give legitimacy to self-sovereignty, and 
tensions with both Jordanians and Israelis mounted.  The intifada was “a spontaneous 
eruption of hatred and frustration, but it represented years of anger, directed mostly at 
Israel but to a certain extent also at the external Palestinian leadership” (Smith, 2004, 
p. 399).  One some level the intifada was also a response to the remaining old pro-
Jordanian West bank elites.  A majority of those who participated in the intifada were 
youth, who grew angry at the older generations’ submission to Israel. 
At the same time, a new generation of Arabs was emerging in the 
territories.  Born under Israeli rule, they questioned their parents’ 
submission to the daily humiliations they witnessed.  For the younger 
generation, this submission meant capitulation to Israel where their 
elders had always viewed it as fortitude or endurance, sumud. (Smith, 
2004, p. 401) 
 
 Jordan relinquished its control over the West Bank in 1988.  The PLO and the 
intifada, along with growing Palestinian-Jordanian tensions convinced King Hussein 
that his credibility as the spokesperson for the Palestinian question was not likely. 
On July 31, 1988, evidently despairing of success in setting up an 
international conference, perhaps seeing in the Intifada a threat to his 
own kingdom, and realizing that, indeed, the Palestinians, especially 
the younger generation, would never accept him as their spokesperson, 
King Hussein of Jordan renounced his claim to the West Bank, which 
in effect reversed the annexation decision made in 1950.  “The 
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independent Palestinian state will be established on occupied 
Palestinian land after is liberation, God willing,” Hussein stated.  
Although Jordan continued administration of the daily affairs of the 
West Bank, the PLO gradually took some responsibility for funding 
these activities.  The Jordanian monarch distanced himself even further 
from the PLO.  On August 7, 1988, he stated that Jordan would not be 
part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in any peace process 
(Bikerton & Klausner, 1998, p. 231). 
 
Palestinian elites then took over the area and in public deliberations Palestinian elites 
(Arafat and his cronies after their return from Oslo) agreed that this decision best 
served both Jordanian and Palestinian interests.  Throughout the 1990s Jordan made a 
conscious attempt to remove itself from the idea of Palestinian political unity (Lynch, 
1999). 
In the early 1990’s, a new sense of hope and optimism took hold of the world 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In secret negotiations between Israelis and 
Palestinians, hopes were high that a peace settlement would ensue.  The withdrawal 
of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho was the first step (Bickerton & Klausner, 
1998, p.269).  Withdrawal of Israeli troops meant Palestinians would begin to take 
hold of all internal affairs.  “Early empowerment” would apply to the West Bank 
where Israeli military would hand over power to the Palestinians (Bickerton & 
Klausner, 1998, p.269). 
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Refugees and Palestinian Diasporas 
After World War II, refugees became an international concern (Waters & 
LeBlanc, 2005; Boaz & Schoenberg, 2002).  As a result, the national and 
international community along with non-governmental institutions collectively joined 
to protect refugee human rights (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005).  Refugee camps grew out 
of the need to accommodate 11 million who were displaced after the war (Waters & 
LeBlanc, 2005, pp. 132-133).  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) was founded in response to the refugee presence in order to provide an 
international body for the protection of refugees (Waters & LeBlanc, 2005; Boaz & 
Schoenberg, 2002).   
This is an important point because now the plight of refugees became the 
responsibility of an international organization.  Essentially, the UNHCR became a 
pseudo nation-state because while it took on the responsibility of refugees, it did not 
have national ties to the countries that refugees sought protection in, nor in the 
countries they fled from.  This meant that while protection was being provided by the 
international organization, it could also indoctrinate the populations it helps with its 
own objectives. 
It is crucial to define the term “refugees” for the purpose of this literature 
review.  According to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, 
refugee status is given to a person who: 
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable 
to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country...  
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While this body does not include Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the UNHCR 
addresses people forced to leave their homes within a country out of force.  The 
UNHCR maintains that IDPs: 
[F]lee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but remain within 
their own country and are thus subject to the laws of that state. Though 
it does not have a specific mandate for IDPs, UNHCR assists several 
million in various crises, but not all of the estimated 25 million 
displaced persons worldwide. (UNHCR, 2006) 
 
These definitions are essential when discussing the Palestinian refugees and 
setting the stage for investigating refugee education.  An irony in this tragic time in 
history is that in attempting to solve the refugee problem for the Jews after the 
Holocaust, there is the birth of another refugee problem: the Palestinians after Israeli 
occupation.  The sadness lies in the similarity of the Palestinian and Israeli cases: 
displacement, racism, ethnic cleansing and global silence in the midst of blatant 
oppression.     
 During the second half of the 20th century the number and magnitude of 
Diasporas have significantly increased. Consequently, their importance as economic, 
political, and social actors is continuously growing. The Diaspora’s new expanded 
role impacts not only guest states, but homelands as well. This phenomenon has 
prompted host and home governments to establish relationships with their respective 
Diaspora communities. The various types of interactions between Diasporas with 
guest states and homelands can result in the making or unmaking of Diasporas. 
However, the outcome is dependent on the way in which Diasporas adapt to changes 
in state policies concerning foreigners.  
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Diaspora-host state interaction has evolved into several common forms based 
on integration, hostility, persecution, symbiosis, separatism, negotiation, and 
violence. The Palestinian Diaspora’s interaction with the different Arab states, 
following the creation of Israel, was one of friendliness and mutual integration 
(Harik, 1986, p.316). This was partly due to the immense cultural commonality 
between the Palestinians and their host Arab states. In addition, the bond between 
Palestinians and Syrians, Egyptians, Lebanese, Jordanians and other Arabs solidified 
as they focused on the “devil,” Zionists (Harik, 1986, p.321). The Palestinian 
Diaspora in the Middle East enjoyed a favorable relationship with its Arabic hosts, 
which is a rarity in terms of Diaspora-host state interaction. 
The unity between the Palestinian Diaspora and their guest states was 
primarily the result of the people’s will. Many Arabs were infuriated with the 
developments leading up to the creation of Israel and forced their respective 
governments into action. Thus, mutual integration occurred where the issues shaping 
the identity of Palestinians grew into something bigger, Arab nationalism. In addition, 
the Diaspora’s concerns and goals had now become part of the host governments’ 
political objectives as well. However, with the consecutive Jordanian, Egyptian, and 
Syrian defeats to Israel, along with the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s political 
blunders, the Palestinian Diaspora’s standing was adversely effected (Harik, 1986).   
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Black September and Palestinian Resistance Movements 
 While on the whole Palestinian Diasporas have more or less been tranquil, in 
the late 1960s-early 1970s, Jordanians and Palestinians were experiencing another 
reality. Jordanians and Palestinians confronted one another as inter-societal tensions 
brewed. The formation of Palestinian guerrilla movements began developing since 
the years following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 (Hudson, 1972).  Fateh (the 
Palestinian Liberation Movement) had emerged as the most successful and 
“structurally complex guerilla movement” (Hudson, 1972, p. 67).  Fateh slowly began 
to make its presence known in Jordan by establishing itself as a government within 
the country.  However it was unable to assert total authority and power over 
Palestinian revolutionary groups of Marxist-Maoist-Leninist organizations such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  In 1968 the PFLP became a 
faction of the PLO (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], 2006).  
In September 1970, the Palestinians attempted to intimidate King Hussein.  
The PLO and factions of Palestinian guerilla groups throughout Jordan were taking 
part in guerilla attacks against Israel from bases in Jordan—disrespecting both King 
Hussein and the Jordanian people.  The fedayeen (freedom fighters—“those who 
sacrifice themselves”) were hard to control, thus making a mockery of the Jordanian 
army (Bickerton & Klausner, 1998, p. 123). The tension came to a climax when the 
PFLP gangs hijacked three planes (CFR, 2006).  The hijackings were very significant 
because the PFLP landed the planes at an abandoned Jordanian air base, essentially 
letting the King know he could not control his own country.  Ultimately the PFLP as 
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well as many of the Palestinian guerilla groups were unable to exert the power and 
effect they desired. 
As far as the superpowers were concerned, the Palestinians injected an 
element of instability into the local political-military situation and a 
consequent additional risk of great-power confrontation.  Thus, when 
Jordan and the United States moved to eliminate guerilla activities 
from Jordan the Palestinians found that they had no effective outside 
supporters. (Hudson, 1972, p.64) 
 
Although the guerilla groups were not able to sustain their long term political and 
military intentions, they indeed were able to shock the social order.  As Hudson 
(1972) asserts, “from 1968 through 1970, the Palestinians were able to apply 
important political and psychological pressure against Israel” (p. 66). 
It was a widely held belief and grand conspiracy among Jordanian citizens 
that Arafat was attempting to overthrow King Hussein for what appeared to be 
appeasing Israelis at the cost of Palestinians.  Neither Arafat nor Fateh were initially 
involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the King, rather it was the PFLP, a radical 
Palestinian faction which advocated a pan-Arabist vision within a communist 
framework.  The King and his military then retaliated by attempting to expel the 
entire PLO in a move now referred to as “Black September.”  Palestinian and PLO 
anger stemmed from Jordanian-Israeli relations, more specifically Jordan’s inability 
to confront Israel more directly.  However, this bloody attempt to make a public 
statement yielded minimal results.  The effects of Black September were long lasting 
and so began the implementation of “concerted government policy of ‘Jordanization’ 
or ‘de-Palestinization’ which enfeebled the Palestinians’ status in the kingdom’s key 
power centers” (Reiter, 2004, p. 74).   
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Jordan and Palestine, Twins? 
 In terms of Jordanian-Palestinian political, social and military relations, I have 
always been under the impression that Jordanians and Palestinians had the best of 
relations.  Incessant references to Jordan as the vanguard of the Palestinian cause 
instilled in me a twofold impression:  the unshakeable bond between Jordanians and 
Palestinians, and second the idea that without the aid of Jordan, Palestinians would 
live in far more dire conditions had it not been for the Jordanian government.  I 
naively internalized these to be truths.  
 In my attempt to understand the inter-societal relationships between both 
peoples led to the birth of this study, but I was still unsure about the role history 
played in current realities.  It was an assumption on my part that the new King 
Abdullah and his attempts to westernize the country were to blame for inter-societal 
tensions.  While this might be on some level true, it was not the entire picture and I 
was quick to refute my own hypothesis.  I learned that Jordan and Palestine have a 
long legacy, one that cannot be oversimplified as good or bad.  Rather, the only word 
that does the relationship and justice is “complex.”    
 The Jordanian-Israeli settlement also spurred tensions between Palestinians 
and Jordanians, mainly because Palestinians were left out of the U.S.-led peace 
process.  However, the peace talks between Israel and Jordan had another major 
player, none other than the United States.  The United States ultimately controlled the 
dialogue and pressured Jordan to settle, or face the thinly veiled threat of financial 
repercussions.  According to Zunes (1995), the “Clinton administration appears 
effectively to have bought an Israeli-Jordanian settlement.  And, by dragging out the 
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debt forgiveness over three years, it ensures continued Jordanian cooperation with 
American regional designs” (p.61).   However, Zunes contends (1995) Jordan got 
many of its demands met by caving in to Israeli interests.  In other words, while 
Jordan initially had many demands for Israelis in terms of Palestinian welfare, those 
became clouded by financial benefits for Jordanians. 
 While Jordan initially refused to sign the treaty unless Israel withdrew from 
the Occupied Territories, and at the very least from the West Bank and Gaza, 
eventually pressure from the United States resulted in Jordan’s abandonment of their 
demands (Zunes, 1995).  The signing of this peace treaty according to Frisch (2004), 
“was the turn of the Palestinian leadership to express its umbrage towards Jordan” (p. 
55).  While Palestinians felt that their interests were excluded from the signing of the 
peace treaty, Jordan in essence, had no other choice.  The decision to sign the 
agreement under financial pressures, afforded Jordan financial stability, which 
essentially immensely helps Palestinians living in Jordan.  The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) did not share these sentiments and neither did many Palestinians.  
Lynch (1999) accurately assesses the situation: “The very future of Palestinians in 
Jordan remains unresolved, because the Oslo accords and the Jordanian-Israeli peace 
treaty defer discussion of the Palestinian refugees to multilateral talks” (p. 320). 
A theme threaded throughout the research literature is the notion of Jordan 
and Palestine as a family.  Families argue and bicker, sometimes a financial and 
social burden, but they are family nonetheless.  The Jordanian Minister of 
Information, Nasir Jawda even said that there was a “real twinship (tawa’ma) 
between Jordan and Palestine” (Jawda in Frisch, 2004, p. 61). However, Frisch 
40 
(2004) argues that even twins have distinct and individual identities.  Soon Jordanian 
and Palestinian identities were forming, but were these dual identities represented in 
society?  It is worth exploring whether or not Jordanian and Palestinian domestic 
relations within Jordan would be the same if Jordan was a republic.  In other words, 
the reality of Palestinians outnumbering Jordanians in their own country if it were a 
republic would most likely reap greater political representation within and extending 
Jordan.  For example Jordanian policies would arguably be more representative of its 
population’s sentiment.   
 An agreement in 1995 signed by both Palestinians and Jordanians sought to 
reconnect the twins that had grown apart, and so, the re-unification of the Jordanian-
Palestinian General Agreement for Cooperation and Coordination was signed (Frisch, 
2004, p. 61).  Pan-Arabism and the unity among “two fraternal peoples” became the 
mantra and collective thought process of the two countries.  It became the moniker 
for Arab unity (Frisch, 2004). Zunes (1995) articulately states, however, that the 
intention behind signing the treaty may have been Jordanian and Palestinian 
realization that any conflict or dissent between them benefits Israelis most.  Israel’s 
divide and conquer objective had been beneficial because they had been “taking 
advantage of the separate deals in their highly selective implementation of various 
clauses of the agreements” (Zunes, 1995, p. 66).  
 The second theme is the apparent internalized oppression of the Arab people, 
and not just strictly speaking of the Palestinians.  This is an admittedly contradictory 
statement, because I believe that the tragedy that is now the modern Arab world is 
(contrary to popular belief) a testament to the resilience of the Arab peoples.  
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However, that is not to say that westernization and globalization have not affected 
Arab countries and their diplomatic relations.  Jordan, for instance, in signing the 
Israeli-Jordanian treaty sent the message that the plight of the Palestinians was not 
important enough to halt or dramatically impact negotiations.   
Jordan in many cases (for lack of a better term) is between a rock and a hard 
place, which may very well be the reason it appears to hold seemingly hypocritical 
political stances.  While harboring most of the Palestinian refugees in the world, 
offering national citizenship, as a country with no natural resource, is also an ally to 
the United States, and one of two countries in the Middle East to recognize the state 
of Israel.  At its core, Jordan has dueling identities.  
United States-Middle East Foreign Relations 
 It is important to investigate the United States’ presence in the Middle East for 
several reasons; first, the hegemonic and imperialist actions of the United States in 
both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq must be closely examined in 
order to understand possible Arab resentment.  Further, United States’ dealings with 
Israel on numerous occasions collude and facilitate in furthering Palestinian suffering.  
Finally, Jordan’s relationship with the United States and the reality of Palestinian 
suffering at the hands of United States-Israeli policies are possible factors in divisions 
between Palestinians and Jordanians.  It appears the United States is at the center of 
Palestinians’ continued disenfranchisement from their host country and their 
continued exclusion from their homeland, two issues at the core of the Palestinians’ 
interaction with their Jordanian counterparts.  In other words, Palestinians partially 
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react to unfavorable United States policies through their relationship with Jordan due 
to their host country’s seemingly close ties with the United States. 
 United States’ Role in Israel’s Occupation, Colonization, and Oppression of 
Palestine 
 
 I think one of the most important points that I try to stress to peers is that in 
the analysis of Palestinian terrorism, violence, Hamas popularity, and the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism, one must look at the direct correlation with both Israeli and 
US foreign policy (Khalidi, 2004; Smith, 2004; Zunes, 2003).  One might find it very 
surprising just how much aid Israel receives.  While a vast majority of the aid goes 
back to United States arms manufacturers (in the form of debt repayment), it is very 
important to present the numbers, because they speak for themselves: 
 For Fiscal Year 2003, 72% of U.S. foreign aid allotted to the Middle 
East was military as opposed to just 28% for economic development.  
The $3.8 billion in military aid is well over 90% of what the United 
States gives the entire world.  (Zunes, 2003, p. 41) 
 
Zunes (2003) continues: 
 
For a country that consists of one-tenth of one percent of the world’s 
population, total U.S. aid to Israel as a proportion of the foreign aid 
budget is enormous: approximately one out of every four dollars for 
foreign aid goes to Israel.  Israel does not receive this kind of support 
because it is poor—Israel’s GNP is higher than the combined GNP of 
its immediate neighbors Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.  With a per capita income of $18,000, Israeli Jews 
enjoy the sixteeth per capita income in the world, better off than oil 
rich Saudi Arabia and only slightly less well-off than most Western 
European countries [emphasis added]. (pp. 110-111) 
 
On some level, this number is not only appalling, but essentially an abandonment of 
the countries that need more aid and assistance, especially given not only how well 
Israel has managed to do economically, but also militarily.  The US not only in its 
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direct relations with Israel manipulates (and without question supports) the 
occupation of Palestine, it does so in the global community as well.   
Why does Israel receive this money if it is not a poor country?  Claims are 
made that financial assistance is necessary to facilitate the peace process, but history 
has shown that Israel has no intention of ending its human rights abuses, and on many 
occasions it has rejected Palestinian calls for peace.  Further, it is a common 
misconception that the Jewish lobbies in the United States hold so much power, that 
politicians are forced to lean in one direction—oftentimes with the Israeli 
government.  However, while the Jewish lobbies are powerful, the extent of their 
power is limited and oftentimes exaggerated (Zunes, 2003).  The real interest in Israel 
lies in military, economic, political, and strategic interests of the United States.  
Clearly, the United States now has a huge base in the Middle East, and thus a 
“genuine” interest in Israeli affairs (Zunes, 2003). Placing blame however on Jewish 
lobbies is just another way of displacing the issue and blame as there seems to be a 
reinforcing cycle between the United States’ arms industry, aid given to Israel by the 
United States, and Israel’s appetite for newer and more effective weaponry.  In 
essence, the United States’ government finances its military arms industry through 
billions of dollars of aid to Israel, which in turn consumes an endless array of war 
technologies from its financier. 
            The role of the United Nations on the question of Palestine, while far from 
perfect, is at least somewhat of a presence (especially in the refugee camps).  At least, 
some would argue, the United Nations has brought attention to the plight of 
Palestinians, unlike the United States that mainly adds fury and almost with a sick 
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sense of humor, pities the Israeli nation-state for its inability to have peace (without 
even acknowledging the hopelessness in Palestine).   
More critically, between 1972 and 2001, the United States used its 
veto power in the Security council thirty-nine times to block 
resolutions critical of Israeli policies in the occupied territories, more 
than all other countries have used their veto on all other issues during 
this period combined [emphasis added].  (Zunes, 2004, p.115)     
 
 United States policies on some level oppress Israelis as well, by thwarting 
peace movements from taking place.  After all, it is the everyday citizens that must 
suffer once again.  There is no doubt that the United States, by enabling Palestinian 
occupation and oppression, breeds hostility and enables chaos to persist.  Therefore, it 
is guilty of thinly veiled anti-Semitic policies that wreak havoc on the people is seeks 
to protect.  If the United States cared so much about Israelis and about peace, it would 
have happened by now; but the truth is, it has no interest in peace.  So long as there is 
no peace between Israelis and Palestinians, the United States will have to remain a 
dominant figure in the conflict.  As Zunes (2003) names it, the United States 
government cares less about peace and more about Pax Americana.  In other words, 
Pax Americana is where the dominant power debilitates the real interest of the people 
inhabiting the land.  
 West Bank and the Gaza Strip are open-air prisons (Zunes, personal 
communications, June 22, 2006).  The human rights violations run rampant.  The 
building of the wall and the constant bulldozing (now daily activities) have been 
approved by almost all US government officials—both democrat and republican.  The 
United States has exerted its veto power in the United Nations Security Council more 
than the remaining countries in the Security Council combined, to veto any matter 
45 
questioning Israel’s treatment of Palestinians.  It has become exceedingly apparent 
only allies of the United States are protected from human rights violations. 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is recognized by the United 
States and the global community as international and human rights law.  Article 13 of 
the Declaration guarantees the right of refugees to leave their country.  More 
importantly it recognizes peoples’ rights to return to their homeland.  For twenty 
years the United States excluded the PLO from participating in peace talks because of 
the PLO’s refusal to acknowledge UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as 
the foundation for negotiation (Zunes, 2003).  When the resolutions were finally 
accepted and addressed by the PLO as the foundation for peace talks in 1988, “the 
U.S. essentially dropped these resolutions as the basis of peace talks” (Zunes, 2003, p. 
117).  President Clinton reversed its support for universal application (Zunes, 2003).  
Even prior to severing with the international law, rarely was the “right of return” ever 
mentioned, only the “right to leave” was highlighted.  
This is also strategic; if Palestinian refugees dating as far back as 1948 were 
allowed to return, they would outnumber their Israeli counterparts.  Further, emphasis 
on the right to leave gives the impression that Palestinians have relocated and 
therefore there is less need for a recognized nation-state.  It is abundantly clear the 
United States supports human rights violations of its allies (Morocco, Israel, Turkey) 
and condemns the violations of otherwise strategically useless countries.   
 A large majority of countries in that region [Middle East] lack 
democratic institutions and engage in a consistent pattern of gross and 
systematic human rights violations.  In addition, three major recipients 
of U.S. aid—Morocco, Israel and Turkey—have conquered all or parts 
of neighboring countries by force, engaged in ethnic cleansing, and 
continue to subjugate the population of these occupied territories in 
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defiance of the Geneva Convention and the United States. (Zunes, 
2002, p. 10) 
 
And so, the systematic ethnic cleansing of countless Palestinians goes unnoticed.   
A theme that surfaces from the research is a parallel between United States 
history and the history (and birth) of Israel.  Both countries were born with the 
simultaneous occupation of another people.  Khalidi (2004) so accurately depicts the 
parallel: “Americans were even more apt than Europeans to identify with lurid images 
of brave, outnumbered settlers of European stock taming an arid land in the face of 
opposition from ignorant, fanatical nomads…” (p. 119). Khalidi (2004) very 
accurately furthers his argument in testifying that some lives are more valuable than 
others—and that if one is not Israeli or American, the value of life depreciates.  
Further, the value of life is still certainly determined (in colonial terms) by who lives 
in the core versus who lives in the periphery.   
Khalidi (2004), Smith (2004), and Zunes (2003) do what our governments 
have not had the guts to: highlight the atrocities on both sides of the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict, and emphasize the importance of accountability that Israeli and 
Palestinian governments must face.  Moreover, it is the role that the United States has 
to confront if peace were ever to materialize.  
Through a mixture of guilt regarding Western anti-Semitism, personal 
friendships with Jewish Americans who identify strongly with Israel, 
and fear of inadvertently encouraging anti-Semitism by criticizing 
Israel, there is enormous reluctance to acknowledge the seriousness of 
Israeli violations of human rights and international law.  (Zunes, 2003, 
p. 157) 
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The United States and United Nations Security Resolutions 242 and 338 
 The United States has formally and publicly supported UN Security 
resolutions 242 and 338 that call for Israeli withdrawal of the Occupied Territories 
that were seized in the 1967 War, where in return Israel is afforded security 
guarantees from its neighbors, as the basis for peace.  However, dating as far back as 
1969, the United States has encouraged Israel to hold on to the Occupied Territories.  
The United States has also declined on numerous occasions an international 
conference calling for an all-inclusive peace settlement instead of the routine 
exclusion of the Palestinian government in peace talks.   
The United States has a vested interest in maintaining a stronghold over Israeli 
Palestinian conflict geopolitically and strategically.  Finally in the mid-1970s, the 
United States allowed the PLO to engage in peace talks on account that they consent 
to three objectives: renouncing terrorism, acknowledging UN Security resolutions 
242 and 338 as the foundation for peace, and recognizing Israel’s right to exist 
(Zunes, 2003).  While the three stipulations are in and of themselves equitable, what 
was unjust was that the United States’ demand did not include Israel.  In other words, 
Israel did not have to renounce terrorism, acknowledge UN Security resolutions 242 
or 338, nor did it have to recognize Palestine’s right to exist.   
The burden fell solely on Palestine and two presidential administrations 
(Carter and Reagan) came in and out of office, when in 1988 the PLO finally came to 
terms with all three stipulations without a reciprocal recognition from Israel (Zunes, 
2003).  Talks were then taken off the table by the United States because it felt that the 
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PLO was not critical enough of terrorist attacks against Israel by a small Palestinian 
faction.      
After countless attempts, why is it that peace still has not been attained?  In 
large part, the United States is culpable.  The United States does not have peace 
because its political authorities have little interest in achieving peace in the Middle 
East, more specifically in Israel/Palestine (Zunes, 2003).  Contrary to popular notions 
that Jewish lobbies are the reason, United States foreign policy is much more the 
rationale for continued hostilities in the region.  The stronger Israel is, the stronger the 
United States presence in the Middle East.  In short, United States foreign policy is an 
elite enterprise (Zunes, personal communication, June 22, 2006).  One does not have 
to be an Islamic fundamentalist or terrorist to see that what the United States is doing 
is embarking on a neo-colonial venture in the Middle East.  One only has to educate 
themselves to see that neo-apartheid is taking place while the global community turns 
its back.  Neo-apartheid as stated here is defined as a new waive of exclusion based 
on recently established legal, economic, and cultural divisions.  This contemporary 
phenomenon is demonstrated by the emergence of The Wall, Jewish only highways, 
and pro-Israeli education.   
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Oslo Accords 
The Oslo Accords memorialized Israel’s recognition of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative agent for the 
Palestinian people, and in return the PLO denounced terrorism, the destruction of 
Israel and recognized Israel’s right to existence.  Further, the agreement formed the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) which was to negotiate land deals with the 
Israelis and govern territories until the creation of a permanent Palestinian 
government.  The primary goal was that the PNA’s governance of the Palestinian 
territories would increase as Israeli troops pulled out.   
The Oslo Accords provided an incremental roadmap to peace.  Zunes (2003) 
maintains “while failing to recognize the Palestinians’ right to statehood and 
imposing other limitations—did provide a framework where more substantive 
progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace might result” (p. 113).  The Oslo Accords 
turned out to be more favorable for Palestinians than United States led mediations 
that did not even want to recognize or include the PLO in peace talks (Zunes, 2003).   
The PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist (which it had done prior in 
1988) and Israel recognized the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people.  
It did not however, “recognize the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, self-
determination, or sovereignty, or that they had the right to borders, or where those 
borders were” (Khalidi, 2004, p. 138).  Clearly an asymmetrical agreement was 
reached, but it was an agreement nonetheless.  This led many neighboring Arab 
countries to believe that the PLO achieved everything it set out for, but things slowly 
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worsened.   Much of the initial optimism slowly evaporated with the continuation of 
the protracted violence between the two sides, culminating in the second intifada.   
The United States and Iraq 
In extensive research of the literature and my own critical thinking, I have 
come to realize the United States’ underhanded attempts at simultaneously appeasing 
and punishing several Middle Eastern countries throughout the years.  This has been 
done to further the United States’ own special interests and there is no doubt that the 
past and current social and political realities are results of the exploitation, 
manipulation and racism veiled as attempts to liberate and hidden behind the notion 
of moral obligation. 
  Ideologies are very powerful, and we see the resurrection of the “white man’s 
burden” to spread democratic ideologies throughout the Middle East.  In Khalidi’s 
(2004) attempt to highlight georegional interests in the historical context, when 
paralleled with the current situation, an eerie resemblance emanates: “The area was of 
particular interest to those powers located outside the region that had ambitions of 
global hegemony” (p.75).  Global hegemony seeks to undermine challenges to 
dominant theories while attempting to address those who resist conquest, colonialism, 
and occupation as radical fundamentalist Arabs or Muslims who hate our American 
freedoms; this incorrect negation has proven deadly. 
 Khalidi (2004) states that “oil transformed and considerably enhanced the 
already great geostrategic importance of the Middle East” (p. 81).  I completely agree 
with his assertions regarding the major interest being oil.  I think the vehicle used to 
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further those interests was racism, more specifically anti-Arabism and anti-Islamism 
(or Islamophobia).  Khalidi (2004) continues: 
With the American occupation of oil-rich Iraq, however, the specter of 
foreign control over Middle Eastern oil emerged once again.  As the 
new American occupation regime in Iraq took its first steps to 
recognize the battered Iraqi oil industry, fear of foreign control, born 
of decades of bitter experiences of being forced to watch others dictate 
the disposition of their countries’ most valuable resource, spread 
throughout the country and the region. (p. 117) 
 
Therefore the common misconception among Americans regarding Arabs as people 
who hated western ideals and freedoms, proved futile once again.  Rather, it was the 
history of oppression and exploitation of the region’s natural resources.   
There is great validity behind Khalidi’s assertion of the history and present 
day Middle East and the overriding theme of resisting foreign occupation that 
becomes manipulated in a marketing strategy that emits “Arabs hate Americans” 
sentiments.  It is my belief however this is a testament to the Arab resilience and 
pride, not anti-Americanism by any means.  Khalidi (2004) describes a contradiction 
with the United States: the hasty and sloppy rush into the occupation and command of 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the natural desire for people to resist being dictated by 
foreigners, even those who have good intentions. 
No amount of rhetoric about democratization, even if it is occasionally 
sincere, and no amount of harping on the all-too-real evils perpetrated 
by the Taliban and the Ba’th that were mercifully ended by the 
intervention of the United States can outweigh this potent 
contradiction.  As a general rule, people do not want to be ruled by 
others from far away, even if those rulers are well intentioned.   (p. 
165) 
 
What I am coming to realize is the great self-fulfilling prophecy that the United States 
media and government create and re-create.  In a sense, we want to view Arabs as 
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backward savages who are incapable of self-rule, and so we treat them as such and 
when a small majority use forceful, unforgivable tactics of resistance and terrorism, 
we point to them to validate our claims.   
Zunes (2003) states “[T]here is a widespread assumption that Muslim 
terrorists are religious fanatics beyond the reach of reasoning, where no offer of 
negotiation or deterrence will bring them out of their insanity” (p. 171). Contrary to 
this “widespread assumption” Zunes (2003, p. 171) provides a roadmap of the 
differences between gross assumptions about Islam, and the actual principles that 
Islam teaches and that “As with Christianity, Judaism, and most major religious 
faiths, the killing of innocent civilians is considered a sin in Islam. Similarly, there is 
nothing in traditional Islamic teachings that justifies suicide in any situation, much 
less suicide bombings” (p. 171).   
This is not to say there is not growing anti-American sentiment, because 
without a doubt, there is.  Many Arabs feel this is a personal attack against their 
values and morality, and their portrayal as incapable savages only perpetuates this 
distrust.   
The more the United States has militarized this region, the less secure 
the American people have become.  All the sophisticated weaponry, 
brave fighting men and women, and brilliant military leadership the 
United States may possess will do little good if there are hundred of 
millions of people in the Middle East and beyond who hate us.  
(Zunes, 2003, p. 3) 
 
Zunes (2003) very eloquently states “[M]ost Middle Easterners do not see American 
democracy at work, but they do see “Made in America” on tear gas canisters and 
bomb casings against civilians” (p. 7).  This quote sends chills down my spine and 
anger through my veins.   
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 One of the quotes that struck me in reading Tinderbox: US Middle East policy 
and the roots of terrorism (2003) was a quote by President Bush that the war on 
terrorism was “the dignity of life over a culture of death…lawful change and civil 
disagreement over coercion, subversion, and chaos…courage defeating cruelty and 
light overcoming darkness” (President Bush in Zunes, 2003, p. 35).  This only 
legitimates my claim that it is through subliminal messages and careful wording that 
cover racism is filtered to the general public.  Even my own paranoia and hysteria are 
heightened, but not for reasons one might assume: I am afraid that this transfer of 
words is creating hatred on both sides of the globe. 
 Given the outright discrimination and sense of entitlement on the part of the 
United States government, it is no surprise we have in fact enabled and perpetuated 
terrorism to continue.  All we hear about are the radical and fundamental Muslims 
savagely exercising their hatred for the United States.  There is no question this 
sentiment does indeed exist.  So cleverly and tactically crafted was American 
rhetoric, even I as an Arab began to think that jihad only meant holy war.  I began to 
internalize that maybe I misunderstood what it meant.  It was validating and 
reaffirming to know I was not so far off and the notion and definition of jihad was 
being spun.  Esposito (2002) defines: 
Jihad as struggle pertains to the difficulty and complexity of living a 
good life: struggling against evil in oneself in order to be virtuous and 
moral, making a serious effort to do good works and to help to reform 
society.  Depending on the circumstances in which one lives, it can 
also mean fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending 
Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and if 
necessary, armed struggle or holy war.  (pp. 27-28) 
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Jihad refers to a righteous (or holy) struggle.  In other words there are two different 
jihads: one outer jihad, and one within.  The problem is that the United States 
government and rhetoric, as well as al-Qaeda have hijacked the definition of jihad in 
a way that not only focuses inordinately on the external struggle, but on its most 
violent manifestations, thereby blurring the lines, confusing the masses, and 
perpetuating more Islamophobia.   
In my reflections, I am coming to see that until the United States government, 
society, and education system try to understand the “other,” we will continue to 
facilitate an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality.  I leave with more questions than answers: 
How did we get here? Where do we go from here?  Will Palestinians and Israelis ever 
live in peace?  When my children read US history in the years to come, will they see 
a sliver of reality amidst mass deception?  One thing is for sure: as Dr. Abdel Aziz 
Rantisi, a senior Hamas leader said: “Israelis will have no stability and no security 
until the occupation ends.  Suicide bombers are Israel’s future” (Esposito, 2002, p. 
100).  As much as I hate to admit, I am afraid he is correct. 
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Refugee Education 
 
Educating refugees is unlike educating any other population of people.  This 
distinct group is different from immigrant populations because they did not choose to 
flee their countries of origin.  External factors determine for refugees they must leave 
behind life as they knew it.  Refugees do not have the same national identities as 
those in the countries where they reside, nor do they leave their identities at the 
border.  Therefore, they are being educated about a new national identity.   
Refugee culture is complex; negotiating the traumas of border-crossing (not to 
mention the political, economic, or social reasons for leaving), negotiating ethnicity 
and a new national identity, and finally, creating a new life in a new place.  In my 
examination of refugee education in general, three themes arose: assimilation to the 
national identity in education, pseudo-state top-down indoctrination, and finally, the 
absence of a global and human rights education.  
Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 
While Jordan has been good to its Palestinian counterpart, compared to many 
countries that harbor refugees, that fact does not render them flawless.  Palestinian 
refugees reside in 13 camps throughout Jordan; no other country has done as much 
for Palestinian refugees as Jordan, going so far as to ensure stability of refugees by 
offering refugees Jordanian nationality (Department of Palestinian Affairs, 2006).  
The Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) is a government body that ensures 
livable conditions of Palestinian refugees in the camps and protects from violation of 
human rights, all the while claiming and protecting the right of return for citizens 
(DPA, 2006). 
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Refugee Camp Environment 
The environment of refugee camps is described in great detail throughout this 
review of the literature, but in this subsection, it is important to offer a brief synopsis.  
The refugee camp environment may oftentimes have adverse effects on Palestinian 
youth.  Al-Simadi and Atoum’s (2000) study of over 250 seventh graders living in a 
Palestinian refugee camp, indicated parent-child relationships as the most difficult, as 
well as negative self-concept (including, jealousy, shyness, and laziness).  The 
authors argue that both of these findings might be consistent with Arabic culture—
parent-child relationships are often patriarchal and authoritarian, which might then 
lead to lower self-concepts.  However, they also acknowledge that self-concept could 
be lower and more negative because of the environment.  Either way, they offer 
possible correlations without testing either factor.   
One way to test the correlation between environment or Arab culture on both 
self-concept and parent-child relationships could have been to assess both Jordanians 
and Palestinians.  Both are members of the Arab world, and live in the same country, 
therefore the elimination or presence of correlation could be attributed to either the 
“Arab culture” as Al-Simadi & Atoum (2000) stated, or to environment (i.e. living in 
the camps or economic factors versus mainstream society).  Furthermore, as Khawaja 
(2003) states, “Camp refugees are employed largely in informal economic activities 
with low wages, long hours, and…thus, poverty among the employed segment of this 
population is quite common” (p. 31).  Those factors surely must have an effect on the 
psyche of children (and adults for that matter), but none are actually tested in the Al-
Simadi & Atoum (2000) study.   
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Khawaja & Tiltnes (2002) show those who received less than basic education 
in Jordan were at 58 percent in 1996 as opposed to refugees at 76 percent in 1999.  
While these numbers are shocking and stir emotions, something is flawed about the 
quantitative data; for instance, there is a three year gap in the research.  Therefore the 
discrepancy in numbers may very well be due to lapse in time.  These factors are not 
mentioned in the study.  Nevertheless, the authors contend that 10,000 Palestinian 
refugees under the age of 45 are unable to read and write properly.   Khawaja (2003) 
highlights the importance of education for those living in the camps stating that “the 
impact of education is strong and consistent—adults with less than basic education 
are 2.4 times more likely to be in poverty compared to those with at least secondary 
education” (p. 45).  What we begin to see is a high correlation between level of 
education and poverty. 
Ethnicity Versus National Identity: An “Us” Versus “Them” Mentality 
“Palestine is Jordan and Jordan is Palestine; there is one people and one land, with 
one history and one and the same fate.”  Prince Hassan, brother of King Hussein, 
addressing the Jordanian National Assembly, 2nd February 1970 
The loss of ethnicity seems a sacrifice for those who are anxious for inclusion 
and being a part of the national identity.  In the case of national integration, the 
foregoing of one’s ethnicity is a small price to pay; it is a small “consequence” in the 
bigger picture.  The maintenance and sustainability of one’s authentic heritage and 
place in the earth is traded in for a grander better way of life—a life of national pride.  
As “a cultural system, nationalism is a special sort of ideology that attempts to 
articulate the genius of locally established structures of meaning with symbolic forms 
selectively drawn from the wider world” (Stutzman, 1981, p. 55).  Stutzman (1981) 
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contends that ideologies are just that- ideologies, flawed and insufficient by their very 
definition.  For refugees, with no land or country to call home, their ethnic identity is 
oftentimes all they have.         
UNRWA and the Jordanian government have worked very hard to improve 
the education of refugees (Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002).  Public education is arguably 
the dissemination of national identity, however refugees do not share in the collective 
national identity, and therefore, education does not necessarily reflect diverse 
populations.  The story of the formation of a Jordanian national identity is an 
interesting one because Jordan’s borders were drawn by British forces in the 1920s 
(Nasser, 2004).  It was then known as Transjordan.  During its formative era (1948-
67) the cultural identity of Jordanians was the promotion of pan-Arabism and pan-
Islamism.  By promoting what Nasser (2004) calls macro identification, Jordanian 
textbooks overlooked Palestinian identity.  He states: 
The individual’s identity is directly transmuted into identification with 
a regional and universal entity like Arab and Muslim.  By advocating 
this type of identification, local differences become less significant and 
are assimilated into external solidarity with the Arab and Islamic 
world.  (p. 255) 
 
The national identity discourse, therefore, left out a great number of people; 
Palestinians and Christians, for instance, became excluded from the national identity.  
Frisch (2004) states that the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is “being two peoples 
that are part of one nation and thus ultimately of one destiny” (p. 71).  Moreover, Hart 
(2002) notes “Palestine, in contrast is rarely mentioned and when this occurs it is 
predominantly done from a Jordanian or pan-Arab perspective” (p. 40). 
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Therefore, the emphasis is on highlighting the similarities of Palestinians and 
Jordanians as Arabs, rather than ethnic diversity.  It is interesting to note that 
Jordanian national identity is a branch of the great Arab identity, and focus on the 
collective takes away from the diverse ethnicities present throughout Jordan.  While 
Nasser (2004) examines old textbooks and the exclusion of Palestinian national 
identity, Hart (2002) investigates Palestinian notions of nationalism in a refugee camp 
in the present day.  Hart (2002) contends with Nasser (2004) that “many of their 
expressions of belonging refer not only to distinct nations but also demonstrate 
engagement with wider, transnational processes as well” (Hart, 2002, p. 36).  
However, Hart (2002) also addresses that refugee camps become communities within 
the greater social context—in other words, a community within a community.   
As Hart (2002) maintains, Palestinian refugee children are taught to hold on to 
hopes of repatriation.  Furthermore, the overriding hope is younger generations will 
become agents of change in their community, and for that to happen, a strong sense of 
what it means to be a Palestinian refugee is instilled.  While this is very encouraging, 
the Jordanian national identity discourse is never far behind.  
Westernization is a top priority because the more Western countries such as 
Jordan become, the more lenience they are awarded.  In other words, the more Jordan 
allies itself with the United States, the more aid, protection and oil they are afforded.  
King Abdullah II has made clear his interests in globalization and building bridges 
with the international community (Ryan, 2004).  The overriding (rhetorical) question 
through it all, however, is whether or not nationalism gives birth to some of the great 
calamities of our time by masking the great injustices of the world—genocide, 
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famine, war, women’s rights  violations, and the list goes on.  The nationalism agenda 
for Jordan to some degree means having to give up what you are for what you want to 
become.  
Jordan’s progress into the 21st century is shaped by an imperial legacy which 
it attempts to reclaim as an Arab state.  Under British rule Jordan’s monarchy 
benefited from friendly and advantageous relationships with western powers.  
However, Jordan’s desire to invoke Arab nationalism in an effort to coalesce various 
factions within its country seeks to mute and pacify opposition to the Monarchy.  This 
nationalistic endeavor is undermined by Jordan’s current close ties with western 
countries that seek to erode and warp Arab nationalism by encouraging “modern” 
Arabism to be in the best interest of the Arab world.  Consequently, Palestinians 
(more specifically refugees) retain their identity and long to return to Palestine despite 
having never left Jordan.  This phenomenon seems in part a reaction to Jordan’s 
cooperation with western powers despite Jordan’s attempts to reclaim and 
disseminate Jordanian identity. 
Indoctrination of Pseudo Nation-state Objectives and Agendas: The Hidden 
Curriculum 
“[T]here is a fundamental tension between international control and national 
implementation” (Samoff, 2003, p. 61). 
 
 The United Nations and other international organizations hold an advantage 
over countries when it comes to addressing refugees.  It holds universal assumptions 
rather than the ideologies and foreign policy interests that cloud the interests of the 
country and its inhabitants (Zunes, 2004).  However, the across-the-board universality 
poses some problems as well.  For instance, where is the voice of the refugees?  It 
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appears what these organizations do is speak for and on behalf of refugees using a 
top-down approach, rather than really implementing a bottom-up mentality.  Samoff 
(2003) articulately discusses the gaps in research that come out of funding agencies, 
by stating: 
The mass of studies and recommendations that emanate from the 
funding agencies reflect little or no attention, for example, to fostering 
an inquiring and critical orientation among learners, eliminating 
discrimination and reducing elitism, promoting national unity, 
preparing young people for the rights and obligations of citizenship, 
equipping them to work cooperatively and resolve conflicts 
nonviolently, or developing among learners a strong sense of 
individual and collective competence, self-reliance, and self-
confidence (p. 71). 
 
The presence of international pseudo nation-states, while on the one hand is great, on 
the other creates another problem.  In Jordan, the UNRWA along with the Jordanian 
government provides great help and assistance to refugees in the camps.  As I write, 
however, whispers that UNRWA is going to cut funding are spreading throughout 
Jordan (personal communication, 2006).  Nevertheless, UNRWA is a pseudo nation-
state in Jordan that provides invaluable help—albeit controlling much of the goings 
on in the camps.   
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International Models of Peace Education 
 This section investigates international models of peace education, mainly in 
Israel/Palestine.  Although these efforts to create unity are not located in the Occupied 
Territories, they represent models of education nonetheless.  The point of this 
segment is to illustrate the challenges and strategies that educators and students face 
as models for Jordanians and Palestinians for enhanced coexistence.  
Inclusive Education 
One of the foremost models of peace education in Israel/Palestine is in Neve 
Shalom/Wahat al-Salam, a village just outside of Tel Aviv.  The founding of the 
School for Peace was an attempt to create an environment wherein Jews and Arabs 
could coexist and live within a “social, cultural and political framework of equality 
and mutual respect” (Feuerverger 1997, p. 17).  It is here, in the School of Peace, 
where Jewish and Palestinian teens can come and be privy to one another devoid of 
threat.  Workshops are a major component of the program, led by one Palestinian and 
one Jew, that aim to bring an awareness of self and other in an attempt to provide 
clarity and peace of mind to both hurting groups of hurting youth.  Dialogue is 
encouraged, and collaboration is embodied in the pairing of Ahmed and Tirzah, the 
leaders.  The teenagers are encouraged to vocalize their feelings of hatred and fear, 
because the dialogues aim to legitimate the voices and authenticate the true course of 
the dialogue—absent of interruptions.  
The School for Peace is an exemplary program, with praiseworthy educators 
that aim to create a safe environment and call for “a shared consciousness toward 
building a sense of moral development in the midst of violence and enmity” 
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(Feuerverger, 1997, p. 20).  Instruction in two languages is a main component of the 
school’s success, and Feuerverger maintains that the inclusion of both Arabic and 
Hebrew is symbolic of mutuality to both peoples.   Collaboration is essential to the 
program’s success as it is an example to youth that in times of war, opposing sides 
can come together and discuss their differences with words, not missiles. This is a 
community wide effort to not only maintain peace but also create an authentic place 
wherein the inhabitants could become critical thinkers and examiners of the realities 
they face, thus navigating a call for change, and peace.    
Feldash and Lemish (1997) also discuss an unorthodox approach to 
collaborative teaching and learning in the classroom.  Their study takes a look at an 
intercultural project at a Jewish only school aimed at exposing some of the injustices 
the Israeli military bestows on Palestinians.  With media aids (two documentaries), 
cases of the Israeli military’s inhumane treatment of Palestinians are exhibited to the 
Jewish students to probe their minds and instigate a discussion.  This is a very 
difficult exercise, as it forces the Jewish students to abandon what they have been 
taught and to envision the world in which Palestinians must survive.   
The concept of collaboration here is a project that both students and the 
educator undertake, in hopes that they come out the experience with an idea of life on 
the other side.  It is a very painful process for the students as participants to be made 
aware of these injustices.  Ignorance is sometimes bliss, especially when it means not 
having to question all that you have been taught when what hangs in the balance is 
knowing full well that these 9th graders would soon have to enlist in the very military 
they witness in the documentaries.  This process is a very difficult one, sometimes 
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even met with hostility, but it nevertheless gives legitimacy to their counterparts, the 
Palestinians, while deconstructing the norms the Israelis had internalized. 
 The breeding of indifference expressed by some of the students when the 
minority refused to accept the injustices carried out by some members of the Israeli 
military may have stemmed from fear; fear, because the possibility that what they had 
been taught all their lives was in some way flawed.  This realization and act of 
resistance are undoubtedly painful, and as the researcher, I would attribute them to 
fear because what these students have to come to know and love is no longer and so, 
the study takes a turn for the worst; a backlash.  Nationalism and loyalty to one’s 
country should not be questioned in the students’ minds, especially considering the 
fact that Israelis know the “school system serves to indoctrinate their children to a 
blind faith in Statist Zionism” (Feldash & Lemish, 1997 p. 21). 
Bekerman’s two year study (2004) takes a multifaceted look at two bilingual 
Arab/Hebrew programs and the way in which both groups negotiate ceremonial 
celebrations.  Bekerman contends the necessity of multicultural education as a tool 
that can eliminate inter-group tensions and conflict.  Parents of both Jewish and Arab 
students send their children to encourage coexistence, but more importantly for 
Palestinian parents because these schools offer higher educational standards.  In this 
study, educators join forces to balance the celebrations of Judaism, Islam and 
Christianity.  This is a very difficult task, given the large number of religious and 
cultural observances, collective and individual.  Bekerman gives examples of 
ceremonies, and even of educators en masse, creatively designing and redesigning the 
framework of these celebrations.  One such example is the celebration of Kabbalat 
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Shishi, which initially was a success, but ceased to exists as soon as one of the 
teachers was reassigned.  Although Beckerman argues that this was an “artificial 
creation,” change is slow and the attempt in and of itself is a step in the right 
direction. 
The educators participate in collaborative and transformative teaching, 
knowing full well it will be a painful process in their praxis.  Glazier (2004) states 
that “when teachers were in each other’s company, as Arab and Jew, they had to 
come to terms with sometimes unpleasant and conflicting ideas” (p.618). Here, one 
notices another theme that arises within this one (a sub-theme if you will)—that of 
consciousness; the awareness that educators were different, and were in the company 
of what they have been taught is the enemy and have tried to unlearn, in order to 
teach their pupils how to understand, empathize, and maintain the peace.  In the 
process of learning about the other, pain is imminent, and one must embrace rather 
than avoid the discomfort in order to come out of the experience enlightened with a 
critical consciousness. 
 The overriding question in my mind is, “How can peace be taught to people 
living in war?”  The answer, I come to find, is that it is very difficult.  Fear is an 
epidemic in Israel, and in the Israeli schools, it is no different.  Educators, students, 
and parents alike, are all fearful of how to deal with the political pandemonium on a 
daily basis.  Arabic and Israeli holidays become controversial, and teachers are fearful 
of the conflict that could emanate.  They proceed with caution, once again fearful of 
the possible outcome.  In Glazier’s (2004) study, Yaffe, an Israeli educator at a 
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bilingual/bicultural school in Israel, proceeds with trepidation when leading a 
discussion about Passover: 
Because if I tell them that B’nai Yisrael [the sons of Israel, literally or 
Jews] were slaves, they’ll say ‘Okay, but what about the Arabs who 
come from Gaza and work for you? They are not your slaves?’  
 
Yaffe further explained, 
 
It is a very difficult story….To say that the Jews were slaves, they 
built [the Egyptians] buildings…Who builds our buildings now? Who 
works for us? (Glazier, 2004, p. 624) 
 
The educators have to face these realities, knowing that there is no getting used to the 
pain of divergent histories.  
 Glazier (2003) also observed the difficulty educators were having in talking to 
students about an Arabic commemorative holiday, Land Day, wherein six Arabs were 
killed protesting the Israeli takeover lands settled by Arabs.  The truth of the matter 
is, however, that the nature of education is in and of itself political.  Any form of 
education is political, and here in the United States, a discussion about Columbus Day 
stirs the emotions of many.             
 Feuerverger’s (1997) study discusses the progress being made at the School 
for Peace, which takes fear and ambivalence head on.  One finding is that fear exists 
among both Arabs and Jews. Both groups want recognition that they have suffered; 
for Jews, acknowledging the deep fears of persecution that reside in their psyches; 
and among Palestinians, a need for legitimate national identity.  The Palestinian need 
for a legitimate national identity cannot be overstated.  Acknowledging that both 
Palestinians and Jews are suffering generates fear because it runs the risk of 
abolishing one’s fears for the purpose of satisfying another’s.  What youth (and both 
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governments, for that matter) fail to realize is that recognizing that trepidation and 
fear exists among the other does not eliminate or negate one’s own fear.  Hertz-
Lazarowitz (1999) echoes this notion of fear, noting that what was observed showed 
the distinction between hope and hopelessness at the personal and the community 
level.  Many people exhibited an acute sense of consciousness. 
Ahmad and Szpara (2005) propose a new paradigm for peace education and 
dialogue; the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Peace (EDCP) paradigm.  
The EDCP paradigm is a “neoliberal, citizen centered, cosmopolitan educational 
vision seeking to prepare caring, thoughtful, peace-loving, conscientious, 
independent-minded, and active citizens” (p. 15).  As opposed to prior government 
centered education paradigms, the EDCP is citizen centered and requires participants 
to be active under the following premises: (1) local and global awareness, (2) 
democratic values, (3) democratic temperament, (4) civic participation, and finally (5) 
peace education.  Because citizenship education and its premises in this new 
paradigm necessitate democratic values, patriotism is implied.  However, further 
research by Martha Nussbaum (1994) makes clear that patriotism should not be 
limited to one’s country, but to all of humanity.  Further, recognition of human rights 
education could enhance the EDCP paradigm.   
Universal human rights, and engagement in the global community, not just 
isolated and individual domestic issues, are necessary (Nussbaum, 1994).  Dialogue is 
a key element in peace and civic education, especially in conflict resolution dialogue, 
because “citizens express their power and fulfill their citizenship obligation by 
expressing their opinions on war and peace” (Ahmad & Szpara., 2005, p.14).  
68 
Judith Cochran (2005) examines conflict ridden dialogue efforts in the United 
States that revolve around the Israeli Palestinian controversy.  Seeds of Peace is built 
on the foundations of tolerance and social change.  After the bombings of the World 
Trade Center in 1993, Seeds of Peace was established to bridge the fundamental 
disconnect between Israeli and Palestinian teenagers from the conflict-ridden territory 
so that they may come to work towards peaceful coexistence (Cochran, 2005, p. 100). 
Training includes, but is not limited to “…cultural interaction, leadership training, 
dialogue, and recreation.  Participants are to develop listening and negotiating skills, 
empathy and mutual respect and trust” (p.100).         
Positive and Negative Attitudes 
 Views of the other, whether negative or positive, inadvertently affect the 
practice of education, especially in terms of peace education.  Donitsa-Schmidt et al. 
(2004) investigate the effect that negative perceptions have on Israeli students.  The 
Jewish-Arab conflict portrays “Arabic as a language of no value” (p. 88).  The 
authors contend that the study of a language that holds low prestige does not motivate 
students to learn to appreciate or study the language of a minority group. What 
Donitsa-Schmidt, et al (2004) found in their study of nearly one thousand subjects, is 
astounding: 
Students in the control group [those who did not learn the language] 
focused on the need to study Arabic because of the surrounding 
countries and in order to deal with Israel’s enemy.  By contrast, the 
reasons given by student in the experimental group were the need to 
become familiar with Arabs’ culture, for the sake of peace and also for 
pragmatic considerations.  (p. 223) 
 
As it turns out in Donitsa-Schmidt, et al’s 2004 study, The effects of teaching spoken 
Arabic on students’ attitudes and motivation in Israel, those who learned the 
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language of the other were receptive to peace keeping, and its importance, whereas 
those who did not still had the perception of Arabs as the enemy.  
Abu-Rabia (1998) echoes the influence of negative connotations to the Arabic 
language in The learning of Arabic by Israeli Jewish children.  The negative attitudes 
of the Israeli Jewish students were evident on all levels, except when it came to 
Arabic learning situations.  In other words, if the Arabic learning situation was 
enjoyable the attitudes were more positive, revealing the importance of the learning 
environment.   
 Negative/positive perceptions are not just restricted to language acquisition.  
Feldash and Lemish (1997) discuss how the perceptions of some of the Israeli 
students backfired when in the midst of discussing the Israeli military’s sadistic 
actions towards Palestinians.  Some students expressed distaste for the exercise even 
going so far as to say they were being brainwashed by the project.  This hostile 
feeling only made them grow closer to and defend their government, justifying their 
actions and obliterating the voices of the other.  This reaction defeated the purpose of 
the entire exercise, but did not negate the efforts of the teacher or the results for the 
majority of the class.   
Feuerverger’s (1997) study highlights the importance of dialoguing about the 
perceptions Jews have about Arabs and vice versa.  The youth come face to face with 
the enemy, with a deadly silence infiltrating the room, broken only by the sounds of 
the leaders. They allow the students to hold their perceptions of one another, and that 
they (the leaders) will not interrupt the pedagogical discourse, so long as it is 
authentic. This allowed the adolescents to own their truth, their experiences and 
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opinions, and discuss them openly.  It was not easy, and oftentimes hostile, but a 
community was forming, one that gave way to open discourse, ultimately opening the 
gates towards cultural sensitivity, critical consciousness, and tolerance. 
 In Horenczyk and Tatar’s (2003) study, the perceptions that counselors had of 
their objectives were also noteworthy.  Here counselors were asked to identify their 
needs and the needs of their subjects; since both Israeli and Arab counselors were 
overextended and strained professionally, they offered up suggestions that might be 
beneficial.  The perceptions of the Jewish counselors, however, as to what they 
needed were very different from the Palestinian counselors’ needs.  The Palestinian 
counselors needed allies and a “louder call for social and cultural change” (p. 389).  
However Israeli counselors perceived their needs differently; they had a more 
“defensive-reactive stance and directed their efforts towards the strengthening of their 
pupils’ psychological resiliency” (p. 389).  It is possible that collective work with the 
Israeli and Arab counselors might help to bridge the divide and aid their pupils to deal 
with conflict resolution.  However, no mention of this suggestion is made in the 
study.      
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Importance of Good Educators 
 A good learning environment is imperative in all realms of education, but 
even more so in models of peace education, because so many different elements are at 
play simultaneously.  The most significant theme that appeared and reappeared 
relentlessly in the literature is the pivotal role of the educator and the importance of a 
good learning milieu.   
In Abu-Rabia’s (2004) study, the Arab significance of the learning situation 
was the most important finding.  Glazier’s (2003) study also indicated the importance 
of the school environment, because in time, students began to mimic appropriate and 
compassionate behavior in the absence of educators.  Likewise, Glazier (2004) 
maintains that as the educators learned how to work with and among differences as 
Jewish and Muslim educators, they began to redesign and ultimately reform the way 
they taught their students.  The impact of this learning environment is invaluable.  
Donitsa-Schmidt et al (2004) assert in their study that the most important factor in 
student perception was the educator and that the “findings of this research also 
highlight the centrality of the quality of  the teaching program and teacher 
qualifications in the educational system and specifically in the language teaching 
framework” (p. 227).  
Educators need support, and when there is so little of it to go around, 
programs and great ideas are abandoned.  The educational realm is designed in such a 
way that allows for great ideas to thrive only when given relentless persistence and 
attention. Bekerman (2004) reiterates “Any such invented tradition is too dependent 
on personal initiative and commitment, which, if not fully supported by the wider 
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cultural system, will fail” (p. 588). It is near impossible to deconstruct viewpoints in 
conflict ridden areas, and educators need all the help they can get. 
 These educators demonstrate wonderful teaching qualities in a time where 
hope is scarce.  The School for Peace is a space where confused, hurt, and angry 
teenagers could come and feel safe.  They received guidance from skilled and 
passionate educators, who have their moments of despair.  This is a place where 
educators and students, Muslims, Christians and Jews, Israelis and Arabs can come 
together and grieve in one another’s company.  The creation of such an institution is a 
testament that there is still hope. As Freire (1994) states that “there are people who 
can make flowers grow where it had seemed impossible” (p. 176). 
Summary of Peace Education Studies 
 The methodology of the research studies was admirable.  As someone who 
knows the unrest in the Middle East, I commend the researchers who risked so much 
by traveling to study the importance of peace in times of conflict.  One of the 
limitations I saw in every one of the studies, except Bekerman’s (2004), was the 
exclusion of a discussion of researcher bias.  Bekerman (2004) was the only 
researcher who overtly reveals personal bias in the introduction, noting to readers his 
Jewish background and his attempt to “come to at least be able to sustain a critical 
perspective on myself and the circumstances of [his] research” (p 577).    
The Donitsa Schmidt et al. (2004) study consisted of nearly a thousand 
students, and if I were to piggyback on this study, I would limit my population and 
add a qualitative dimension simply because the study conducted was on such a grand 
scale that the voices of the participants were missing.   The benefit of reading both 
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Glazier’s studies was that one (2004) focused on the teachers and their praxes, while 
the other (2003) focused on students and their praxis.  The development of critical 
consciousness was evident, and the voice of the subjects was present.  Abu-Rabia’s 
(1998) study was also helpful in its determination to learn not just the Arabic 
language, but also the motives behind the act of acquisition. However, it was not as 
thorough as it could have been.  The mere presentation of numbers does not in and of 
itself indicate the truth of the matter. 
 Without a doubt, much work needs to be done; but by working towards and 
not against education as a practice of freedom, we may indeed have a hopeful future.  
The state of the world as we know it is dark.  Many are dying in vain, and many 
spirits crumble daily.  Educators must hold on, the hard work is nowhere near done. 
As Fr. Denis Collins (1996) states, “The day we claim we are satisfied with the 
schools or the systems we have is the day our maladies become terminal” (p. 9).  
Courage is essential.  We must not be afraid.   
Dominator culture has tried to keep us all afraid, to make us choose 
safety instead of risk, sameness instead of diversity.  Moving through 
that fear, finding out what connects us, reveling in our differences; this 
is the process that brings us closer, that gives us a world of shared 
values, of meaningful community.  (hooks, 2003, p. 197) 
 
The controversial nature of these studies has to be addressed.  Although as an Arab I 
have grappled with my own feelings and biases towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, one sentence in Glazier’s study (2004) resonated with me.  When Yaffe, the 
Israeli teacher, discusses her acknowledgment that she too benefits from the land 
distribution and she states, “This is my country…I haven’t any other place to go” (p. 
623).  I begin to realize the birth of my own cultural sensitivity, and with this I feel 
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hope that peace is not unattainable. Instead our unity in diversity may ultimately be 
the greatest gift we give one another, and as Ahmad and Szpara (2005) contend, one 
way to start is vis-à-vis local and global consciousness.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this literature review is to provide a concise historical 
framework and a solid depiction of the research surrounding current Jordanian-
Palestinian social, economic, and political sectors.  Life and education in the refugee 
camps are also discussed in great detail so as to investigate how one’s education in 
the camps can affect their transition into higher education.  Because little exists in 
terms of peace and human rights education in Jordan regarding Jordanians and 
Palestinians, I referred to instances of transformative education in Israel/Palestine as 
models.  However, it is important to restate that the unity efforts in peace education 
mentioned above in Israel did not take place in the Occupied Territories, making a 
significant difference. 
 As we can see, the data regarding Jordanian-Palestinian cohabitation is dated.  
Moreover, it does not take into account the experiences and perceptions of one 
another—studies discuss notions of Palestinians and their identity without taking into 
account the perceptions of the host and dominant culture.  Quantitative analyses of 
life in the camps are also studied, but none to my knowledge incorporate a 
comparative analysis of Jordanians as well as Palestinians (Khawaja & Tiltnes, 2002; 
Kawaja, 2003).   
It would be valuable to add to the research already in existence, given the 
ever- changing political milieu in Jordan.  It is just as valuable to extract those 
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perceptions from Palestinian refugee and Jordanian graduates.  My sincere hope is 
that this study will be an invaluable contribution to the body of literature on Jordanian 
Palestinian coexistence, peace and human rights education, as well as anti apartheid 
rights discourse.     
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Critical Ethnography Methods 
This qualitative study employed critical ethnographic methods in order to gain 
insights into the perspectives of Palestinian refugee and Jordanian graduates from 
public universities in Jordan.  The “critical” component to this research is defined by 
Carspecken (1996) as: 
[Concerned with] social inequalities, and we direct out work toward 
positive social change.  We also share a concern with social theory and 
some of the basic issues it has struggled with since the nineteenth 
century.  These include the nature of social structure, power, culture, 
and human agency (p. 3). 
 
One of the main objectives in a critical ethnographic approach is to maintain and 
honor the authenticity of what the researcher sets out to observe. Empowerment is 
also at the core of critical ethnography (Anderson, 1989), coinciding with Freire’s 
(2003) notion of conscientization or reawakening of the human spirit.  In this cross-
cultural research, the role of the researcher is vital; it was my responsibility to honor 
the people I intended to study. 
As described earlier, the study explored the Palestinian Diaspora to Jordan and 
its implications for both Jordanians and Palestinian refugees.  Data collection 
consisted of intensive observations of Palestinians in various refugee camps, and 
Palestinian refugee and Jordanian university graduates.  Field notes, interviews with 
Palestinian refugees and Jordanian graduates, as well as members of the greater 
community, were all central to the study.  The study relied heavily on critical 
ethnographic methods because both the methods and this study challenge traditional 
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notions of research while simultaneously positioning the researcher and participants, 
with an undercurrent of activist research.  
Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) argue that critical researchers confront 
research in an attempt to critically examine how realities are shaped with the intention 
of transformation.  Patti Lather (1991; 1993) refers to the transformational aspect of 
critical research as “catalytic validity,” or research that “moves those it studies to 
understand the world and the way it is shaped in order for them to transform it” 
(Kinchelow & McLaran, 2000, p. 297).  Research, such as my own which 
encompasses catalytic validity, aims not only to define and articulate the realities of a 
certain population, but does so with the intention to have an impact.  Fine, Weis, 
Weseen, and Wong (2000) aver the responsibility and inherent difficulties of such 
research:   
Some think we make “much ado about nothing.”  Others are relieved 
that we are “saying aloud” this next generation of troubles.  Many 
wish we could continue to hide under the somewhat transparent robe 
of qualitative research.  And yet we are compelled to try to move a 
public conversation about researchers and responsibilities toward a 
sense of research for social justice.  (p. 108)  
 
While traditional research seeks to describe the phenomena or study in question, 
critical ethnography seeks to question power and create agency for the benefit of the 
people being described (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000; Lather 1991; Lather, 1993).   
This qualitative study on Jordanian-Palestinian refugee coexistence adheres to 
critical ethnographic methods, with the intention of seeking to understand how power 
manifests itself, as well as notions of activism which situate the researcher as 
advocate for a marginalized population.  In short, critical ethnography transcends the 
objectification of the researched and the ethnocentric gaze by questioning how power 
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manifests itself.  Problematizing the relationship between the researcher and the 
participant is central to critical ethnography, as it decolonizes the study by allowing 
self-thought and self-determination.  As Manganaro (1990) asserts: 
 [N]o anthropology is apolitical, removed from ideology, and hence 
from the capacity to be affected by or, as crucially, to effect social 
formations.  The question ought not to be if an anthropological text is 
political, but rather, what kind of sociopolitical affiliations are tied to 
particular anthropological texts” (p. 35).  
 
Manganaro’s (1990) declaration deconstructs the notion of research as a political 
undertaking free from bias and politically motivated ideology, the same way Freire 
(1994) speaks to education as political: the two are not independent.   
As Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) state, “critical research traditions have 
arrived at the point where they recognize that claims to truth are always discursively 
situated and implicated in relations of power” (p. 299).  In other words, just because 
absolute truth does not exist, it is not necessarily equated with power.  Furthermore, 
Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) deduce “truth is internally related to meaning in a 
pragmatic way through normative referenced claims, intersubjective referenced 
claims, and the way we deictically ground or anchor meaning in our daily lives” 
(p.299). 
In positioning the researcher in the study, Carspecken (1993; 1999) argues 
researchers must recognize their own existence and belief system, where they are 
ideologically grounded and why it this is so, and how to avoid claims which obstruct 
what is observed.  Arguably one of Carspecken’s (1996) more essential theses in 
positioning my research is the claim that what we see and who we are is predisposed 
and grounded in what we value. This notion is furthered by Kincheloe and McLaren 
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(2000) who purport that “rather than rely on metaphors found in mainstream 
ethnographic accounts, critical ethnography, in contrast, should emphasize 
communicative experiences and structures” (p. 300).  Their assertion positions the 
study in the sociopolitical context which other methods of research tend to ignore. 
Kincheloe and McLaren (2000) address notions of researcher objectivity they 
term the “reflexive approach” to critical ethnography in discussing recent innovations 
in critical ethnography.  The “reflexive approach” is a method which states the 
researcher ought not to separate oneself from the participants, but rather, become “a 
unified subject of knowledge that can make hermeneutic efforts to establish 
identification between the observer and the observed (as in modernist interpretive 
traditions)” (p. 301).  This approach to critical ethnography aims to “free the object of 
analysis from the tyranny of fixed, unassailable categories and to rethink subjectivity 
itself as a permanently unclosed, always partial, narrative engagement with text and 
context” (p. 301).   
As addressed above, notions of power and truth are central to critical 
ethnography, but so too are notions of culture (Kinchelow and McLaren, 2000; San 
Juan, 1996; Stewart, 1996).  Culture as described in critical ethnography is not static, 
but rather fluid and multifaceted.  Culture is a social process and practice immersed in 
material social relations such as the economy, politics, communication, and social 
reproduction (San Juan, 1996).  The positioning of culture as material social layers is 
mandatory to the progressive and emancipatory approaches.   
Building on ethnographic notions of culture, this study is also grounded in 
Willis’ (1977) understanding of culture.  Willis (1977) contends: 
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I view the cultural, not simply as a set of transferred internal structures 
(as in the usual notions of socialisation) nor as the passive result of the 
action of dominant ideology downwards (as in certain kinds of 
marxism), but at least in part a the product of collective human praxis.  
(p. 4) 
 
In the understanding of culture as neither passive, nor a top-down construction, this 
study is situated in the belief of the collective human experience of nationality, 
community, as well as social process, as embedded in material social relations. 
This critical educational research approach is fundamentally localized, but it 
also transcends the educational institution to explore the relations between the local 
community (whether Palestinian, Jordanian, or both), the school, and the 
sociopolitical environment.  The objective of critical ethnography is empowerment.  
Gordon, Holland, and Lahelma (2001) continue, stating that “the aim [of critical 
ethnography] is to theorize social structural constraints and human agency, as well as 
the interrelationship between structure and agency in order to consider paths towards 
empowerment of the researched” (p. 193). 
The origin of ethnography is found in both sociology and cultural 
anthropology (Gordon, Holland, and Lahelma, 2001; Brunt, 2001; Spindler and 
Spindler, 1982).  In no way does this research intend to make generalizations about 
Jordanians or Palestinian refugees.  Moreover, researchers oftentimes abuse their 
power as ethnographers by perpetuating stereotypes, thus enabling misnomers in 
research to continue.  While ethnography seeks to simply document participant 
voices, perspectives, and experiences, critical ethnography addresses the inequities 
which are the foundation for and origins of the participant experiences.  The intent 
here is to stay as far away from stereotyping and creating broad universal “truths.”  
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This is the exploration of individuals sought out by the researcher to seek their truths, 
their realities, and their perceptions regarding coexistence in Jordan.    
Research Design 
McMillan (2000) states that observations, interviews, and gathering 
documents are “the primary modes of data collection for ethnographic studies” (p. 
255).  Cross-referencing observations (through passive as well as thick description), 
field notes, interviews, personal notes, and other relevant data was integral to 
discover themes that are threaded throughout the study.  The researcher and the 
researched engaged, blurred the ‘one-up, one-down’ role of traditional research, as 
they aimed to critically explore realities in Jordan.  
Field Notes 
 Both passive and thick descriptions were used when taking field notes.  
Passive observation and note-taking are best during the beginning of observations to 
minimize the researcher’s presence (Carspecken, 1996).  The natural progression of 
the study led me to thick description when both researcher and participants became 
more comfortable.  
The purpose of thick description is to ensure accuracy.  Thick description pays 
careful attention and provides detailed notes such as: description of physical setting, 
reconstruction of dialogue, portraits of the participants, accounts of events, depiction 
of activities, and the observer’s behavior (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998).  At times notes 
were “quite thick,” meaning not every detail was necessary, and when necessary I 
returned to my tape recorder to “thicken” them with details (Carspecken, 1996).   
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Another reason notes were quite thick had to do with the surrounding 
environment.  Oftentimes it was inappropriate to walk around with a notepad and 
paper because it could raise too much skepticism.  I noticed that I improvised, using 
my own techniques and strategies to best provide pure observations.  I began to write 
target words that would elicit a response from me when I went home; target words 
such as mukhabarat, unemployment, or even physical descriptions, like souk runs in 
the middle of rc (refugee camp).  These target words then became the framework or 
outline of my field notes.  Throughout observations it was important to make the 
strange familiar, and the familiar strange (Spindler and Spindler, 1982).   
Interviews 
  Both structured and unstructured interviews were employed.  Research 
questions were used to guide interview questions. Therefore, both were 
complimentary to one another and information both directly and indirectly pertinent 
to the study was elicited.  Interview questions were generated from the observations, 
but tentative questions were also compiled that stemmed from the research questions 
to guide the interview. 
Interviews lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half, with follow-up 
interviews that lasted an average of half an hour to an hour.  Interview questions were 
cross checked by both the participants of the study, as well as the dissertation chair, 
Dr. Katz, and committee members Dr. Koirala-Azad and Dr. Zunes.  Interview 
questions were also cross checked with non participants in the study to ensure 
applicability and whether or not questions were relatable enough to comprehend.  
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This was a valuable tactic because many questions were altered or changed, and I was 
able to format questions in such a way that did not offend the participants.   
One such example is that one of the questions asked participants to respond to 
Jordan’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Upon reviewing the questions with 
someone, she mentioned that calling it the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” was 
controversial, and that many refer to it as solely the “Palestinian conflict.”  To see a 
framework of interview questions, please refer to appendixes B and C.   
Simultaneously, however, it was very important to ensure participants felt at 
ease; if the interview took another turn and digressed, I allowed it to happen.  Legard, 
Keegan, and Ward (2003) agree that the importance of interviews is “the power of 
language to illuminate meaning” (p. 138).  Bogdan and Biklen (1998) state that: 
Qualitative interviews vary in the degree to which they are 
structured…even when an interview guide is employed, qualitative 
interviews offer the interviewer considerable latitude to pursue a range 
of and offer the subject a chance to shape the content of an interview. 
(p. 94) 
 
This methodology helped gain a greater perspective on not just the research 
questions, but also into the participants’ worldview.  The semi-structured technique 
was invaluable because it opened up the research to include important facts which 
might not have been recognized in an overly structured approach.    
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Data Collection 
Dialogues were supposed to take place after observations in order to generate 
questions shaped around what was observed.  This was only partially the case.  All of 
the questions were framed around the first two weeks’ observations of Jordan.  In 
other words, the questions did not directly come from observations made in the 
refugee camps.  The reason for this was that two of my interviews (then four) were 
conducted on my first day with refugees.  While interview questions did not emanate 
from a refugee camp environment per se, they were implicitly woven into my 
interview questions as the study progressed.  However, all of the questions were born 
out of what was observed in Jordan the first two weeks there.  Carspecken (1996) 
states that the purpose of this stage in the research is “to democratize the research 
process” (p. 155).  Participants were able to share their ideas regarding their reality in 
their own words.  The dialogic data is the opportunity for the researcher to hear what 
people living in and within the intended environment have to say about the study.   
The timeline spanned from July 10 until August 22, 2006.  Originally the plan 
was that I would continue my research again, from December 2006 to January 2007 
in Jordan.  When the Lebanese-Israeli war broke days after my arrival, plans for my 
research quickly changed.  The immediate modification and objective were to 
complete everything I set out to do in the two-phase study, during my almost two 
month stay.  This also changed the research design, which shifted from a critical 
ethnography to a qualitative study utilizing critical ethnographic methods, or a small-
scale critical ethnography.  I could not claim to develop a critical ethnographic study 
based on solely two months of data collection. 
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As a result of the modification, I immersed myself in the research process and 
made no time for much-anticipated leisure with family.  It is no exaggeration to say I 
began to work morning, noon and night, and oftentimes way after midnight 
completing transcriptions, conducting interviews and typing up journal entries.  This 
comprehensive immersion in my study was both a simultaneous blessing and curse.  I 
planned on collecting data four to five days a week for several hours at a time.  What 
I came to realize very quickly, however, was the instinctual collection of data, 
whether from the driver or my cousins during random conversation, and so forth: I 
was essentially ceaselessly collecting data.   
About a month earlier, I had sent a letter to both the University of Jordan and 
Hashemite University requesting permission to access University of Jordan students 
and Hashemite University students.  A letter from Dr. Katz was attached with my 
request, along with tentative interview questions.  Upon receiving my letter of intent, 
both universities denied my request, and therefore with the help of my committee 
chair, Dr. Katz, the dissertation shifted to focus on university graduates.  Initial 
devastation over not being able to interview university students quickly turned to 
relief.  In essence this liberated my entire study.  Tentative interview questions and 
observations no longer had to work under the auspices of the university.  This was 
significant because upon arrival, I quickly became aware of the political nature of my 
study, and the role of the university.  Moreover, fear in Jordan is pervasive and, to a 
certain extent, is engulfing people, particularly the underprivileged, economically 
disadvantaged people of Jordan (see Chapter Five).  
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While I had hoped participants would feel at ease discussing Jordanian-
Palestinian refugee coexistence, it was too naïve of me to expect such a thing.  The 
very nature of the study is seeped in fear.  Students would then have to worry about 
societal as well as academic consequences of speaking out.  The relief of knowing 
that they would not have to face persecution with the university comforted me as well 
as participants, immensely.         
Research Setting 
 The research took place mainly in virtually homogenous Palestinian refugee 
camps in Jordan.  Interviews were conducted at local hangouts, participants’ homes, 
or any other mutually agreed upon location.  There are thirteen refugee camps in 
Jordan, ten of which are recognized as “official camps” by the UNRWA and three of 
which are considered “unofficial”(DPA 2006; UNRWA, 2003).  The Department of 
Palestinian Affairs granted me full, unrestricted access into any refugee camp in 
Jordan.  This is very rare, considering they typically assign only one refugee camp to 
a scholar and researcher.  The permits were signed along with a letter in Arabic that 
was translated and notarized by an official translator.  Below is a chart of refugee 
camp profiles, the dates of establishment and estimated populations according to both 
DPA and UNRWA. 
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Camp’s Name Establishment Date Estimated 
Population (DPA) 
date N/A 
Estimated 
Population 
(UNRWA) as of 
2005** 
 
Al-Wihdat (Amman 
New Camp)* 
 
1955 
 
44,395 
 
50,703 
 
Jabal El-Hussein* 
 
1952 
 
27,891 
 
30,241 
 
Prince Hassan 
(Hinikeen) 
 
1967 
 
9,000 
 
--- 
 
Talibieh* 
 
1968 
 
8,754 
 
9,000 
 
Madaba 
 
1956 
 
5,500 
 
--- 
 
Hiteen (Marka)* 
 
1968 
 
45,550 
 
48.027 
 
Zarqa* 
 
1949 
 
16,491 
 
18,043 
 
Sukhneh 
 
1969 
 
4,750 
 
--- 
 
Baqa’a* 
 
1968 
 
83,127 
 
89,778 
 
Jerash (Gaza) * 
 
1968 
 
26,000 
 
23,185 
 
Souf 
 
1967 
 
15,000 
 
20,141 
 
Azmi Al-Mufti 
camp (Al-Husun)* 
 
1968 
 
18,655 
 
26,965 
 
Irbid 
 
1950 
 
21,753 
 
24,351 
 
 
* recognized by both UNRWA and the DPA    (DPA 2006; UNRWA; 
2003) 
** recognized and unrecognized refugees 
 
Data above was compiled by cross referencing both UNRWA (2003) and DPA (2006) 
information.  It is unknown why there is a discrepancy in the numbers of Palestinian 
representation in the camp.  The numbers provided by DPA (2006) do not mention 
what year the numbers were collected.  The main purpose of the above table is to 
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provide a visual representation of Palestinian refugees throughout Jordan and the 
distribution among the camps.  Jordan is “home” to more Palestinian refugees than 
any other country in the world: 
Country Number of Registered Refugees 
Syria 317,346 
Lebanon 394,523 
West Bank 687,542 
Gaza Strip  993,818 
Jordan 1,780,701 
         (UNRWA, 2003) 
It is important to note numbers may have shifted since 2003, particularly in the wake 
of increased tensions in Lebanon. 
 Four refugee camps were observed: Madaba, Baqa’a, Hiteen, and Hussein 
camps.  In this study, real names of the refugee camps are used for several reasons.  
First, problematizing and contextualizing the setting are integral to understanding 
why certain refugee camps are vastly different from others.  For instance, whether or 
not camps are recognized by the United Nations can have an impact on suggestions 
for further research and allocation of funding.  Second, each camp has its own modus 
operandi, and providing pseudonyms would oversimplify and overlook distinct 
features of the camps. Third, the likelihood of participant identification is improbable 
(not impossible) because of their pseudonyms, thereby minimizing potential harm and 
ramifications.  Fourth, though a handful of people assisted in my visits to the camps, 
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very few are aware of the nature of my study, and even fewer know interviews were 
conducted.     
Most of the time was spent in Madaba and Baqa’a.  Two research participants 
lived in Madaba (originally four) and one lived in Baqa’a camp.  Each camp had its 
own culture (as defined in critical ethnography to include: culture as a social process 
with a foundation in material social relations such as; economics, politics, 
communication, and the domain of social reproduction) and its own functioning 
society (San Juan, 1996).   
Research Participants 
Participants were both Palestinian refugees and Jordanians who graduated 
from a public university in Jordan.  Originally five Palestinian refugee graduates and 
five Jordanian graduates were interviewed.  However a string of events outside the 
control or the scope of the study and indicative of the social pressures on refugees 
resulted in two Palestinian refugees opting out of further participation resulting in 
three Palestinian refugee graduates, and three Jordanian graduates.  These factors are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter Four.  In total, ten initial interviews and nine 
follow up interviews were conducted.  Nineteen interviews and two participant 
withdrawals became very overwhelming.  To include diverse experiences, the hope 
was that participants would be male and female, as well as Muslim and Christian.  
The study ended up with two female Palestinian refugees and one male, all of whom 
were Muslim.  The Jordanian participants were all male and all Christian.  
Participants were interviewed twice, and they all signed consent forms.  All consent 
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forms were signed and pseudonyms were assigned or self-selected.  Tapes of the 
interviews along with all signed letters of consent are in an undisclosed location.     
Participant Profiles: Palestinian Refugees 
 
Name 
 
 
Age Birthplace University Major Graduation  Occupation 
Nour 23 Madaba Mu’ta 
University 
 
English 
Literature 
2005 Unemployed
Khaled 23 Madaba Zeituneh  
University 
 
Computer 
Programming
2005 Computer 
Instructor 
JR 35 Baqa’a Al 
Hussein 
Bin Talal 
University 
Mathematics 2005 Teacher 
 
Participant Profiles: Jordanians 
 
Name Age Birthplace University Major Graduation 
 
 
Occupation
Osama 22 Amman Hashemite 
University 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
June 2006 Training 
Engineer  
Shadi 23 Karak Jordan 
University 
of Science 
& 
Technology 
[JUST] 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
June 2006 Training 
Engineer 
Ibrahim 32 Amman Jordan 
University 
Finance & 
Banking 
Administration
1998 Finance 
 
While the initial hope was that participants would be self-selected to ensure varied 
perceptions, this was not entirely the case.  Many times, participants were selected by 
either refugee camp leaders or family members who knew graduates.  However, the 
varied experiences and perceptions remained in tact because all had distinctive 
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qualities and observations and their own story to tell.  The reasons for choosing to 
focus specifically on university graduates were because they are the immediate future 
and are vital in determining the direction of Jordan with the mindset necessary to 
break away from old perceptions and to enter a new paradigm of hope and resolution.   
I anticipated that having contacts and allies in the community would help 
tremendously, and it did.  I could have never conducted this study without the help of 
my family in Jordan, my mother, and many allies and volunteers who helped guide 
and ensure the proper execution of this dissertation.  In many cases, members of the 
culture (as defined by critical ethnography) navigated me through the process.  The 
participants were as actively engaged in the research as I was, and they had a vested 
interest and ownership in its outcomes.  The process of the study enabled us to 
collectively engage in an exchange of ideas revolving around notions of power and 
hegemony, and why the structures in Jordan shape and sometimes perpetuate the 
dominant-subordinate paradigm. 
Data Collection 
The study was conducted in Jordan during the months of July and August 
2006.  This gave me the time I needed to familiarize myself with the community and 
recruit participants that were willing to talk about their experiences regarding 
Jordanian-Palestinian refugee coexistence.  The journey was dedicated to becoming 
familiar with the refugee camp environment and culture, while simultaneously 
becoming familiar with people in the community.      
 An ally and member of the community was always necessary in assisting in 
recruiting, and if necessary, translation.  While I speak Colloquial Jordanian Arabic, I 
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was unable to understand the majority of my initial hour-long interviews with the 
Palestinian university graduates.  It was mentioned during my proposal defense that 
the Jordanian-Palestinian dialects should not be a problem, but for me it was.  My low 
variety Arabic diglossia forced me to rely on pseudo-research assistants to aid in 
immediate translation during the interviews.  My makeshift assistants (whether my 
cousins, my mother or my aunt) were pivotal during the Palestinian refugee interview 
portion.  In time, I was able to adapt more to the Arabic, which was Palestinian 
dialect and oftentimes formal, and I was able to somewhat familiarize myself.  When 
my research assistants could not attend one interview, I merely told the participant to 
speak to me the way they would to a ten year old.  Between his English and my 
Arabic, we were able to make do.  While many of the Palestinian refugee graduates 
have taken courses in English, the level was nowhere near enough to capture their 
thoughts and relay their messages.  As a result almost all of the Palestinian refugee 
interviews wound up in Arabic.       
 As for the Jordanian university graduates, most of the interviews were 
conducted in English, with a little Arabic present in every interview.  However, the 
Arabic of the Jordanians was much easier for me to understand and respond to.  I 
ended up utilizing my Arabic much more than I had anticipated, which was very 
interesting for many reasons.  First, my ignorant assumption that I would be able to 
conduct my interviews in English highlighted the ethnocentric arrogance that I have 
unknowingly internalized; the assumption that anyone who understood or learned 
English could or would speak it, especially regarding such deep and complicated 
subject matters.  Secondly, some Palestinian refugees could speak to me in English, 
93 
but chose not to, which I think was a combination of comfort (being able to convey 
their thoughts adequately) and a political statement.      
 Thirdly, I think having to speak in Arabic was a very big lesson on the 
importance of research.  The compromise of having to rely on assistants and 
translators and having to rely on my seemingly limited Arabic forced us to engage in 
an unanticipated dance; the receiving and delivering of messages made both the 
participants and me check and double check the authenticity of what we were 
communicating.  This exchange brought us even closer together, creating a bond 
between someone who sought the participants’ stories, and the participant who seeks 
to be heard.         
 Data collection included mainly fieldwork and field observations as well as 
interviews.  Throughout the course of the study, the objective was to study and 
explore the perceptions and experiences of Jordanian and Palestinian refugee 
coexistence.  Themes were generated and interview questions emanated from the 
observations of societal observations in Jordan.     
 The first two weeks of my stay in Jordan were observations of the culture at 
large.  I observed and explored the shopping centers, driving regulations, 
conversations in passing, etc.  The remainder of the trip was more overt observation 
in the refugee camp. Unless I was interviewing Jordanian participants, I was in the 
refugee camp.  Time spent in the refugee camp spanned anywhere between two-seven 
hours a day.  Field notes were typed up, and all interviews were translated and 
transcribed prior to my return in the event that my tapes were confiscated.  A backup 
copy of all tapes were made and left in Jordan in a safe, locked place in the event that 
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anything happened to me or the tapes that I had on me during my flight back to 
California.          
    Data Analysis Procedures   
 Data analysis began immediately after data collection.  Whenever any 
observation was completed, field notes were typed and studied.  Interviews were 
immediately translated and transcribed.  Interview transcriptions took as long as 
fifteen hours and no fewer than five hours to transcribe.  Further analysis began from 
the focal point—the research questions.  The research questions about coexistence 
from the perspectives of Palestinians and Jordanians are the framework, the roadmap 
for this study, but as anticipated, more questions arose when abroad.  
 Observations, field notes, interviews, personal notes, and other relevant data 
were all cross referenced to come up with themes that threaded throughout my 
research.  Reflections and a personal journal were also kept.  I was constantly writing 
down possible ideas, themes, and questions and put them away for a day or two 
before revisiting them to see if any new ideas generated.  Data was reviewed with my 
cousins and family members in Jordan because I felt it would be more authentic to 
cross reference my observations with theirs; they were able see things that I was not 
able to.  All of these exercises individually and collectively have allowed me to 
identify themes, strengths and weaknesses, new observations and thoughts, and 
insight.  Upon returning from Jordan, data was coded by thematic relevance.  Quotes 
were grouped together based on whether or not they adequately addressed the 
overriding themes which were revealed from the study.      
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   Protection of Human Subjects  
 Although I anticipated that some questions might make participants feel 
uncomfortable, I underestimated just how uncomfortable some of the questions were.  
However, participants were free to decline to answer any questions they did not wish 
to answer or to stop participation at any time.  I also projected there were no known 
risks and/or discomforts associated with this study, which was also inaccurate.  To 
truly understand why there was discomfort and uneasiness during almost every 
interview and follow-up interview, one has to understand the current reality in Jordan.  
All-encompassing and pervasive fear exists, and to say that fear is omnipresent is not 
an exaggeration (This argument is further illustrated in Chapter Four).  I want to be 
careful here, because I can imagine that some Jordanians reading this might think I 
am being dramatic.  I do not believe this to be the case, but it is also fair to say the 
fears for refugees are greater, more heightened, than the fears for Jordanians or 
wealthy Palestinians.  I was told on more than one occasion that one out of every four 
people is mukhabarat (secret police), and oftentimes the fear was that I was one of 
them.  While there was no direct benefit to participants, the anticipated benefit of this 
study was that participants might come away with a greater understanding of their 
attitudes and perceptions of coexistence in Jordan.  I believe that this was the case 
because many, if not all, participants alluded to this during their follow up interview.
 Names and data collected are kept as confidential as possible. Only the 
researcher, community allies, and the person who led me to the participants knew the 
identity of those who agreed to be interviewed.  Should data gathered during the 
study be used for this dissertation or any published material, in order to maintain 
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confidentiality, pseudonyms were given to all participants. Study records were kept as 
confidential as possible.  Study information was kept in a private, undisclosed 
location.  Only the dissertation chair and I had access to the files.  Tape recordings 
will be expunged upon completion of the dissertation defense. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Methodological Challenges 
 
Introduction 
 The subject matter of this research is grounded in undoubtedly the most 
conflict ridden part of the world.  Old, current, and emerging religious, economic, 
cultural, and social fissures create an environment which poses various challenges 
this chapter will address.  Further, the omnipresence of mukhabarat (secret police) 
and their focus on possible dissenting discourse complicated an already sensitive 
research venture.  Consequently, at the request of my dissertation committee I 
included this “Methodological Challenges” chapter to chronicle and catalogue the 
complexities of the environment I lived, researched, and worked in.   
Background of the Researcher 
 
It is now acknowledged that critical ethnographers have a 
responsibility have a responsibility to talk about our identities, why we 
interrogate what we do, what we choose not to report, how we frame 
our data, on whom we shed our scholarly gaze, who is protected and 
not protected as we do our work.  What is our participatory 
responsibility to research with and for a more progressive community 
life? (Fine, et al., 2000, p. 218)  
 
I should preface by stating my bias.  My bias lies with the Palestinian people 
who have been overrun by Israel’s forces, humiliated by Israel’s apartheid, and 
marginalized by Israel’s occupation of Palestine. This inevitably invokes sentiment 
towards Palestinians, or the “other”, living in Jordan as it seeks to piece together a 
meaningful existence in their host country.  However, the Palestinian people’s 
condition in Jordan is primarily a manifestation of Israel’s ongoing occupation of 
Palestine.  
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Freire’s (1994) notion that education is not neutral and political from birth 
helps me rationalize my biases.  This notion is furthered by methods of critical 
ethnography that do not require neutrality.  In my praxis, I have shed many tears, 
engaged in many arguments, been called an Anti-Semite by peers and colleagues, and 
I have internalized the oppression by sometimes believing the propaganda that has 
been fed to me.  I have learned through much reflection to unlearn the hatred and fear, 
and have begun to build bridges and form allies.  Though it has not been easy, I have 
come a long way.  As a transnational scholar and global activist, I seek to further 
discover and expose the various injustices that I observe, in addition to injustices and 
inequities that I have yet to see.        
 As a bi-cultural woman, both Armenian and Jordanian who holds dual 
citizenship in Jordan and the United States, I have always been aware of my 
identity—both the benefits and consequences.  When we left the Middle East, my 
family resettled in South San Francisco.  Growing up, I attended an Armenian 
bilingual and bicultural school in San Francisco.       
 At an early age, I learned what it meant to be bicultural and sometimes what I 
learned was that being half one thing, and half another, was something to be ashamed 
of.  This mentality never infiltrated the family realm, as my parents made a very 
conscious effort to educate both my sister and me about what it meant to be both 
Armenian and Jordanian; one was never sacrificed for the other.  Summers were spent 
in Jordan, surrounded by Arabic and Middle Eastern culture.  This was not easy; I can 
recall with great guilt and shame the times that I internalized my oppression; I was 
too insecure and too weak in my convictions.     
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 In college, and the events following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, I became hyper-aware of my Arab-ness.  My involvement in protests and going 
to trials to support friends who had been unjustly arrested were a part of my praxis. 
We wore green armbands, which only created more tension on my university campus.  
I recall going to meetings that the “Students for Justice in Palestine” club put together 
only to see lines of cop cars waiting.  They waited for nothing, because they were 
peaceful meetings.  The senseless fear that quickly spread was paralyzing.  
 Many nights, I recall being outside of clubs hearing drunken men sing the 
national anthem (sometimes skipping verses and dropping words) and chanting 
“USA! USA!”  During a study break days after the attack, I witnessed a Muslim 
woman walking passed a group of white men.  They proceeded to scream at her, 
telling her to “go back home” and that this was “all her fault.”  Notions of sexism 
were rampant as well, especially for women who chose to wear the veil.  
 I would be lying if I said that I did not hear many people I knew well saying 
clearly racist comments quickly followed by statements such as, “but I’m not racist” 
only to clear their own conscience.  Gross generalizations became the norm.  Political 
correctness was no longer necessary; now it became acceptable to talk about Arabs 
and fundamentalist terrorists without differentiating between the two.  United States 
citizenship transcended global citizenship.        
 I began to realize that war had become nothing short of a spectator sport, a 
legalized gang—a quarrel among leaders wherein innocent lives must fight and die.  
The United States was taking a step backwards as a nation with men, women and 
children suffering for the mistakes of the men we placed in power.  The 
100 
desensitization of war, and the dehumanization of those we called enemies, was 
nothing short of sin.  The war in Iraq has not solved any of our problems, it has 
merely displaced them.          
 In my own investigations and studies, I began to see the core of terrorism as 
deeply connected to frustration with mishandling and exploitation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  I have dedicated my years at USF to critically learning, thinking 
and questioning taken-for-granted truths.  I questioned the role of the United States 
after September 11, 2001.  I attended peace dialogues as a means of coming to terms 
with my anger and sadness and healing my wounded spirit.    
 When my family came from Jordan to visit us in the United States in 2005, 
they embedded in me a desire to explore issues they raised about coexistence in 
Jordan.  At the time, I had no idea this would become the huge undertaking that is my 
doctoral dissertation.  Many family friends have asked that I abandon this study, 
which only made me thirst for more information.  With the help and guidance of my 
mentors at USF in the International and Multicultural Education department, and the 
scholarly exchange of ideas, this study came alive.  I began to combine my passions 
for Jordan, Palestinian refugees, global human rights education, activism and 
revolution.           
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A Journey Back Home 
 Traveling to Jordan was the culmination of years of work and soul searching.  
Upon landing from a twenty four hour voyage to Queen Alia International Airport 
and looking for familiar faces, I was reminded of childhood journeys to Jordan.  I 
remember thinking that landing would never happen.  Like a child approaching her 
birthday, I count down the hours until I see the eyes of my family looking 
everywhere, trying to recognize me, the same way I search for them.  Finally when 
our eyes meet, what appears an hour-long scavenger hunt becomes an exhilarating, 
emotional encounter.   
Fears of homesickness leave my body almost immediately as I begin 
to realize that I have been homesick for Jordan for some time now; but 
I was unable to identify that within myself.  Here I find what I never 
knew I was searching for.  (Field notes, July 12, 2006) 
 
 We make our way to the car and I almost feel intoxicated; exhausted, 
disheveled, yet giddy.  Driving home from the airport, both sides of the highway used 
to be barren land where people would stop and picnic, or Bedouins would live; I 
recall even seeing camels as a child running alongside the highway.  This time, 
however, the highway is surrounded by a huge gas station, Hardee’s, McDonald’s, 
Burger King, and a huge water-park dubbed “Amman Waves”! The almost twenty 
minute car ride to our flat consists of trying to familiarize myself to an old friend who 
has had a complete facial reconstructive surgery due to the recent economic boom in 
Jordan.  My neighborhood is surrounded by new buildings, construction sites, and 
streets.   
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Development here is rapid.  Everyday a new place is being built and 
housing is on the rise at remarkable, unparallel rates.  Villas abound; 
almost invisible the last time I was here.  Expansion is unbelievable.  
One sight outside of my flat captured me:  a man building a house with 
his son, teaching him the trade.  The son looks at his father and 
emulates his moves; his dad puts a nail in and hammers, so too does 
the son.  This apprenticeship, I gather is not uncommon.  (Field notes, 
July 12, 2006) 
 
Prior to my arrival I was told that I would not recognize Amman, my birthplace and 
Jordan’s capital city.  I wondered whether economic development was helping or 
hindering everyone in Jordan.  My research question regarding sociopolitical climate 
and the effects it has on Jordanian-Palestinian refugee coexistence surface 
immediately.  I wondered: did the economic “boom” help everyone, both rich and 
poor?  I could not help but answer my own question, all the while hating the answer: 
the gentrification of Amman. 
As I drive from one location to the next I notice that Jordanian traffic 
as I knew it was different.  It was still hectic and chaotic, but 
something was different: people were driving in their lanes, making 
full stops at red lights and not making illegal turns—this used to be a 
norm in Jordan.  I ask the driver what is going on and he tells me to 
look up: cameras akin to the ones we have in the States are all over the 
place, taking pictures of illegal driving.  This was a shock to me 
because in no way did it seem to belong in Jordan or anywhere else in 
the Middle East for that matter.  Driving chaotically was a very 
distinct Arab trait—one that many of us used as a right of passage.  In 
other words, driving in Amman looks more like driving in Los 
Angeles: chaotic, sometimes police don’t do anything and yet 
somewhat monitored.  I was shocked.  What shocked me even more 
was the sheer presence of police.  They were on every single traffic 
light on motorcycles.  Now, it is important to realize that in Amman, 
police were more like figures, and their jobs included very little.  I 
wonder how many men entered law enforcement because there is a 
huge increase in volume.  The police used to be very notorious for 
being lackadaisical, and yet now even if people still could care less 
about them (in other words, they do not instill any fear) they are at 
least aware of their presence.  The driver tells me that they all drive 
American cars and use American guns.  Ah makes so much more 
sense now! (Field notes, July, 13, 2006) 
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Jordan’s overt attempts at Westernization are omnipresent, and one does not 
need to look far to find the United States in the Middle East.  It is a very awkward and 
uncomfortable concept: the Americanization of Jordan.   
I read an article in Jordanian magazine JO called Empowering the 
people: Democracy and the art of the possible (2006).  Dr. Sabri 
Rbeihat, head of the Ministry of Political Development, discussed the 
role of the people in Jordanian politics and the importance of political 
participation (Observer Comment [OC]: I wonder, however, in this 
Americanization of Jordan, people are so busy with having access to 
American products that political participation seems a bit 
uninteresting.  I have only noticed that middle-aged men and women 
discuss politics at home all the time, but are more consumed with how 
pleasurable it is that they now have soy milk to drink and Starbucks: in 
other words, leave the decision-making to the decision-makers.  I am 
assuming that this is more common among the wealthy). I would also 
call what is happening here a Jordanian Renaissance.  Everything is 
coming to fruition at once. Access to the West is more within reach 
than ever before and if someone has the money to spend, the West and 
the East live together in perfect harmony.  (Field notes, July, 13, 
2006). 
 
My family falls in this category—the one wherein access is not an issue of concern, 
but rather a right; I would hesitantly go even further to suggest it is a taken-for-
granted right; one that comes with a sense of entitlement.   
 Political talk is in every conversation among adults—at every meal 
and every gathering.  This is a land of contradictions in so many 
ways…[T]here is little civic participation among the wealthy and an 
unhealthy intensity of participation in pockets of poverty; criticism of 
the West but a desire to emulate.  Even policy wise there is criticism 
and a simultaneous desire to appease. (Field notes, July 14, 2006) 
 
And so, my position as the researcher is redefined as a Jordanian-Armenian woman 
who comes from the United States and her family in Jordan falls within the top one 
percent of wealth; complicated to say the least.   
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I tell my cousin that I want to start looking for a gold necklace with 
my name written in Arabic.  She thought it was so tacky, but it is 
something I have always wanted.  “People look forward, Marianne not 
backward” as if to say that anything Arabic is ‘backward’.  [OC: I 
think that there is an overall Arab internalized oppression…will find 
out.] (Field notes, July, 13, 2006) 
 
The observation above was too simplistic at the time, but not completely off the mark.  
As days turned to weeks, I noticed the importance class played in the internalization, 
and how certain Arabs viewed themselves.  As the study unfolded, I realized how 
Arab-ness fit on the continuum; on the one side nationalism and on the other, 
westernization at the expense of ethnic identity.  I realized for the first time that 
someone could assimilate to the United States, even when they do not live within 
United States borders; frightening.  
Methodological and Ethical Challenges 
How is the “native” ethnographer in the field of education positioned 
vis-à-vis her own community, the majority culture, the research 
setting, and the academy?  (Villenas, 1996, p. 712) 
 
 My role as a researcher was not easy. The main issue that arose, even in the 
beginning stages, was my bias.  My predisposition is that the Palestinian situation is 
the result of the United States’ and Israeli occupation and oppression, and that 
without Jordan’s aid Palestinians would be in a situation far more calamitous.  
Ultimately, the tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians, I believe, deviate from 
the real issue: systematic neo-apartheid of Palestinians in their own country.    
 I made a conscious effort to be aware of my bias during observations, 
interviews, even noting when my emotions were being triggered.  By presenting data 
that included both sides of the perceptions regarding Jordanian-Palestinian 
coexistence, I was letting go of some of that bias.  I wanted my research to be as 
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accurate, untainted, ethical, and authentic as possible, but I realize that this subject 
resonates with me at my core and that at times I lost myself in the content of what I 
witnessed, rather than remaining a distant observer.  While qualitative research does 
not require the elimination of bias, I wanted to state mine from the beginning, so I 
could move beyond it and honor the voice of participants.  Even after returning, I 
realize it is still a work in progress.      
 Notions of my own identity as the researcher are very important.  Although I 
was born in Jordan, and hold a Jordanian passport, my connection and citizenship to 
the United States (given the current Anti-American sentiment) garnered a level of 
distrust from participants.  I was viewed by some as a traitor and no longer a true 
Jordanian.  I addressed these issues by ensuring and reiterating participant anonymity 
while expressing my ultimate goal of shedding light on the importance of peaceful 
coexistence, however sometimes it was to no avail.  Moreover, my identity as a 
Jordanian-Armenian woman and scholar created an unanticipated challenge: 
ethnocentrism.  As discussed in Chapter four, reviewing my analyses with colleagues 
enabled me to see that I myself had to confront my own notions of ethnocentrism, 
despite my transnational identity.      
 One obstacle that I thought I would face was my gender and religion.  This 
was not as big of an issue as I thought.  As a female and Christian in a predominantly 
Muslim environment, I assumed I might not be able to extract as many responses as 
someone in the dominant community.  I do not believe this was the case.  I did have 
to change my dress and behavior, both of which I was more than willing to do in 
order to research this topic further.  I had to alter or shift my behavior when the 
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environment necessitated, and I have documented those instances.   
 Many fellow Jordanians, ranging from housewives, corporate executives, 
students, educators to chauffeurs, are upset about this study.  I am told I have turned 
my back on my people.  I swallow a lot of what is said out of respect, but I 
realize my own patterns stemming even from my unconscious peace activist days; 
moments where I have critically examined the Armenian, Israeli, or dominant 
communities, I faced ridicule. I have been called anti-Armenian, anti-Semitic, anti- 
American and now, anti-Jordanian; but I oftentimes wondered, what about being pro-
humanity?           
 My role as the researcher, I believe, was also helpful, as a Jordanian born, 
Arabic speaking person.  This was a huge asset to me and my research.  Although I 
did require help talking to people, they felt comfortable talking to an Arab versus an 
American, especially given the Anti-American sentiments among some (not all) 
participants.  One other asset, I believe, was my age.  As a 26 year old, not too far out 
of university, I related to my participants.  I have also worked in higher education, 
and I not only love the academic environment, but find I can easily engage with 
people in their early twenties.        
 Jacobsen and Landau (2003) specifically investigate the challenges of 
research focused on forced migrants and their realities.  It is very important to address 
not only my personal challenges during my time in Jordan, but also the 
methodological and ethical concerns inherent in studying forced migrants.  Jacobsen 
and Landau (2003) address the dual imperative in refugee research: the importance of 
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thoroughly addressing the methodological and ethical concerns of research on forced 
migrants.   
The main methodological concerns they claim weaken refugee research are 
the researcher’s inability to explicitly inform key factors of the research design and 
methodology.  Researchers should state how interviewers were selected, interviewed, 
and where interviews took place.  Second, the authors state the inherent political and 
legal marginality of refugees means they have few rights and are susceptible to 
negative retribution as a result of their willingness to speak and be interviewed.   
Next, Jacobsen and Landau (2003) discuss the problems with sampling, 
interview technique and construct validity.  Construct validity speaks to whether or 
not responses given to interview questions are an accurate indication of what the 
study seeks to explore.  They also emphasize the possible ethical and methodological 
challenges of having local research assistants’ aid in the research process as a result 
of political, social, or economic ramifications this poses both to the study and to the 
participants.  Finally, they express concerns with small-scale studies and lack of 
accurate representative of the target populations.     
 While some of Jacobsen and Landau’s (2003) concerns regarding the ethical 
and methodological challenges of refugee research were addressed in Chapter Three, 
it is important to re-examine and explicitly explore and address them within their 
contexts.  First, I met Jordanian research participants through contacts who had access 
to recent university graduates.  One interview was conducted at the contact’s house 
because he was a neighbor of the participants.  The other two participant interviews 
were conducted at my aunt and uncle’s house because it was most convenient for 
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participants, as my flat was out of the way.        
 Jordanian participant interviews did not take place at their homes so as not to 
trouble them to be hospitable.  Jordanians are known for their hospitality and it would 
have been selfish to ask to meet at their homes.  This way, at my aunt and uncle’s 
home we could serve them food and entertain them as a way of thanking them for 
their participation.  These contacts who connected me to participants were not local 
researchers, which minimized the concern of furthering their personal and research 
agendas.  It is important to note, while allies in the community were an asset and yet 
do pose an ethical limitation, the main variables for finding and connecting me to 
participants was finding graduates, thereby minimizing ulterior motives.  It was more 
difficult than anticipated to find university graduates who were entirely Jordanian or 
entirely Palestinians because of the pervasiveness of intermarriages.  Therefore, 
participants were randomly selected based on several requirements; those who were 
full Jordanian or full Palestinian and graduated from a public university were 
automatically selected to be interviewed.   To be considered full Jordanian came with 
its own requirements; participants’ and their parents had to have historical and tribal 
lineage to Jordan, which falls in alignment with Jordan’s tribal history.  
 Palestinian refugee participants were selected through an ally as well.  He was 
considered one of the unofficial leaders and was brought to my attention by a driver.  
He told me his neighbor used to be a refugee who just moved outside the camp.  
Through this exchange I was able to meet Mr. Abu Ahmad, who led me to three 
university graduates.  The main criteria, once again, was their completion of 
university so as to evade any possible ramifications of speaking to students still 
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enrolled.  The first set of interviews were conducted at Mr. Abu Ahmad’s house, and 
the second in participant homes in between observations of the respective refugee 
camps.          
 The refugee reality seeped in political and social fears and the ethical concerns 
this posed during my time in Jordan are thoroughly examined in Chapters Four and 
Five. In short, many ethical concerns followed me during my time in Jordan and 
particularly upon returned to the United States.  The risk in speaking about such a 
politically charged subject was at the fore of my mind during my entire stay.  Certain 
strategies were used to minimize risks and to maximize anonymity (both my own and 
my participants’).  While walking through the camps, the DPA permit was hidden, 
and when it was requested, I tried my best to hand it covering my name with my 
thumb.  Participants were spoken to in private and interview questions were never 
revealed to anyone except the person being interviewed.  When asked about the 
subject of study, I led people to believe it was about the camps solely, and had 
nothing to do with life in relation to and alongside Jordanians.  
 The third concern to be addressed was the small sample size of participants.  
Though originally nineteen interviews were conducted, six were eliminated because 
of participant withdrawal.  Further, as addressed in Limitations of the Study, this 
study does not attempt to generalize the existence of all Jordanians and all Palestinian 
refugees.  These are the opinions of a small group of people.  While this study 
contributes to discourse around Diaspora studies, refugee, transnational, and human 
rights discourse, generalizations of participant perceptions can not be made to speak 
for an entire population.  Most importantly, my findings and generated themes are not 
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absolute truths, but perceptions.  Therefore, the most fundamental position I must 
take is to assert that my findings can be affirmed or disproved at any time.  Jacobsen 
and Landau (2003) support my claim by stating “the most fundamental prerequisite of 
good social science [is]: allowing for the possibility that one’s hypothesis however 
dearly held, could be proven wrong” (pp. 190-191).     
 While Jacobsen and Landau (2003) imply their preference for large-scale 
survey data, this goes against my personal preference and philosophy regarding the 
invaluable nature of qualitative studies utilizing critical ethnography.  Finally, 
although the initial intent was to conduct a full scale ethnography, for personal and 
professional reasons (addressed above), the study was reduced to a qualitative study, 
and at best, a small-scale ethnography.  I hope I have adequately addressed how my 
role as a researcher, as well as the methodological and ethical challenges affected the 
research.  Fundamentally, what I sought was perceptions regarding coexistence, and 
along this journey, I found so much more.   
Before taking the journey to collect data for the dissertation, I was jokingly 
told a blue-eyed, young, and Christian person would be raped, kidnapped, or 
mistrusted.  Interestingly enough, I never feared what refugees could do to me, but 
rather, what mukhabarat (secret police) were capable of doing if they ever found out 
my intentions to shed light on Jordanian-Palestinian coexistence.  I found myself 
paranoid on several occasions, oftentimes practicing what I would say if I were ever 
questioned.  I relied heavily on the fact that I had dual citizenships, but loathed 
carrying around a tape-recorder. 
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Ultimately, my study was compromised when two Palestinian refugee 
participants dropped out of my study a week before I was set to return; they dropped 
out for fear I was mukhabarat.  Mukhabarat can be Jordanian as well as Palestinian, 
thus reinforcing the complexity of the situation.  However, the focus of mukhabarat 
reiterated greater social assumption among Palestinian refugees regarding Jordanians 
and assimilated Palestinians as oppressors while simultaneously reinforcing Jordanian 
assumptions of Palestinian refugees as people who threaten Jordanian national 
security.  The greater social assumption is reaffirmed by the ghetto-like environment 
of the refugee camps. 
I grew to resent the fact that people were inquiring about my study, but on the 
other hand, I fully understood I would have never collected the invaluable amount of 
information and data had I not had the connections I did.  However, the more people 
knew about me and my study, the more I was exposed.  With so many mukhabarat in 
Jordan, one is never sure who they are talking to and what information they are 
providing.  I despised having to identify myself or my study, as this compromised my 
research.   
One very interesting occurrence happened during data collection at Hiteen 
refugee camp in Zarqa.  Before heading for Hiteen, I was told by a friend to come to 
his house at ten in the morning; he arranged for someone to take me to Shneller, a 
German boarding school headed by nuns where children filmed a documentary about 
refugee children and their life.  Nizar (my ally and “in” for the day) and I made our 
way 30 minutes outside Amman, only to find locked gates.  A guard told us to speak 
to someone in the head office.  Upon meeting the head and being told we had no 
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authority to enter, we decided to make our way to Hiteen refugee camp.  The woman 
told us to go to the Hiteen head office and show our permit.  The events that 
unraveled are noteworthy because my gut tells me the minute we left she made a call 
to set us up at Hiteen. 
Upon making our way to Hiteen refugee camp, Nizar insisted a trip to the 
head office would benefit me and my study; he believed I would find statistics about 
the refugee camp and an “official” stance on life at Hiteen.  I pleaded with him, 
letting him know I would rather go it alone and make my own observations without 
anyone’s help.  I believe he mistook my insistence as politeness, and with that, I lost 
my battle as we climbed the stairs to the main office.  Trembling, I handed my permit 
to two men.  This permit from the Department of Palestinian Affairs has been both a 
blessing and curse.  My name is on the permit, and I always made sure to show the 
permit by covering my name with my thumb, but this time he took it out of my hand, 
examining it closely.  He asked me what I wanted from them, and I let him know I 
was at Hiteen to observe “life”; in my attempts to sound vague, I sounded unprepared 
and dumb which is something I was okay with.  The man ordered me to be more 
specific, and I told him I was interested in education, health, and the living 
conditions.  The man holding my permit handed back my permit and told me I was 
forbidden to take pictures, but allowed me to proceed.  Relieved, we headed out for 
the souk (marketplace) and I quickly realized Hiteen was unlike the other refugee 
camps I had observed.   
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The souk reminded me of being in Syria.  It was clean compared to the other 
refugee camps I witnessed, and immediately my mind flooded with conspiracy 
theories.   
Hiteen is very clean in comparison and so far all of the children that I 
have seen have some sort of shoes on.  This place has felt strange to 
me from the beginning, but I keep observing.  The souk is very modern 
for a camp, and people are using wheel barrels to haul things around.  
One thing I have had difficulty with is seeing all of the dead sheep 
hanging—heads, ears and all—just waiting for the blood to dry.  Here, 
it is no different.  They are flung over a man’s shoulder in front of me, 
and I can not help but close my eyes…Chicken slaughter houses are 
also all over the place.  I can still hear them clucking.  Fruits, herbs, 
and veggies are for sale and literally for a second, you forget that you 
are in a camp.  As we exit the souk, we enter the residential part of the 
camp…All of a sudden an old, red minivan pulls up to us and orders 
us to stop.  I keep walking pretending I do not hear them and I grow 
more anxious.  It is a van filled with five men.  I feel the intimidation 
take over me.  (Field notes, August 3, 2006) 
 
The encounter which ensued still feels surreal.  Unlike me, Nizar stopped to see what 
they had to say and I was irritated.  I let him go to find out what they wanted, all the 
while remaining out of their sight.  He went up to the minivan and spoke to them for 
what appeared an eternity.  As he made his way back to me, he reassured me that 
everything was all right.  I did not believe him. 
All of a sudden the official who was in the office comes out of the 
minivan.  Great!  And this is exactly why I didn’t want to go to the 
office.  He comes out and asks what it is he can help me with as if I 
was the one who stopped him.  I tell him, I’m just here to look around.  
He tells me to ask him questions about what it is I am interested in 
finding out.  “Um, okay, how is education in the camps?” It is the best 
I could come up with after being simultaneously annoyed and afraid.  
He continues to tell me that there are five UN schools in the camp and 
two government schools.  There are 11,000 pupils.  Education until 
10th grade is compulsory and everything at the camps are great.  He 
tells me to take notes, so I am forced to take out a pen and paper and 
begin to pretend I am interested in what he says, all the while trying to 
come up with answers and excuses that will not set anything off.  He 
continues to tell me that there are five schools that alternate schedules 
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and the boys and girls are separate.  “Is there anything else you want to 
ask?” he says, and quickly I respond by asking how much a family 
receives from the UN per month? “Nothing” he says.  “How do they 
pay for rent?” I quickly ask, this time interested in the answer.  “They 
don’t” he explains.  I am so confused but I do not want to ask.  “Do 
you have any other questions?”  “No,” I say, “but thank you.” (Field 
notes, August 3, 2006) 
 
Assuming, I was free to move on, I felt much more relieved.  He told me, “You are 
welcome” and just as I was about to let out a sigh of relief, he continued “oh and by 
the way, we live just like the Jordanians” (Field notes, August 3, 2006).  There is no 
way to prove what I believe to be true, but I honestly think these men sought out 
looking for me and to let me know they were never too far away.  The message they 
were sending me was, we were being watched and they were not trying to hide it.   
Nizar told me we were going to go back to the office to get the statistics he 
insisted would be present, accurate, and helpful.  We made our way back to the head 
offices and two men emerged from an office.  One asked us into his office. The man 
asked me the purpose of my visit, and I told him I was looking at education in the 
camps. 
He tells me that he is a volunteer at one of the schools.  I pretend to be 
happy as though I just struck gold, but I am unimpressed.  He tells me 
that sometimes there will be 50 students to a class and not enough time 
for a teacher to cover everything.  Education there is great, and life in 
the camps is good.  I pretend to take notes, but I am studying him 
more [emphasis added].  As a Palestinian living in the camps, he can 
say that everything is pretty normal, and they live the same way 
Jordanians do—no different.  Again, something in me is triggered.  I 
pretend to be writing so as not make any eye contact.  I tell him I 
noticed how clean the camp is compared to Baqa’a and he explains 
that it’s because the community cares.  He says it is up to the 
individual and he does not want his kids to play in waste, unlike other 
places which simply may not care.  I see.  He tells me school is 
compulsory until 10th grade, and everything in the camps are 
successful—they live like any other Jordanian and insists I not to listen 
to what others in other camps have been telling me.  He, as an official 
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knows the ‘truth’.  I want to leave as quickly as possible and so, 
without drinking my coffee, I say thank you and shake hands…The 
aura in this camp was suspicious and I sense much underhanded 
business taking place.  What did it really cost to keep this place as 
clean as it is, and running as successfully?  Something is definitely up 
here [emphasis added].  (Field notes, August 3, 2006) 
 
One can call my observation paranoid and without merit, and their judgments would 
definitely hold value, but paying closer attention one understands I never told anyone 
my study had anything to do with comparative existences between Jordanians and 
Palestinian refugees.  All the men I spoke to made it a point not only to let me know 
they lived the same way as Jordanians, but not to believe anyone who said otherwise.  
I firmly believe the men I spoke to were Jordanian or Palestinian mukhabarat.  If I 
was not going as an “American researcher” but rather a Jordanian native or 
Palestinian native of Jordan, I wonder if and how the treatment would have differed.  
Whether or not I am correct, we will never know.  However, it is important to realize 
because of the pervasiveness of mukhabarat the possibility they could have been 
present was enough for me to word my questions and behavior carefully.  Moreover, 
it begs the questions, if Jordan is attempting to Americanize, was it a façade? Or more 
importantly, is the United States becoming more like Jordan? 
MMM:  Did you talk or discuss politics at university? 
 
JR: It is not allowed at the university, of course, but as individuals we 
were talking politics among ourselves in such regard, but we were 
afraid. 
 
MMM: Afraid of what? 
 
JR: We were afraid from any girls who may be agents of mukhabarat 
[intelligence service].  Here, we have lots incidents’ like that.  And 
there are people who spy.  Consequently, when we talk, we talk with 
the ones we know and trust.  Democracy? Nothing!  (personal 
communication, August 10, 2006) 
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The most inherent reality for the refugees was mukhabarat.  The possibility of 
mukhabarat looms over the minds of the majority of the inhabitants in the refugee 
camps.    
Palestinian refugee participants were two females, Nour and JR, and one male, 
Khaled.  JR was never intended to be a participant, and in fact I did not meet her until 
shortly before I was set to return to the United States.  I initially planned to speak to 
two other refugees: Zeid and Rula, both of which pulled out of my study in the midst 
of grueling transcriptions and a week before I was supposed to return.  Zeid and Rula 
began to question my identity and feared for their lives.  In an attempt to schedule a 
final interview with Rula, I was told she was in vacationing in Syria.  My aunt 
immediately recognized what was happening; she knew this was a lie intended to 
distract me and she recommended I begin immediately looking for an alternate 
participant.  I decided if I could conduct another follow-up interview with Zeid (the 
first was completely null due to an audiotape malfunction) then I would still meet my 
goal of three interviewees; Nour, Khaled, and Zeid.   
 My aunt kindly dialed Mr. Abu-Ahmad for me and spoke to him because his 
accent was too difficult for me to comprehend over the phone.  He told her a meeting 
with Zeid was difficult because he was busy and she immediately confronted him 
about the alleged lies.  Mr. Abu-Ahmad finally admitted both my participants were 
present, but unwilling to help me any further with my research because they feared 
their safety.  Zeid’s father threatened to personally shoot him if he spoke to the 
“American girl” one more time, and Rula’s parents said unless I conducted the 
interviews with security guards present, she was forbidden to speak to me.  Knowing 
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full well I could not conduct my interviews with police officers, I had to think 
quickly.  Because of the war in Lebanon and my near completion of all my 
interviews, I had to find one more person willing to talk and trusting of me before I 
left. It is in Baqa’a refugee camp where I found JR, whose eloquence and honesty 
were a blessing. 
 At this point in my journey, it is not an exaggeration to say I had a breakdown.  
All the stresses of conducting radical research in Jordan, coupled with the guilt of 
making participants fear for their safety, defending myself and my study, along with 
the sheer exhaustion of transcribing and typing interviews all converged.  I was also 
lonely and missed my family and friends back home.  I felt in abandoning Rula and 
Zeid, I had abandoned myself and my study.  For the first time in almost nine months, 
I broke out in hives.  I locked myself in my cousin’s room and cried for hours as she 
patiently listened to me ramble on.   
I never returned to Madaba refugee camp again because I felt with every visit, 
I was jeopardizing people’s safety.  I was never able to say a proper goodbye or thank 
you; our goodbyes consisted of one tear filled phone call to Mr. Abu-Ahmad’s son, 
who pleaded with me to never forget them or their cause.  In Madaba refugee camp, I 
felt more at home than in West Amman where I lived for the summer.  I felt free and 
purpose driven.  I look back at my time in Madaba with immense sadness and guilt 
that still make it hard for me to reflect and write.  
Upon realizing I was no longer able to go to Madaba refugee camp, I began to 
quickly employ my connections.  Nizar, the kind gentleman who made time to take 
me to Hiteen refugee camp recalled a friend in Baqa’a refugee camp whose sister 
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recently graduated from a public university.  After a few phone calls and pleading, we 
quickly made way to Baqa’a.  Even though there was a big barbeque scheduled for 
me and my mother, we all knew this was an opportunity I could not afford to miss.  
Upon meeting JR and instantly connecting to her, we formed a friendship and began 
the process of my interview.  After four initial interviews, and two participants who 
dropped out, I ended up with three Palestinian refugee participants: Nour, Khaled, 
and finally JR.   
Border Identity Challenges 
 
In the midst of a massacre, in the face of torture, in the eye of a 
hurricane, in the aftermath of an earthquake, or even, say, when horror 
looms apparently more gentle in memories that wont recede and so 
come pouring forth in the late-nite quiet of a kitchen, as a storyteller 
opens her heart to a story listener, recounting hurts that cut deep and 
raw into the gullies of the self, do you, the observer, stay behind the 
lens of the camera, switch on the tape recorder, keep pen in hand?  Are 
there limits—of respect, piety, pathos—that should not be crossed, 
even to leave a record?  But if you can’t stop the horror, shouldn’t you 
at least document it? (Behar, 1996, p.2) 
 
After my return from Jordan on August 26, 2006, I could not confront my 
research for nearly two months after conducting field work.  The first month, I used 
the excuse that I was reflecting; and while I truly was, the real underlying reason was 
fear.  I was afraid what I wrote would not do justice to what I saw.  I was afraid to 
face the emotions I silently carried with me while in Jordan.  I was also scared 
anything I wrote from here on out would ultimately upset so many of my family 
members abroad.  After discussing my trepidations with Dr. Katz, and letting her 
know my paralysis was due to fear of inadequately telling this profound story, she 
smiled and told me “you will rise to the occasion” (personal communication, October 
9, 2006).  As I walked out of her office, I wondered how or why she had so much 
119 
faith in me.  Did she know I had no idea how or where to start?  I decided to begin the 
only place I knew would be cathartic—with honesty—honesty about my state of mind 
upon returning from Jordan. 
 My trepidation is in no way an indicator of forgetfulness or carelessness. 
Rather, it indicates just how entangled and ingrained in the research I became while 
abroad.  My complete immersion in the study was necessary, and data collection was 
systematic and methodical.  Years of work culminated in this experience where 
everything I read merged into real life.  The evolution of this work dawned on me 
while I was in Jordan, and I could not believe there I was finally talking to the people 
I spent years researching. I went there to tell their story, to get their perceptions, and 
to understand their realities.   
One of my main objectives was to bring legitimacy to the issue of harmonious 
coexistence.  However, what I came to realize upon my return was that on some level, 
I felt I abandoned the very people I went to focus on.  Writing about my emotions 
would minimize them, and I realize now that this dissertation will oversimplify the 
reality in Jordan, because I can not capture the eyes of little orphans, the sadness 
etched in the mothers’ faces, or the rage engulfing so many youth.  Nothing will give 
those memories justice, except a journey of one’s own.  Here, you will only 
experience this journey through my lens, one blurry from tears silently shed since my 
return. 
 One thing I painfully learned and internalized is the reality of research as a 
selfish undertaking.  Villenas (1996) asks, “As ethnographers, we are also like 
colonizers when we fail to question our own identities and privileged positions, and in 
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the ways in which our writings perpetuate “othering” (p. 713).”  I realized during my 
two month hiatus from writing that I am angry at myself as an academic and a 
scholar.  Am I the researcher Villenas (1996) identifies as both the colonizer and 
colonized?  Have I on some level lost touch with my community? And now, rather 
than an active participant, have I become “researcher-observer”? The not-so-
subliminal undertone of researcher as educated, I sense, created a one-up, one-down 
phenomena I could not shake no matter how hard I tried.  I could not hide my 
privilege, the very privilege I grew to resent.   
I am here because I am a woman of the border: between places, 
between identities, between languages, between cultures, between 
longings and illusions, one foot in the academy and one foot out.  But I 
am also here because I have an intellectual debt to the Chicano critique 
of and the creative writing of Chicana authors. (Behar, 1996, p. 162) 
 
The guilt and remorse involved with this research and my role of the 
“privileged scholar” still exists within me.  I do not think it will ever leave, given my 
identity as a transnational immigrant and woman.  Moreover the marriage of my 
cultural identities with my academic capital is still something I negotiate, even more 
so since my return.  Ruth Behar’s (1996) “intellectual debt” is something I think 
many academics and scholars of color relate to.  My intellectual indebtedness 
provides a new role for me, not necessarily as “researcher-traitor” but rather, agent of 
change.  Now, I have somehow rationalized my privilege.  I suppose for someone 
who was born and raised in the Middle East, there was a “researcher-as-traitor” 
feeling I was unprepared for; me as oppressor?   
Here is my own dilemma:  as a Chicana graduate student in a White 
institution and an educational ethnographer of Latino communities, I 
am both, as well as in between the two.  I am the colonized in relation 
to the greater society, to the institution of higher learning, and to the 
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dominant majority culture in the research setting.  I am the colonizer 
because I am the educated, “marginalized” researcher, recruited and 
sanctioned by privileged dominant institutioins to write for and about 
Latino communities.  I am a walking contradiction with a foot in both 
worlds—in the dominant privileged institutions and in the 
marginalized communities.  Yet, I possess my own agency and will to 
promote my own and the collective agendas of particular Latino 
communities.  (Villenas, 1996, p. 714) 
 
Now, I view this academic journey as a woman who hopes to contribute as much to 
the field of Middle Eastern literature as possible, knowing full well I am always 
indebted to the field that gave birth to the thirst and passion of my research agenda.  
And so, when Behar (1996) poses the question “But if you can’t stop the horror, 
shouldn’t you at least document it?” (p. 2), my answer is simply, “Yes.” 
 There was a mourning process upon my return from Jordan, as I mourned the 
death of my naïveté about Jordan, and mourned leaving behind my family and new 
friends.  The grieving process and fear led to the paralysis that became my two month 
hiatus, and hope came out of the realization that I had a role and a responsibility to 
bring scholarly attention to the plight of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.   
Loss, mourning, the longing for memory, the desire to enter into the 
world around you and having no idea how to do it, the fear of 
observing too coldly or too distractedly or too raggedy, the rage of 
cowardice, the insight that is always arriving late, as defiant hindsight, 
a sense of the utter uselessness of writing anything and yet the burning 
desire to write something, are the stopping places along the way.  At 
the end of the voyage, if you are lucky, you catch a glimpse of a 
lighthouse, and you are grateful.  Life, after all, is bountiful.  (Behar, 
1996, p. 4) 
 
While I am still not at the point of viewing life as “bountiful” (p. 4), I see the 
lighthouse ahead. 
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CHAPTER V: 
Deconstructing Handala 
 
Meeting Handala 
 
 On my second day in Jordan my cousins took me to Starbucks.  This “coffee 
shop” was more of a chic hangout where young women dressed to impress.  A large 
two-level store offered panoramic views of Amman.  Leaving the parking lot on our 
way to Starbucks, I pointed to a bumper sticker on a car, asking my cousins what it 
symbolized.  It was a small caricature of what appeared at the time to be a stick 
figure; a little boy with hands behind his back, barefooted, and hair sticking straight 
up.   
 
(http://arab.sa.utoronto.ca/Links.htm , 2006) 
 
One of my cousins said that it was Handala.  I asked who Handala was and she said 
“it’s a Palestinian thing.”  I pressed further, but neither knew who he was or what he 
represented. 
Razan and I looked up ‘Handala’ and its meaning.  OC:  This image 
has stuck with me since I first laid eyes on it.  Somehow it will be 
incorporated in my research…I want to adopt this little boy—make 
him my own.  I feel that he is already with me, and when I think of my 
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research, I think of him, and how I long to see his face. (Field notes, 
July 25, 2006) 
 
As it turns out the Palestinian political cartoonist, Naji al-Ali created Handala 
(meaning bitterness) as a symbol of Palestinian displacement and refugee status. Naji 
al-Ali states: 
The child Handala is my signature, everyone asks me about him 
wherever I go. I gave birth to this child in the Gulf and I presented him 
to the people. His name is Handala and he has promised the people 
that he will remain true to himself. I drew him as a child who is not 
beautiful, his hair is like the hair of a hedgehog who uses his thorns as 
a weapon. Handala is not a fat, happy, relaxed, or pampered child, he 
is barefooted like the refugee camp children, and he is an 'icon' that 
protects me from making mistakes [emphasis added]. Even though he 
is rough, he smells of Amber. His hands are clasped behind his back as 
a sign of rejection at a time when solutions are presented to us the 
American way [emphasis added]. Handala was born ten years old, and 
he will always be ten years old. At that age I left my homeland, and 
when he returns, Handala will still be ten, and then he will start 
growing up. The laws of nature do not apply to him. He is unique. 
Things will become normal again when the homeland returns. I 
presented him to the poor and named him Handala as a symbol of 
bitterness. At first he was a Palestinian child, but his consciousness 
developed to have a national and then a global and human horizon 
[emphasis added]. He is a simple yet tough child, and this is why 
people adopted him and felt that he represents their consciousness. 
(Naji al-Ali, in This week in Palestine, 1999) 
 
When asked when we will see Handala’s face, Naji al-Ali continues: 
When Arab dignity is no longer threatened, and when the Arab 
individual regains his freedom and humanity [emphasis added]. 
Still, the most tiring part is to continue the road with all its 
contradictions. The weariness of the homeland will always remain 
deep inside. (Naji al-Ali, in This week in Palestine, 1999) 
  
 And so, Handala becomes the indigenous framework of the study.  Each of 
Handala’s characteristics represents a theme that was presented by the refugees.  The 
interesting footnote to Handala is while it represents a symbol of pride and hope for 
Palestinians, it simultaneously represents Jordanian lack of awareness, or interest for 
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that matter.  It is here that the framework of this study is born; the lack of Jordanian 
consciousness and the heightened Palestinian one.  Employing Handala as the 
foundation and framework decolonizes my study by setting the innate activist tone of 
this piece. 
War 
 Soon after our arrival, my mother and I found ourselves in the midst of what 
was to become a war between Hezbollah and Israel.   
I am here at a time that is very sensitive in Jordan.  It is scary.  I feel 
so close to it, and yet, everyone has become so numb to it all.  When 
one walks in to every store, there is breaking news about what is 
happening in the Lebanese airport, little children being carried away in 
stretchers, women crying, and people screaming for mercy.  I feel 
shaken to my core, as I realize how far removed I have been back in 
the United States, and not by accident.  (Field notes, July 13, 2006) 
 
The above entry is the first mention about the war, when neither I nor anyone else 
knew what was in store for Jordan or the greater Middle East.  I recall fearing for my 
own safety and the safety of my family.  I worried in silence, however, because my 
fearful outlook only highlights my naïveté and how detached I have become living in 
the United States.  I envisioned my family and friends in the United States watching 
their television sets closely, wondering about me, and then going about their day.  I 
also wondered what kind of information they were receiving.  I wondered how Jordan 
would change in the very near future. 
There is a lot of unrest and people are fleeing Lebanon to come here 
by taxi.  The news is grim and we are tied to the television.  Daily life 
goes on, but on the fore of everyone’s mind is news that is very close 
to our borders.  Some say the possibilities may have very tragic 
ramifications in the near future, others say that worse has happened 
and will continue to happen, and that still we are the only stable 
country in the Middle East.  Sentiments, of course, are diverse.  The 
King made a statement to all Arab nations today: do not get involved 
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and politically this makes very good sense, but I can’t help but think of 
Jordan’s all too politically correct history and present. (Field notes, 
July 14, 2006) 
 
On the way home that night, the driver and I spotted the first Lebanese license plate; 
it was the first of many to come.  The demographics of Jordan were rapidly changing: 
To date, it has been rumored that hundreds of thousands of Lebanese 
people have crossed the border to Jordan.  The number of refugees 
almost over-month has risen dramatically.  However, the numbers by 
foot and by car will diminish slowly as all infrastructures for civilians 
to get in and out have been successfully targeted and now lay in ruins.  
I am starting to really see why they hate us and not in the same why I 
did before.  I knew it all along, but now it is materializing before my 
eyes.  But I am also very ironically starting to empathize a little with 
the magnitude of the conflict.  In other words, I am angered by the fact 
that Arab nations are politically disorganized and not on the same level 
with one another.  It creates fury within.  Where are we—Jordan—in 
this war and why haven’t we stepped up?  How will this affect my 
research?  It has been less than a month since the war.  The sites on 
TV have been devastating, and being so near to war is eye opening for 
me.  (Field notes, July 25, 2006) 
 
Notions of my own privilege emanate. 
I am afraid.  I have not been in a situation like this before.  I realize my 
own privilege.  I am so used to being so far detached and distant.  My 
cousins are so accustomed to these occurrences and are no longer 
fazed by them.  They think my interest in such things is futile and silly.  
I am so afraid to go into the refugee camps given what’s been taking 
place, but I am trying to convince myself that now is a very important 
time to go. (Field notes, July 14, 2006) 
 
And so, the stage was set.  While I was preparing for my study, neighboring nations 
prepared for war.   
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Jordanian Participants 
Three Jordanian alumni were interviewed twice.  The first interviews lasted 
from an hour to an hour and a half.  The follow up interviews lasted between half an 
hour to an hour.  All three Jordanian alumni participants wound up being men.  Shadi, 
a 23 year old recent graduate from the esteemed Jordan University of Science and 
Technology [JUST] holds a Mechanical Engineering degree and was training for 
Royal Jordanian Airlines.  Shadi is eager to make money and because it is so difficult 
in Jordan he contemplates the possibility of having to leave his home country and go 
anywhere where upward mobility is more likely.  He does not have any idea where he 
can go, but he realizes the likelihood of having to leave for economic stability.  
Shadi’s father is a retired police officer who was highly regarded in the community; I 
was told that when his father entered the room, people saluted him.   
 Ibrahim, a native Jordanian and graduate of the University of Jordan is driven 
by the Christian faith.  As an employee of the Finance Department of Royal Jordanian 
Airlines, Ibrahim as well as many of his peers have grown frustrated with the 
economic reality in Jordan.  Ibrahim also sees his future residence outside Jordan, 
working to make money.  He hopes when and if he returns to help his native Jordan.  
The financial strains on his family have impacted his need and desire for stable work.  
Upon completing our interview he discussed his sister’s unemployment.   When he 
mentioned that she was seeking a job in banking, we quickly arranged for her to have 
an interview with a contact at one of the banks in Jordan. 
 Osama is a 22 year old graduate from Hashemite University, and like Shadi, 
majored in Mechanical Engineering.  Ossama is currently training to become an 
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engineer.  Osama loves his mechanical engineering background, and although he does 
not know where he will live in ten years, one thing he knows for sure is his profession 
as a mechanical engineer.  He dreams of one day being an engineering professor. 
Interview questions revolved around Palestinian refugee existence in Jordan, the role 
of Jordan in the Middle East, and the role of education in both fostering or 
disregarding Palestinian ethnic identity and coexistence (See Appendix G and H).  
Once again the research questions for Jordanians were: What are the experiences and 
perspectives of Jordanians regarding Jordanian and Palestinian coexistence?  How 
does the sociopolitical climate contribute to Jordanian perspectives of coexistence?  
How do education and the “hidden curriculum” address coexistence? 
Answering the Research Questions: Jordanian Perceptions 
 It was difficult to conduct a study that aimed to understand Jordanian 
perceptions of a sustained Palestinian presence; it was even more difficult to 
understand both the role of the sociopolitical climate, as well as the role of academia.  
The main reasons for the difficulty had nothing to do with garnering trust from 
Jordanian participants (as was the case with Palestinian refugees); the main reason 
was conscious ambivalence.  The overall undertone among Jordanians was willful 
and deliberate abstinence from politics, one that was encouraged in the personal, 
local, and national realms.   
The reasons for nonchalant approaches and participation to the sociopolitical 
climate in Jordan are varied.  First, it has to do with identity—the umbrella from 
which all other reasons exist.  The identity of Jordanians as non-meddlers and non-
instigators extends to the alumni participants of this study and applies also to the 
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Monarchy.  One can even draw a parallel between the ambivalence of the people, as 
well as the foreign policies of the government.  In both instances, there is the desire to 
maintain peace, even at the cost of taking necessary action.   
The second reason is one of privilege.  One could pose the question, why is 
the white United States oblivious to the strife of minorities?  The answer is; because 
they can be.  In essence, wealthy Jordanians have bought political ambivalence, 
because their privilege allows them to do so.  Ibrahim, a graduate from the University 
of Jordan, born and raised in Amman, Jordan states: 
 Ibrahim:  …[C]lass makes a difference.  When you are in upper class, 
you don’t think of these issues.  You see it like, uh, silly issues.  Uh 
yeah, yeah, uh, in classes your priority is different. So, uh, the priority 
maybe is different when you are in high classes.  Now maybe, I’m 
fighting my way to be successful, I would see anyone, either he is on 
my side or against me.  But if I am a successful, the [financial] security 
is somehow reachable, so I won’t think of people the same way.  
(Ibrahim, personal communication, August 6, 2006). 
 
The third reason is education.  The emphases in education lie in engineering 
programs and finance or banking, both of which are invaluable to economic 
development in Jordan. However, what I call “critical education” is nonexistent. The 
emphasis on education for upward economic mobility, and the upward national 
mobility of Jordan are more important than asking ‘futile’ questions that critically 
examine the national order, thereby dumbing down Jordanians, and frustrating 
Palestinian refugees.  What remains is the overall pan-Jordanian mobility at the cost 
of the individual, culminating in the slogan, “Jordan First”.  The emphasis is so 
heavily placed on Westernization and pan-Jordanian economic success that ethnic 
identity, critical education, and political participation fall to the periphery. Ibrahim 
states: 
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MMM [Researcher]:  What we are talking about now, is the economy 
of Jordan is kind of gone up too with rise of lands, and houses and 
more of these things. Have you benefited? Has this helped you at all? 
 
Ibrahim:  No.  Maybe it helped the economy, uh as a finance source. 
Yes I could say this is helped the economy of Jordan, it strengthened 
the JD, maybe a lots of foreign currency come to the country it is good 
for the economy. As I said, okay they might have some rights but to 
take my rights. Of course, the government they pulled this money from 
Iraq, there is a finance word for it, uh. So it’s good for the economy, 
but bad for people. (Personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
First Research Question: Jordanian Perceptions of the Sociopolitical Climate 
Many themes were generated from Jordanian alumni participants as well as 
my observations of Jordanian society at large.  Most of my observations were met 
with resistance from my aunts and uncles, and again I have to tread lightly while 
simultaneously not compromising the authenticity of my study.  Therefore, I have 
struggled for months about maintaining both the legitimacy of my observations and 
validating my family’s argument.  I ultimately do not live in Jordan, and 
fundamentally can not begin to understand what it is like to not only coexist with 
Palestinian refugees, but coexistence in the Middle East at large.    
 Of the three participants, two seemed to express ambivalence surrounding 
Jordanian and Palestinian refugee coexistence.  Repeatedly, there was mention of the 
difference between the wealthy and assimilated Palestinians versus the 
underprivileged refugees who seem to be causing all the “problems,” if and when 
they arise.  It appears once again affluence along with assimilation make Palestinians 
tolerable.  In one conversation with a young Jordanian woman, she spoke, “I think the 
rich ones should be able to stay, it is the poor ones that must leave” (personal 
communication, August 6, 2006).   
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It is safe to say that many of the perceptions surrounding coexistence have to 
do with ability to blend in, and generate money.  However, this sentiment does not 
translate to all refugees and immigrants coming to Jordan.  There is a growing anti-
immigrant, anti-refugee sentiment surrounding Iraqis who fled the US led war in Iraq.  
Most of those who fled were those who could afford to.  With this emergence of a 
new minority in Jordan, coupled with heightened fears of terrorism, a fear of the 
“other” began to spread.  Herein lies one of Jordan’s most curious realities: the 
King’s acceptance of refugees and immigrants to Jordan, and here lies the 
discrepancy between the Monarchy and the people.  Therefore, when a researcher 
such as I suggests that Jordan’s vacillating support for other Arabs lacks the 
necessary direction and collective empathy, it is understandable that the response is: 
Are you kidding? What more can we do?  
Anti-Immigrant, Anti-Refugee Sentiment 
If you ask Shadi, he is not privileged because he considers the flood of 
immigrants coming to Jordan as jeopardizing his future financial success.  Here is a 
very interesting moment in my interview with Shadi; in our discussion notions of the 
economy, the flood of immigrants and refugees to Jordan, and privilege all converge: 
MMM:  Do you think if they got their land the problem would go 
away? 
 
Shadi:  Well, I think that they won’t get their land.  
 
MMM:  You don’t think they will get their land.  Well, now we are 
talking about the importance of land.  I see now that the last time I 
came here was six years ago, and now since six years ago, I see a lot of 
Lebanese now, Iraqis, Palestinians.  There is a very big number of 
refugees, a very big number of immigrants coming to Jordan.  Uh, 
what do you think about the number of immigrants and refugees 
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coming here?  
 
Shadi:  Everyone is talking about these numbers and everyone is uh, 
they are not happy with these numbers of refugees to Jordan, okay?  
Uh, Jordan if you want to say before uh lets say, in 1950s in 1930s the 
whole number of Jordanians wouldn’t reach three million, four 
million.  Now, we are six million.  Uh, or with refugees we may be  
 
MMM:  Double! 
 
Shadi:  Double million.  There are three million [non-Jordanians], 
which is a big number, okay?  If you can go to any Jordanian family, 
uh, uh they feel their salaries, they feel what they want to get.  As the 
salary goes upwards, then they will feel.  There is no doubt, meaning it 
takes and it puts, like uh, America now I know that there is a normal 
doctor, if he became a professor, the professor begins to take more 
salary, more money.  Okay, but there are taxes, on the salary, okay? 
(personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
Shadi continues by discussing how the amount of salary he makes is very little given 
how expensive everything has become in Jordan.  Whereas a onetime salary of 500 
JDs a month was impressive, it can barely make ends meet now.  Herein lies the 
problem for Shadi and many others, and the source of the problem appears to be the 
influx of refugees who have come to Jordan, set up residence, and seemingly live 
better in Jordan than Jordanians can.   
Shadi:  The apartments before two years had a price of JD 50,000 let’s 
say, now it’s doubled.  So how will I pay this if I want to marry, 
having a salary let’s say 1000JDs and I want to live my life happy and 
I want to have a wife and children.  Tell me where I can and when I 
can marry. [Pause]Tell me.  How much years do, do I want to marry? 
(Shadi, personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
Shadi’s frustration is not exclusive only to him; in fact per observations many young 
Jordanians find themselves in seemingly discouraging situations.  In order to be able 
to get married and support a family, money is necessary.  However, many men see the 
current economy setting back their future plans of marriage.   
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Perhaps one reason for the incorrect inferences about the influx of immigrants 
and refugees might be because many Jordanians do not venture outside West Amman, 
the most affluent part of the country.  However, some do, and what they find are 
Jordanians living in poverty.  There is a sense that it is not okay for Jordanians to live 
in poverty, and I strongly agree.  Jordanian loyalty for Jordanians is unshakeable, and 
perhaps this is one of the similarities between Jordanians and Palestinians: the 
unending support for one’s culture.  However, the opposite side of the argument is 
that some Jordanians live in poverty because some non-Jordanians do not.   
Shadi:  Yeah, of course, we didn’t benefit and we are still suffering. 
We suffering at every single dinner, or, or every single coin, or JD, or 
dinner, okay, has its own meaning.  This is for let’s say taxes, this is 
for uh, telephone payment, this is for electricity, this is for uh diesel, 
for water, okay this is for gasoline for our cars, two cars, okay and for 
me okay, I want to buy, to eat, to go,  
 
MMM:  So do you wish then that the immigrants or refugees didn’t 
come? 
 
Shadi:  Everyone wish, wish, wish that! (Shadi, personal 
communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
The inaccuracy of such a statement facilitates anti-immigrant and xenophobic 
sentiments.  I have found no documentation of the quantitative comparison between 
Jordanian-Palestinian poverty in Jordan, which would have strengthened or negated 
either argument for poverty in the country.  However several facts remain about 
Jordan as a country without natural resources, surrounded by instability, and run by a 
Monarchy that allows the flow of immigration and refugees while simultaneously 
trying to drive modernity and westernization to the land.  Jacobsen (1996) addresses 
several key factors which affect refugee policies.  She breaks them down to 
bureaucratic choices of the government, international relations, the capacity of the 
133 
host country, and finally security (Jacobsen, 1996).  All factors undoubtedly affect 
both Jordan’s abilities to harbor laji’een and the quality of life al-laji’een receive.       
MMM:  Uh huh.  So you think this is a problem? 
 
Shadi:  Of course. 
 
MMM:  That all the refugees and immigrants are coming to Jordan. 
 
Shadi:  Of course, of course, of course.  (Shadi, personal 
communication, August 6, 2006). 
 
Shadi’s sentiments are a very accurate portrayal of the general consensus in Jordan.  
The truth is many Jordanians have suffered as a result of the economic milieu in 
Jordan. In fact, it was not uncommon for people to ask me why I was studying 
Palestinian refugees instead of Jordanians living in poverty; “at least they have the 
UN” they would remark.  I am not an economist, nor do I claim to understand the 
finances in Jordan, but one observation I made holds some validity; everyone 
complains about the market in Jordan, and some rightfully so, but at the same time, 
Jordan’s economy is profiting a great deal from wealthy immigrants.   
I always hear people, the general public here talking about the 
immigrants and refugees that have come, but not in a good way.  What 
they may or may not realize however, is Jordan’s massive economic 
boom in large part is because of the rise in sheer numbers of people.  
(Field notes, July 25, 2006) 
 
 The apathy for the Palestinian refugee problem and ambivalence towards 
national consciousness, paired with immigrant resentment, culminates in the 
Jordanian perceptions of the sociopolitical climate.  However, while I went searching 
for the role sociopolitical and academic climates played in Jordanian-Palestinian 
refugee coexistence, I underestimated the role of the socioeconomic reality, one that 
is very complex.  As Benedict Anderson (1999) states, “The dreams of racism have 
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their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to 
divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘while’ blood and ‘breeding’ among atrocities” 
(p. 149).  Racism then, according to Anderson (1999), manifests itself not across 
borders, but within them, and therefore justifies domestic oppression. 
 MMM:  What do you think Palestinians think about Jordanians? 
 
Shadi:  Well, uh.  It depends, it depends on if it is a refugee or a rich 
one.   
 
MMM:  So you think money has to do with it.   
 
Shadi:  Yes! Money, money, money everything.  No money no funny! 
 
MMM:  [Laughs] So, tell me now, what do you think a Palestinian 
refugee thinks about a Jordanian?   
 
Shadi:  [Pause] Palestinian refugees?  I don’t know. I don’t know 
what they think.  I think it depends on how they live.  If they were very 
happy, then they would say that Jordanians are very good to them. 
 
MMM:  No, they live in desperate circumstances.  
 
Shadi:  No, of course, then they won’t love Jordan anymore.  [Pause] 
Of course.  (Personal communication, August 6, 2006). 
 
 My interview questions regarding the influx of immigration were passionately 
received and the issue ultimately all participants wanted to discuss.  The growing 
number of immigrants coupled with growing native-Jordanian resentment yields 
inter-societal tensions, cultural imperialism, and hegemony; all of which remain 
completely nonexistent in scholarly research in Jordan.  
 It appears many Jordanians have convinced themselves they are used to 
Palestinian refugees, and some I suppose are; however, there is a difference between 
acceptance and getting used to the idea of the ethnic minority/majority.  I say ethnic 
minority/majority because statistics show more Palestinians exist in Jordan than 
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Jordanians (see Research Problem)!  The real problem if you ask Jordanians is not the 
Palestinian refugees, but the Iraqis: 
 MMM:  What do you think now, when we talk bout Jordan, we talked 
about Jordan and its history and we talk about Jordan now, and we see 
the Iraqi’s coming, and now the Lebanese people coming, we see a lot 
of Palestinians, a lot of immigrants coming to this country, what do 
you think about this rise of immigration to Jordan, and refugees 
coming to Jordan? How do you feel about that? 
  
Ibrahim:  Ah, it’s something we used to enjoy it in the beginning, but 
now we don’t because it’s affecting our lives in a bad way, you could 
say. Yes feel sometimes [laughing] there’s a joke in the street 
(someone foreigner is saying to his friend; ah the Jordanians are 
increasing in this country). 
  
MMM:  Yeah. 
  
Ibrahim:  So we feel like that we are the minority. So, um, it’s 
something else.  I don’t like it personally, it’s not very often, but in the 
same way it’s not to have right just like the Jordanians, I don’t like the 
foreigners to come and share [with] me my rights.  Maybe you don’t 
understand what I am talking about. 
  
MMM:  No I do. So, you feel you don’t have rights? 
  
Ibrahim:  No, it’s not what I meant. I meant they are the same as my 
rights.  They are even taking all of my rights. Um, especially the 
Iraqi’s, you know.  The government opened the doors for them. And 
they came in a big numbers, very, big, big number…Other things, the 
rented houses, it went up so quickly, you rarely find a house now. A 
year ago they got the right to own, this is a big issue, this is, we are 
talking politics now…in Gulf area, it full of British and full of many 
nationalities, but they are not uh, allowed to buy and own stuff, 
because they live there for many years, they are not allowed, so only 
buy a car maybe.  But here they came, they buy lands, and, flats and 
whatever, so the prices (whistling). (August 6, 2006) 
 
Analogous to the White Man’s Burden in the United States, Jordanians view the 
coexistence as a burden that almost creates a martyr-mentality regarding the 
Palestinian Burden.  This notion of martyrdom will be furthered later on in the 
chapter. 
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Osama, the third and final Jordanian participant was the anomaly.  Osama 
represents what I hope Jordanians will one day strive toward; his awareness of the 
injustices and his refusal to accept and internalize the realities were a source of hope, 
perhaps the only source of hope I found during my time in the Middle East.   
MMM: Now, you have a lot immigrants coming, refugees coming to 
Jordan now, now Lebanon, from Iraq, Palestinians.  There are so many 
millions.  What do you think of the high number of people coming to 
Jordan? 
 
Osama: Uh, it’s a good thing, I think.  Because there are lots of 
immigrants, they bring their money here, and also they came away 
from war, and uh, protesting and uh and all things in their countries.  
So, it came out of you.  Because I think they aren’t finding any other 
place, so it would be sad for them not to come here, and live with us. 
 
MMM: What I am understanding now, that you’re saying, it’s good to 
bring the money for investments, and it’s sad they have had a really 
rough time, and Jordan is safe for them. 
 
Osama: Yeah. But it is really difficult, you know, there is no place to 
live, you know…And you can’t feel and you can’t give love and 
passion for your family because there is all war and [inaudible].  
(Osama, personal communication, August 11, 2006) 
 
In meetings with Osama, one is quickly able to realize he brings a consciousness 
which transcends the wealthy sector of Amman as well as national (Jordanian) 
borders.  He makes connections between the national and global wars people escape 
in coming to Jordan, all the while realizing their plight as refuges or immigrants in a 
new land.  In many cases, being a refugee precludes a Palestinian (or Iraqi, etc) from 
upward mobility.  While many speak of the collective Jordanian burden in harboring 
these refugees, Osama is able to do what only a handful of Jordanians I spoke to 
could: he attempted to understand.   
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Interestingly enough Osama knows he is an anomaly and his perceptions are 
not the norm (contrary to what most want to believe).  In the beginning of our second 
meeting, Osama wants to warn me not all Jordanians see things as he does, and upon 
going home after the interview and his reflections, he worries he is not a good 
indicator of collective Jordanian perceptions: 
Osama:  Sure, I go home, uh, thought a lot about it, because um, I 
thought maybe I wasn’t that objective, uh with my answers because 
you know, uh, not all Jordanians think like that.  You know, I don’t 
want to give that good of an idea or impression for you. Because really 
I have friends that they are like a cancer and they really hate 
Palestinians and I know people from Jordan, they really because they 
uh, when they know that I am Jordanian, they came and [inaudible] I 
remember maybe before two years one them told me that um, he don’t 
allow Palestinians to enter his house.  
 
MMM: He doesn’t allow Palestinians to enter his house? 
 
Osama: Yeah. Yeah. And also Muslims too, okay.  So, not all people 
are like I think and like I told you I inherited these thoughts from my 
parents.  And they also they inherited their thoughts from their parents 
 
MMM:  Right 
 
Osama:  So, uh, it’s not completely the same for all other guys. 
Maybe it was just by coincidence that you got me [laughs]… I wish all 
Jordanians would be like me. I know for them I am wrong.  Maybe if 
some people when uh, uh, most of my friends, they ask me where have 
you been maybe I didn’t tell that him because maybe I would go mad 
if they knew that really these are my thoughts and opinions, you know.  
Because for them, maybe I am a coward or I don’t have any patriotism 
or whatever, so uh, just I hope that maybe with time, their thoughts 
will be different because I didn’t have this uh kind of thoughts and 
opinions. (August 11, 2006) 
 
It is important to note, while Osama was able to articulate Palestinian refugee 
inequities and injustices, he reaffirms anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment 
when it comes to the Iraqi presence.   
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MMM: …So, what does the presence or you seeing so many refugees 
in Jordan mean to you? 
 
Osama: Palestinian or Arabic refugees? 
 
MMM:  More specifically Palestinians. 
 
Osama: I am getting used to it, but I am not getting used to Iraqi 
refugees because that to me is another race and really another nation, 
other thoughts and ideas.  We didn’t act with them yet, you know. 
(August 11, 2006) 
 
In other words, Osama considers Palestinians as very similar to Jordanians, therefore 
making it easy to “act with them” unlike Iraqis which he considers “another race” 
entirely.  The complexity of Arab identification cannot be overstated: for instance, 
many Jordanians state Palestinians and Jordanians are one in the same, even twins 
(See Literature Review).  This is true in some cases; cases wherein those Palestinians 
have assimilated, consider themselves Jordanian, have distanced themselves from the 
Palestinian struggle, and are not an economic burden to society at large.  If one is 
speaking about Palestinians in those terms, then yes, one will find many Jordanians 
who agree with the notion that Palestinians and Jordanians are one in the same.     
Lack of Critical (Inter) National Consciousness and Blind-Faith Westernization 
When asking Shadi about political participation and the political climate, 
notions of ambivalence arise. 
MMM:  What do you think of politics in Jordan? Specifically you said that 
you think the biggest problem is politics, what do you think about politics in 
Jordan? 
 
Shadi:  Well, I don’t think I uh, well uh, I am new to hearing politics or see 
politics on the TV, television, I am new for this subject. I, don’t bother myself 
to thinking about politics or thinking about anything that bothers me, okay?  I 
want to live my life happy; have a family, have my children, have my parents, 
uh being settled okay?  
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MMM:  Uh huh. 
 
Shadi:  I don’t need to think with politics.   
 
He continues: 
 
MMM:  Do you wish you learned more about this subject? 
 
Shadi:  About Palestinians and Jordanians? 
 
MMM:  Yes 
 
Shadi:  No 
 
MMM:  Why? 
 
Shadi:  I don’t want to bother myself.  I don’t want to lose my temper 
for nothing. Nothing is worth it.  (Shadi, personal communication, 
August 6, 2006) 
 
It is safe to say many young adult Jordanians are taught not to involve themselves in 
politics because it only leads to trouble.  Essentially, political participation translates 
to meddling and seeking confrontations.  In a discussion with a family acquaintance 
and proud Jordanian, we discussed some of the generated themes that arose on behalf 
of Jordanians.  Upon telling her my discovery of political ambivalence, she quickly 
remarked, “Of course; Jordanians do not go searching for trouble” (personal 
communication, August 1, 2006); the assumption behind her statement being the 
incorrect reversal that non-Jordanians go searching for trouble.   
Shadi’s statements regarding wanting to stay out of trouble and not wanting to 
bother himself are common findings among newly graduated, and privileged youth 
throughout Jordan.  Shadi was not the exception, but the norm; Ibrahim one of the 
other participants seconds the ambivalence.   
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MMM:  Now I heard that they have at the University, they have 
protests from time to time.  Did you participate in any protests at the 
University? 
 
Ibrahim:  Personally, no: I never.  Uh, I never was interested in this 
issue.  Uh, yeah we would see it, you know.  And we would hear about 
it, live in it somehow, but I have never been a part of it.  (Personal 
communication, August 6, 2006). 
 
The lack of critical national consciousness and privilege, in turn, resulted in an 
absence of critical national dialogue surrounding issues of immigration, 
Jordanization, pan-Arabism, and globalization.  The urge to engage in an exchange of 
ideas regarding sociopolitical realities in Jordan was confined mainly to the home.  
The reasons for a confined dialogue, assuming one exists, are varied:  fear of 
repercussions, Jordanian self-proclaimed non-meddling in political spheres (in other 
words, not asking for trouble, which relates to the aforementioned factor of the 
culture of fear in Jordan), and ambivalence as a result to privilege.  
 One of my assumptions was participant anti-American sentiment as a unifying 
factor; I anticipated participant anger over the role of the United States.  On the 
contrary, most of the participants viewed the United States’ role in Jordan as a 
necessary evil.  Jordan is a country surrounded by warfare and social, economic, and 
political instability and conflict: 
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(http://www.1stjordan.net/content/pictures/map.jpg, 2002) 
Israel/Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, And Saudi Arabia are neighboring 
Jordanian countries.  The explicit necessity on behalf of the Jordanian Monarchy is to 
maintain a national stronghold over its inhabitants, thus making the United States an 
implicit inevitability.  In other words, many citizens of Jordan (Jordanian and some 
Palestinians) believe a United States presence is not only desirable, but essential to 
sustained peace, once again opening Jordan up to criticism for reliance on the West at 
the expense of pan-Arab identity.  
 Jordan is strategically using the United States, and vice versa. While Jordan 
desires a stronghold over its people and neighboring countries vis-à-vis the United 
States, the United States is strategically maintaining a presence in the Middle East 
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through surrogates like Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.  Ultimately, Jordan 
has much more to lose and the more control the United States possesses in the Middle 
East, the more short term peace will exist, but at the expense of sustained and 
longstanding peace in the long term. 
 While native Jordanian citizens and the Monarchy do not agree politically or 
socially about the refugee and immigrant problem in Jordan, it appears the role of the 
United States remains undisputed by the general populace.  Moreover, while 
Jordanians and Palestinians (refugees and non-refugees) are indoctrinated with the 
Jordanian nationalist slogan “Jordan First”, they are also indoctrinated with blind-
faith westernization that local, national, and global notions reinforce as “necessary” 
steps.  Therefore, Jordanians and some Palestinians, both refugees and non-refugees, 
have internalized the message of a necessary United States presence for sustained 
peace.   
 Shadi and Ibrahim are aligned with this train of thought and have internalized 
the United States’ role and presence as essential to Jordan’s prolonged safety.  While 
they disagree with the Monarchy on its social issues regarding refugees and 
immigrants, they agree with geo-strategic and geopolitical Jordanian-United States 
relations.  As Shadi states, “Jordan is in the middle of war, okay? The environment 
now is uneasy; it makes you uneasy, you know?” (Personal communication, August 
6, 2006)  
Shadi is correct in his analysis of an uneasy climate; I noticed my own 
heightened fear and paranoia while abroad.  At first, I had a difficult time negotiating 
whether my fear was legitimate or whether it was because of my own internalized 
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oppression and notions of Arabs. Ultimately, I think it was a little of both.  All 
shopping malls and grocery stores have metal detectors at the entrance.  Either a 
security guard is overseeing people enter and exit, or a woman is checking purses.  
Initially, this scene ingrained even more fear in me, but it made most people feel 
safer.   
I also realized that I am way more fearful and way more aware 
of my whereabouts here than in the States.  I do not know if it is 
because I am in the region or what, or if it is because of the war.  I am 
not afraid of the refugees though.  I heard planes above my flat today 
and they were very loud.  I haven’t heard planes above before, and 
certainly never that loud.  I quickly recognized a knot in my stomach 
and I ran to the window to look up.  I couldn’t see them; maybe they 
were directly above my house.  All I know is that it triggered deep 
fear, and I thought maybe they were planes headed to Lebanon or 
maybe there is something going on that we don’t know about.  I am 
sure if I said this to anyone in my family they would laugh at my 
naïveté.   
Also, going to my aunt and uncle’s house I see undercover 
police hanging around nearby, listening in on a handheld radio.  I 
would never have guessed it because I thought they were just guys 
hanging out.  It was the driver who brought this to our attention.  I was 
so afraid, but I concealed it.  Why would they be here?  The driver 
tells us they are probably there because the United States embassy is 
very close to where they live.  I pretended to be satisfied with the 
answer I got.  I hate the fear. (Field notes, July 27, 2006) 
 
Fear in Jordan is embedded in the national consciousness.  This notion will be further 
developed later in this chapter, but for now it is important to position the 
sociopolitical climate in the midst of immense fear, mine included. Per obserbations 
the prevailing Jordanian sentiment (even if it is a false sense of safety) is that the 
United States presence in the Middle East confers Jordan’s sense of security.   
MMM:  What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with the 
United States? 
 
Shadi:  It’s very good.   
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MMM:  You think it’s good. 
Shadi:  I love it.  
 
MMM:  Really? 
 
Shadi: Yes, of course. 
 
MMM:  There are a lot of people who say “no, I think it’s turning 
their back, or they are being puppets” or—? 
 
Shadi:  No. No. The circumstances are what? We have a war, okay, 
every way around us, okay? If the United States is not there we will be 
suffering [emphasizes by speaking it slowly and in a louder tone], we 
will be all Jordanian refugees.  We will be refugees, in our land also. 
 
MMM:  Right. 
 
Shadi:  This is the truth, America is here to protect us, if America 
wasn’t protecting us.  If America wasn’t protecting us, I would not be 
sitting here with you, and I have one leg over the other, and I am 
drinking beer, okay?  And you are studying your doctorate.   
 
MMM:  So you don’t, do think maybe it’s not good to be dependent 
on the United States? Or is it normal? 
 
Shadi:  It’s good. It’s good.  It’s normal, normal. It’s good. (Personal 
communication, August 6, 2006). 
 
Shadi’s remarks are the norm among Jordanians and particularly Christians who are 
the minority in Jordan.  Although I will not be delving into the cross-religious 
tensions in Jordan, it is fair to say they exist. 
 Due to the presence of so many cross-religious, cross-border, and cross-ethnic 
and national tensions, the United States presents itself as the only viable solution to 
steady economic, political, and social existences in Jordan. When asked about life in 
Jordan, Ibrahim states, “Well life in Jordan as most people say, it’s fantastic but you 
need the income of Europe or western country” (personal communication, August 6, 
2006).  Dependence on the West seems more important than the consequences; 
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indeed in weighing out the risks and benefits of Western reliance, for most people it is 
a no-brainer.   
MMM:  What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with the 
United States? 
  
Ibrahim:  You mean as a people, or as a government? 
  
MMM:  Politically. 
  
Ibrahim:  Very good, the best in the region.  As a politician side, a 
political side, no…I think it’s very good, very good relationship. 
(August 6, 2006) 
 
Osama, reaffirms Ibrahim and Shadi’s thoughts when asked about Jordan’s 
relationship with the United States, “[pause] I think it’s a good relationship” (Osama, 
personal communication, August 8, 2006).  When pressed further about whether or 
not he agrees with it, he simply replies, “yes”. (Osama, personal communication, 
August 8, 2006).  The simple manner with which Osama responds is arguable do to 
several factors which have already been addressed, but are worth mentioning again; 
the notion of Jordanians as non-meddlers, coupled with the fear. 
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Second Research Question: Jordanian Perceptions of Education and the Hidden 
Curriculum 
 
 Jordanian perceptions regarding academia were akin to perceptions of the 
sociopolitical context: academia was the microcosm of the macro-sociopolitical 
context.  This finding supports San Juan’s (1996) claims of the importance of 
addressing and acknowledging the true definition of culture as a social process 
embedded in material social associations.  The Jordanian participants exhibited 
ambivalence towards critical education, which follows the sociopolitical ambivalence 
depicted towards national critical consciousness.  The major emphasis in Jordan is on 
pan-Jordanian economic success and boom, as well as globalization, which to some 
extent threatens the ‘buy in’ necessary for liberation education and social integration.   
Moreover, the similarities between the sociopolitical context and education in 
Jordan fit the critical ethnography paradigm so well, as the interconnectedness of 
different cultural sectors emanate.  The spillover from the economy, politics, 
institutions, and academia all affect culture and notions of cross-cultural studies.  The 
reality of globalization is threatening the sociopolitical and academic contexts as well 
as emancipatory and radical research such as this one.  The “one size fits all” 
approach one finds in Jordan completely contradicts the true cultural (economic, 
political, educational) makeup of the country.  
 The themes generated from the participants regarding education reflected the 
need to compete in a global market, or education for development.  In essence, the 
socio-economic context shaped the educational context.   
 Osama:  So, I think, I will see Amman [become] like Dubai, like 
maybe, like, like uh, jobs, careers…As I see it now in Jordan, there is 
too many Jordanian interests are becoming privatized and foreign.  So, 
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frankly they are not just any corporations, sensitive ones like Jordanian 
telecommunications, and for instance Royal Jordanian Airlines.  It’s 
being privatized. These are very important and big companies that are 
going to become privatized.  After a while, the education might also be 
privatized.  This is something very good because we can benefit from 
foreign proficiency and foreign experts.  (Osama, personal 
communication, August 8, 2006) 
 
Although the socio-economic context helped fashion academia in Jordan, the 
sociopolitical context perpetuated social inequities; the presumption being while the 
impacts of globalization had implications on academia, the impacts of the 
sociopolitical context recreated the inequities in the greater academic community.  
The Jordanian participants supported claims of education for globalization, but 
refuted claims of Palestinian refugee inequities in academe.   
When I asked Osama about the academic climate at his university, he replied, 
“educationally it is very good, but socially it’s not very good” (Osama, personal 
communication, August 8, 2006).  What he seems to suggest in his testimony was 
supported by many native Jordanians; while the social tensions on campus exist, the 
academic rigor is ever present.  When Shadi was asked what Jordanian education is 
missing, he pauses before saying, “well higher education in Jordan or education in 
Jordan is going forward.  Upwards” (personal communication, August 9, 2006).  
When I pressed further and asked what he would change, he replied, “nothing” 
(Shadi, personal communication, August 9, 2006).  In our continued interaction, I 
asked once again what Shadi’s perceptions were of education and he responded, 
“Perfect” (personal communication, August 9, 2006).  When most participants were 
asked about their perceptions of university, the automatic assumption was that they 
were being asked about rigor and their responses reflected participant views that 
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higher education had high standards.  In other words, education is equated with 
tangible knowledge, and did not include autonomy, quality teaching, or what I call 
critical education.   
When pressed about inequities and tensions, things were not so clear.  In an 
attempt to address perceptions about the hidden curriculum some participants grew 
defensive.  Here, the hidden curriculum in the Jordanian participant context seeks to 
understand inequities in academia, the dissemination of national identity, or tensions 
between Palestinians and Jordanians.  The prevalence of the hidden curriculum 
appears to be so pervasive that the Jordanian participants were unable to identify it.  
Shadi particularly resented the line of questioning: 
MMM: Do you think that education, you’re saying education here 
is— 
 
Shadi: Perfect. 
 
MMM: Perfect. Do you think it’s the same for you and for a refugee? 
 
Shadi: Yes of course.  Because there is something here called 
makrameh, [royal grants].  Meaning it gives you chairs. 
 
MMM:  I read that the King gave 4,000 seats I think to Palestinian 
refugees 
 
Shadi:  I think so.  
 
MMM: And when I brought it up to one of the refugees, they said that 
it was all for show because they gave the seats, but they all had to pay.  
 
Shadi: Okay how much refugees we have in Jordan? 
 
MMM: 1.8 million registered 
 
Shadi: [raises his voice] 1.8 million they need seats in the 
universities?  The country’s budget 1.2 or 3.2 million dollars. Okay? 
So how will it withstand all of this?...There are refugees living more 
than the Jordanians.  There are villages in the south of Amman, south 
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of Jordan in Karak, Mafraq, Tafileh, there are people living in the 
villages that don’t know the a’s, b’s and c’s.  
 
MMM: Right. 
 
Shadi: Let’s say Jordanians have the right more than the refugees.  
Know what I mean? (Shadi, personal communication, August 9, 2006) 
 
Shadi’s honesty exposes one of the underlying tensions of competing victimhoods; 
the Jordanian burden to help Palestinian refugees when so many of their “own” are 
suffering.  There is indeed validity to this argument, but this “us versus them” 
mentality further exacerbates Jordanian and Palestinian refugee coexistence, while 
enabling the mentality of Palestinian indebtedness and the martyr-mentality of 
Jordanians.  This mirrors many of the responses I received upon telling people of my 
intention to explore Palestinian refugee realities within Jordanian borders; why?   
Shadi’s reaction to questions about whether or not Palestinian refugees receive 
the same level of education and opportunities as Jordanians was to deflect and 
highlight Jordanians living in poverty.  On some level, so long as Jordanians were 
living in poverty Palestinian poverty was a non-issue, or at least muted by the fact 
that Jordanians were the priority.  The argument goes:  Palestinian refugees living in 
poverty are equal to Jordanians who live in poverty; and wealthy Palestinians exist in 
Jordan, therefore, Palestinians and Jordanians are on the same footing.  According to 
Shadi, if Palestinian refugees could not succeed academically it had nothing to do 
with a lack of access or opportunity, but a lack of will and discipline. 
MMM:  So you think then, nothing in education, education is perfect? 
 
Shadi: Education is perfect, yes.   
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MMM: Do you think that Jordanians and Palestinian refugees they 
have the same education? 
 
Shadi: Well, I…no, I’m not saying that Jordanians and Palestinians or 
refugees have the same education, but I think, I think they have the 
same chance to educate.  They have the same chance, meaning, the 
Jordanian that has 90 goes into engineering a Palestinian that has a 90 
can go into the same.  It’s not like because he is a refugee he can’t 
study engineering.  I told you last time that the most percent of the 
numbers present for us in engineering, in mechanical engineering.  
(Shadi, personal communication, August 9, 2006) 
 
The statement above speaks to the idea that failure and success are personal choices, 
not institutional responsibilities.  As the conversation continues, Shadi explicitly 
names his resentment: 
MMM: Sometimes do you resent Palestinians here? 
 
Shadi: Of course. Sometimes yes.  But of course not all Palestinians, I 
am talking about refugees.     
 
MMM: You are only talking about refugees? 
 
Shadi: Yes. Of course. 
 
MMM: Why do you get annoyed with refugees only? 
 
Shadi: Not all the refugees.  In general, like you said when you went 
to the refugee camps, they say that “the government doesn’t care, we 
have to pay, we have to make ourselves, to go through the life” but 
they are not thinking about working, okay?  A little bit ago we were 
[in traffic], somebody or a person came and he begged me to buy 
chewing gum, but he didn’t think for instance to go get a career?  How 
can I tell you? (personal communication, August 9, 2006) 
 
Much of the resentment present among Jordanians has to do with the immigration 
wave in recent years, coupled with an increased standard of living that makes it hard 
for all inhabitants of Jordan to keep afloat. 
 Osama provides a strikingly similar account of higher education in Jordan.  
While Osama was ready to accept the mistreatment of Palestinian refugees in the 
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greater context, he hesitates to do so when it comes to academic access.  When asked 
if education in Jordan was the same for Palestinian refugees and Jordanians, he 
responds, “yeah” and when asked once again if educational access is the same, once 
again his response is “yeah” (Osama, personal communication, August 11, 2006). 
Ibrahim too gives a similar analysis of equality in education in Jordan. Once 
again, the argument used is so long as Jordanian inequities exist, the Palestinian 
refugee inequities and woes will have to wait.  
MMM: Do you think education is different for Palestinians and 
Jordanians? 
 
Ibrahim: You mean the level of education or the chances? 
 
MMM: No, more like um, when I went to the camps I heard some 
people talk about how some Palestinians will get 92 on tawjihi, the 
refugees or they wont make it to university, or they have a hard time 
finding a job after university and there’s a lot of wasta in the university 
and that they don’t get the privileges, so I don’t know if you’re 
thoughts are the same or different.  Do you think education for all of 
them and Jordanians are the same or no? 
 
Ibrahim: You know, uh, you could say lots of Jordanians don’t get the 
chance.  It’s not only them.  Uh, you know what we need um, just to 
out all the camps in university and not the Jordanians.  They have 
equal chances. Because the camps are big numbers, you know.  Really 
big numbers and you really need to protect the Jordanians.  They are 
now sometimes really the minority they call it you know, and uh and I 
know lots of Jordanians they got harder grades, and they never really 
got where they wanted. (Ibrahim, personal communication, August 11, 
2006)   
 
Interestingly enough, Ibrahim explicitly makes the connection between the inner 
academic as a microcosm of the society at large:  “the problem is not in the university 
as much as the problem in the country” (Ibrahim, personal communication, August 
11, 2006).  Although Ibrahim is speaking to Jordan’s overpopulation as the main 
cause of continued exclusion and lack of opportunity, he makes the link between 
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culture of academe and culture at large (in the critical ethnography sense).  Moreover, 
there is validity behind Ibrahim’s assertion:  Jordan is bursting at the seams, and at 
times can not withstand the social, political, and economic implications of the 
immigrant wave.  All the while, native inhabitants who were already on the social, 
academic, and economic periphery fall even further behind.  Higher education for the 
Jordanian participants reinforced negative perceptions of Palestinians.       
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Palestinian Perceptions of the Sociopolitical Context: Ethnic Ghettoization of the 
Mukhayamat? 
 
 Before delving into Palestinian refugee perceptions of the sociopolitical 
climate, it is important to explore Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan; as per my 
observations, the camps could be considered ethnically ghettoized societies on the 
periphery of Jordanian society.   
When driving to Baqa’a you notice much more of an urban feel.  It is 
not far out of Amman, and rather than resembling a village that never 
entered the early 1900, here you get the feeling that you are in a 
ghetto.  In other words, it looked and felt a little more familiar to me.  
Baqa’a holds in it 120,000 people and unlike Madaba, it is recognized 
by the United Nations.  At first site it is more typical.  Driving through 
the ‘downtown’ of this city-within-a-city, there are many more shops 
and stores.  The first thought that enters my mind is that it indicates 
more job opportunities for the residents of this camp.  In a way, these 
images look like something else too: I remember seeing certain images 
like this in the wake of the Katrina hurricanes... The deeper inside you 
go into the camp the more poverty you see and soon that familiarity 
begins to fade and even more desperation hits you.  (Field notes, 
August 1, 2006) 
 
Refugees pose no economic, social, or political advantage and the assumption that 
they are the source of problems is false.  The greater society at large needs to 
critically question why some reactionary acts are taken in the camps; rather incorrect 
inferences are made about refugees with a “refugees are troublemakers simply 
because being refugees and Palestinian predisposes them to social disorder” 
mentality.  In other words, a refugee simply because he or she is a refugee, is not to 
be trusted.  
Critical analysis about the status of Palestinian refugees, the role of the 
Monarchy, and the greater society was absent not just among the participants of the 
study; instead I found rhetoric that perpetuated the ethnically ghetto-like existence of 
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Palestinian refugees.  In other words what needs to take place is a shift in the focus 
from refugees as the problem (a hegemonic lens) to a national dialogue (transnational 
lens).  By ethnic ghettoization, I mean to suggest refugee camps as pockets of refugee 
existence devoid of Jordanian presence; a separation from the majority, which creates 
tensions and sometimes hostility.   
The argument of ethnic ghettoization holds some validity because of ghettos 
as systematic areas of more or less ethnic division similar to the refugee camps 
wherein mainly Palestinian refugees reside.  The refugee existence might have some 
similarities in terms of isolation, exclusion, and hostility, but ultimately the ethnically 
ghettoized environment garners images of Jews in European cities or present day 
cities in the United States.  Making an assertion of the camps as ethnically ghetto 
would then colonize this study by viewing the camps through a Western lens.   
The only word to really describe the refugee camps is, therefore, not 
ethnically ghetto, but al mukhayamat; the Arabic word is a derivative of khyam, 
which literally translated means “tents”.  Mukhayam is the singular of mukhayamat.  
From this point on, the refugee camp or camps are referred to as al mukhayamat 
(plural: the camps), or mukhayam (singular: camp), or ‘refugee camps’ 
interchangeably.  In addition, al-laji’een, the Arabic word for refugee is used; al-
laji’een and refugees are used interchangeably throughout the rest of this study as 
well.  In order to elicit the indigenous views of both Jordanian and Palestinian 
perceptions of the camps and refugees, the words al mukhayamat and al-laji’een 
decolonize the study, which adheres to the philosophy and intention of the study, 
while simultaneously paralleling Handala as the indigenous framework of the study. 
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Population Density 
The youth will not get tired 
Their goal is your independence 
Or they die 
We will drink from death 
But we will not be slaves to our enemies 
We do not want 
An eternal humiliation 
Nor a miserable life 
We do not want 
But we will return 
Our great glory 
My homeland 
My homeland 
 
 (Tukan, Ibrahim, My homeland) 
 
The population density in the camps further exacerbates the living conditions 
of al-laji’een.  While conducting fieldwork in mukhayam Baqa’a (the most densely 
populated camp in Jordan), the resources are scarce because there are simply not 
enough of them to address such a large population.  I met with one of the unofficial 
leaders of Baqa’a.  When we were passing out food to the orphans and widows of the 
camp, we were told he would provide invaluable insight.  As a communist and a 
former prisoner for working with the opposition during Black September, he harbored 
resentment towards Jordan.   
He said that before he liberates Palestinians from Israel as an enemy he 
will liberate them from Jordan because they are the real enemy…“If 
you ask me, I will go to the border, and while I am there, I will make 
my country [Palestine] independent from our neighbor [Jordan] before 
our enemies [Israel].” (August 1, 2006) 
 
He gives me permission to ask him anything I want, and says he will answer honestly 
because he does not fear anyone.  When I ask him to address the major issues in the 
camp, he lists them one by one. 
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With his thumb up in the air, he tells me the first problem is 
health.  I thought health would not be a problem because unlike 
Madaba, Baqa’a is recognized by the United Nations.  He tells me that 
many women die giving birth on their way to their hospital because it 
is so far away and they don’t have cars.  They do not have enough 
hospitals.  He continues to tell me that a doctor sees about 400 patients 
a day, and sometimes before even examining someone he will just 
hand over a prescription for what the patient might 
have…Transportation, he continues.  Transportation is an issue 
because for a student of any university to make it on time for an 8am 
class, she must leave the house at a quarter to six.  Five minutes late 
doesn’t cut it, because they do not have enough busses leaving the 
camp.  [OC: I notice that many people go into the city, but hardly 
anyone form the city goes into the camp.] Sanitation.  He tells me to 
come at 10pm to see the trash from the day that has piled up…He then 
interrupts himself and tells me that he also wants me to come to a 
wedding.  You will not hear traditional wedding songs, he explains, 
but traditional Palestinian national songs.  There is no place for kids to 
play and so they are always on the streets playing amidst the garbage.  
Security.  This he explains is one of the biggest problems that he sees.  
The camp doesn’t have proper security for 120,000 people whatsoever.  
He explains that the King will donate more security to the camp, but 
rather than secure the camp, security goes on the outskirts. [OC: It is 
almost as though the security is to protect people from the outside 
from people within the camp.  Talk, about making the strange 
familiar—it reminds me of not enough, let alone sufficient security in 
EPA or Oakland, but cops on every corner in Hillsborough.]   
Education.  The most important thing for our kids, he says, is 
education because they have nothing else at all…To get to university 
they need books which cost money, sometimes uniforms, bus fair, 
tuition, and families make on average 150 JDs for families of 
sometimes up to ten and even more.  They pay 30 JDs for rent, then 
water, electricity and utility, food, etc etc etc.  The government will 
come out and perform a PR stunt saying that they are opening all of 
these seats, which is true, but not without money.  (Field Notes, 
August 1, 2006)       
 
Because of the dense population, insufficient funding and allocation of funds, the 
problems at Baqa’a are overwhelming.   
One cannot discuss the environment in al mukhayamat without discussing the 
sheer population of youth.  This study is significant both in terms of scholarly 
research, but particularly significant for sociopolitical reasons.  The participants of 
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this study along with the youth in Jordan are the immediate future for Jordan, 
Palestine, and for the world; in fact, even visually seeing a family of 13 or 14 
impresses upon my psyche just how numerically vital this generation is.  In 
discussing and sometimes arguing with Jordanians about the Palestinian refugee 
reality, I felt I always posed critical questions and thought- provoking comments.  
However, the one time I found myself without a response was when the question of 
population density in the camps arose.  It is not uncommon to see families of ten or 
more in al mukhayamat, and many Jordanians found this completely hypocritical; 
how can the mukhayam reality (poverty) hold any merit when al-laji’een keep 
reproducing?  Palestinian refugee reproduction essentially becomes the perpetuation 
of their own poverty; Jordanians perceive al-laji’een are to blame for recreating their 
own destitution vis-à-vis reproducing, thereby becoming an economic burden for 
Jordanians. 
This economic burden on Jordanians lay the foundation for inter-societal 
tensions.  The Jordanian mentality (akin to the White Man’s Burden) creates this 
sacrifice mentality and essentially competing victimhoods between Jordanians and 
Palestinian laji’een.  I decided to take my questions to Mr. Abu Ahmad; afraid to ask 
him for fear of offending him, I posed my question carefully.  I was surprised to find 
he was not offended in the least because reproduction was a source of pride, even 
survival.   
 As we walk I ask [Mr. Abu Ahmad] about the high number of births in 
the camp.  He tells me they need more Palestinians than Israelis.  He 
tells me many of them are dying in Israel and they need to keep the 
population alive.  They need more soldiers.  He also tells me that in the 
Qur’an it is encouraged.  I asked him what happens if a woman can not 
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have children.  He says that she is divorced and the man remarries.  
(Field notes, July 31, 2006) 
 
In my own bias, reproduction posed what I assumed was a problem: without proper 
sanitation and health clinics in al mukhayamat, was having children the “right” thing 
to do?  I made the argument that perhaps with proper sex education this would not be 
the case.  (Upon discussing these observations with two USF colleagues and peers, 
they immediately identified my observation as ethnocentric and deficit based.  The 
assumption that sex education would make this “problem” go away meant I viewed 
their reproduction as wrong, thereby exposing my own ethnocentrism).   
It is from this awareness I realized refugee notions of procreation were linked 
to a much greater transnational need for survival.  In other words, this was not a case 
of more sex education campaigns or birth control awareness.  Rather it goes back to 
Mr. Abu Ahmad’s idea of soldiers and the power in numbers.  This obligation as 
dutiful refugees maintains and keeps alive the Palestinian identity by birthing new 
generations; in essence a new birth was the birth of hope and continued resistance.  
The birth of a new legacy, a new army, with a new generation of warriors and agents 
of change for Palestinians, meant hope.  En masse a revolution was stirring. 
Palestinian Participants 
 
 Ultimately the three participants were JR, Khaled, and Nour.  JR lives in 
mukhayam Baqa’a.  Her parents are illiterate and had no formal schooling.  She 
attended Al Hussein Bin Talal University, and currently works as a teacher in a 
private center.  To help pay for her education JR took on different jobs, such as 
picking vegetables in green houses in the sweltering heat and wearing her hijab.  
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Since her graduation, JR works day and night to help save money for her brother’s 
college tuition. 
 Nour is a graduate from Mu’ta University and lives in mukhayam Madaba 
where I spent most of my time.  Of all the participants I engaged with, she was the 
most interested in the subject matter.  Oftentimes, she referred to me as the only hope, 
the sole solution to Jordanian and Palestinian tensions.  She is one of 13 children, and 
her illiterate mother is a widow.  When we were engaging in our interviews Nour’s 
sister was crying to her uncle, begging his permission to attend university.  She was 
told they could not send her to school because they could not afford her application 
fee, let alone tuition.  Her sobs could be heard in the next room while Nour and I were 
speaking.  Nour’s profile is different than most Palestinian refugees because she 
harbored no resentment of Jordanians.  On the contrary, she was open to meaningful 
relationships with her Jordanian counterparts. 
 Khaled is a 23 year old graduate of Zeituneh University.  He majored in 
Computer Programming and was working in a computer lab in mukhayam Madaba.  
He is seeking to find ways to continue his education in the United States or England.  
His biggest fear is the possibility of having to sell his parents’ home to be able to pay 
for continuing his education, a sacrifice he is not sure he is willing to make.  Khaled 
has access to a computer lab, so every now and then he emails me.  He likes to email 
me because it is a good opportunity for him to practice his English.  During our first 
encounter Khaled said he was hopeless about peaceful coexistence, and upon 
completing our second interview he said just being able to speak freely with me about 
his thoughts was a revival of hope.       
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Deconstructing Handala 
 
The generated themes of al-laji’een in al mukhayamat can be found in 
Handala.  Once again, Handala (meaning bitterness) stands with his hands behind his 
back (American rejection and refugee pride), barefooted (poverty), using his hair as a 
weapon (education).  The themes which emerged during my time in Jordan are 
encapsulated in this image of a refugee who is poor, but smells of amber; globally 
forgotten and humiliated, yet prideful and defiant.  As I sit here envisioning my time 
with al-laji’een, I visualize Handala there next to us.  In many ways he has come to 
life for me and I adopted him as my son; he is the manifestation of my newly reborn 
global consciousness.  I adopted him from al-laji’een and hold him in my soul where 
he resides, all the while I long to see his face. 
Four mukhayamat were explored: Madaba, Baqa’a, Hiteen, and Hussein.  
Each mukhayam possessed its own qualities.  Most of my time was spent in 
mukhayam Madaba with my ally Mr. Abu-Ahmad and four out of five (later two) 
interviewed participants resided in mukhayam Madaba.  My connection to mukhayam 
Madaba was and is a very strong one.  On the eve of my first visit to mukhayam 
Madaba I was filled with nerves and anticipation.  
Tomorrow, I am going to meet with Mr. Abu-Ahmad at Madaba 
refugee camp.  Moussa the driver directed me to Mr. Abu-Ahmad, and 
I was told he would help me.  He is the unofficial man in charge of the 
camp, and this is a huge relief.  People will trust him and if he tells 
them it is safe to talk to me, maybe that will garner trust.  We will see.  
I am a little worried about my research because there is so much 
protocol.  I am also worried about the tape recording.  I am worried 
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about so many things related to the study, but I keep telling myself to 
be patient and take my time.  Tomorrow we will make the trek to 
Madaba, a city just outside of Amman.  I will meet with both Moussa 
and Mr. Abu-Ahmad and they will introduce me to refugee camp life, 
environment, and most important—participants willing to speak with 
me.  I know being here during a war is intense, and people will be very 
angry and while I understand this is on the fore of everyone’s mind, I 
hope it doesn’t deviate from Jordanian-Palestinian refugee 
coexistence.  (Field Notes, July, 25, 2006) 
 
In their hearts, Palestinian laji’een have transnational (sometimes dueling) 
identities; they live mono-national lives both professionally and academically, but 
socially, Palestinian refugees lead clearly transnational lives; al mukhayamat are 
overwhelmingly Palestinian, but they exist within a larger Jordanian context.  The 
Monarchy does not reinforce or encourage transnationalism (in fact it disseminates a 
Jordanian national identity) in al mukhayamat, and evidence is present in the fear 
many laji’een possess.  JR, a graduate from Al Hussein Bin Talal University and 
Mathematics major, addresses the sensitivity of Jordanian-Palestinian relations. 
 JR: Of course it [the subject of Jordanian-Palestinian relations] is 
sensitive.  Yes, it is sensitive and I will tell you why.  First of all this 
Jordanian-Palestinian thing is sensitive because of fear.  I am telling 
you, fear of the intelligence service and the fear of having a point 
against you.  Second, there are some people, Jordanians and 
Palestinians who are very precious to you and you don’t want to hurt 
anyone around you.  So this Jordanian-Palestinian statement brings 
about a multitude of problems.  Therefore, I keep myself a lot from it. 
(JR, personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
Since (and even before) the terrorist attacks in Jordan, mukhabarat (or secret 
police) comingle with the society at large in Jordan.  The way this works is complex; 
mukhabarat investigate ‘suspicious activities,’ activities which are very broadly 
defined.  The flaws inherent in the presence of mukhabarat are twofold; the 
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possibility of abuse of power (including police brutality), and the paranoia they instill 
in the general public (particularly, but not excluding, non-Jordanians).   
Mukhabarat and the fear they instill here are immense.  Everyone 
knows they exist, but no one knows who they are, and they could be 
anywhere at any time.  People will undoubtedly mistrust me at first, 
and I am okay with this—that is why I want to take my time, and 
honor the process of research.  (Field Notes, July 25, 2006) 
 
On several occasions, I was told mukhabarat participate in protests, attend university 
classes, are wedding guests, and even live in al mukhayamat; they are everywhere.  
Not surprisingly, there are no statistics to confirm or deny what many civilians living 
in Jordan believe to be true; one in four people are mukhabarat.  The underlying 
purpose of the mukhabarat is intended to provide a sense of confidence in the system.  
The sensitivity of this study cannot be overestimated.  It is not an exaggeration by any 
means for me to suggest the participants of this study risked a great deal in speaking 
to me. 
The presence of mukhabarat has arguably created a false sense of security for 
the people in Jordan.  In fact, I found myself far more afraid of mukhabarat than the 
Palestinian refugees I was constantly told to fear.  Other Jordanians, however, did not 
share my concern.  In fact, the overall idea is you only fear mukhabarat if you have 
somehow asked for it. However Shadi (Jordanian participant) illustrates the level of 
mukhabarat control in his discussion about Jordanian privilege.  
Shadi: Okay, I don’t bother myself to watch the politics or anything, 
just put on NBC 2, NBC 3, ONE TV, let’s say uh, Showtime, that’s 
all.  Watching videos.  When they hear a sound whispering about 
politics or something like that, they will shut them [Palestinians] up.   
 
MMM: Who is “they”? 
Shadi: Uh, meaning, let’s say, uh politicians.   
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MMM: Mukhabarat. 
Shadi: Of course mukhabarat. (Personal communication, August 6, 
2006) 
Even uttering the word mukhabarat is risky to mention.  Notice Shadi searching for 
another word before settling with “politicians”.  In pressing Nour further about why 
she does not discuss Palestinian-Jordanian coexistence at school, she restates, “I told 
you, I can’t discuss these at university; I am scared to.” (Personal communication, 
July 26, 2006) 
 In one of my observations, I notice I have not seen one Palestinian flag in any 
of the camps.  I have only noticed one inside a house in a corner. 
We begin walking and our first stop is the all boys’ school.  No one is 
there because it is summertime, but it was interesting nonetheless.  
Education in this particular camp is very high—almost 100% 
[enrollment] according to AH.  We stop in the middle of the courtyard 
and read the sayings on the wall.  The white school with light blue 
doors signifies UN presence.  Sitting in the empty courtyard I try to 
envision the boys playing in the schoolyard.  I try to envision them 
getting in trouble by their teachers, or doing homework.  I try to 
envision them sitting under the mission statement wondering whether 
or not they are internalizing these messages of hope.  I also see little 
boys in a white school with light blue doors, and two flags (not their 
own) waving up above [emphasis added].  I try to envision the bully 
being lectured about his actions. In other words, I try to find the noise 
in the silence I am in. (Field notes, July 30, 2006)  
 
Nour, a graduate of Mu’ta University with an English Literature background.  She is 
unemployed; a reality for many refugees who go to university and get their higher 
education degree, only to face unemployment.  In asking Nour about my 
observations, fear emanates once again:  
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MMM: Let me tell you, I haven’t seen any Palestinian flag raised in 
any refugee camp that I visited.   
 
Nour: Let me tell you, those people feel that this land is not theirs.  
They came here as refugees, there is fear among them in a way that no 
Palestinian dares to raise the Palestinian flag on his house, or to 
display it anywhere.   
 
MMM: They are afraid to this degree? What would happen if you 
raised the flag? 
 
Nour: There would be a problem if a Jordanian saw it.  By doing so, 
they create a problem.  So they avoid that in order not to have 
problems.  They are fearful. (Personal communication, July 30, 2006) 
 
On many occasions we heard parents tell stories of mukhabarat knocking on doors in 
the middle of the night and taking their sons away.  Parents were not allowed to 
investigate or ask the whereabouts of their sons, and when they returned bruised and 
beaten days later, they never spoke of the incident (personal communication, July 30, 
2006).  This was not unusual.  My fundamental impression al mukhabarat aggravate 
the sociopolitical climate in Jordan was confirmed when Ibrahim (Jordanian 
participant) revealed key evidence linking mukhabarat with perpetuating social 
tensions: 
Ibrahim: Yes, I love Jordan, and uh, I believe that God wants us here 
is to make a difference. Not to change the country, I can not change 
the country, but I can make a difference in the country. I am…all who 
met me, most of them…they say that’s “we never met someone like 
you” I always look at the positive side of life. Even uh, I’ve had a few 
interviews with the mukhabarat [secret police]. They tried to per-
persuade me to have a ‘Jordanian heart’ you know, and to look at them 
like trying to let me seeing them as not same like us, you know. 
 
MMM: Who is not the same? 
 
Ibrahim:  The Palestinians. This is very confidential to say, uh, it’ 
just, that’s their job. 
 
MMM:  Yes.  
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Ibrahim: But I never cared, even I answered one of them, I said: “I 
can’t do that” most of my friends, most of them, they are 
Palestinians. Uh, It’s like he was telling me to leave them.  
(personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
Ibrahim’s attempt to be as vague as possible did not hide his reference to mukhabarat 
essentially recruiting him to “have a Jordanian heart” alludes to the power and 
influence of the secret police.  Moreover if government officials were perpetuating 
this mindset, where were the orders coming from, and why? 
 Ibrahim’s refusal to work with and alongside mukhabarat by having a 
“Jordanian heart” raises important questions in me regarding why he did not comply.  
I wanted to believe he was against the unjust nature of the request, and while I think 
on some level this is the case, the overriding theme is arguably the principle of 
Jordanians as non-meddler.   In fact, as we deconstruct different layers of coexistence, 
Ibrahim reveals his thoughts about Palestinians: 
 MMM:  You said it also you said something like the Palestinians, they 
are different from Jordanians?  How do you think the two are different 
from each other?  What do you think the difference is? 
 
Ibrahim:  Um. Well, uh it’s a good question. I can’t tell how, but we 
feel it. We feel a Palestinian friend is different, he is close friend, but 
you can, you could, you could sense like more sincerity, or more 
faithfulness in the Jordanians. Like in time of need, maybe you find 
the Jordanian is closer to you than the Palestinian. 
 
MMM:  Really? 
 
Ibrahim:  I think so yes. I never needed a friend, uh, I mean, I never 
experienced that, but you can feel like the Jordanian is like uh, is more 
available to you…You know, “I am more available if you need me!”  
Or you say if the Palestinian circumstance changes, he will forget 
you…I think that’s different from a Jordanian. He keeps being a friend 
forever.  (Ibrahim, personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
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It is Ibrahim’s statements and remarks of Palestinians as untrustworthy and unreliable 
which lead me to make the assumption he did not comply with mukhabarat because 
of his altruistic reasons, but more likely because of fear and not wanting to get 
involved. 
His Arms Behind His Back: American Rejection 
 It was common to find pictures of Che Guevara throughout refugee camps, on 
cars, t-shirts, hanging in stores, and so on.  Che Guevara represented revolution and 
the struggle of oppression, and yet when critically examining the seemingly strange 
presence of Che Guevara in the Middle East, one notices the Western lens; why Che 
Guevara and not countless other revolutionaries?  In other words, Che Guevara, an 
Argentinean-born Marxist revolutionary, represented the rebellion and declared 
socio-economic inequities could only be resolved through zealous revolution.  The 
significance of Che Guevara is this: Cuba had a successful socialist revolution which 
still challenges the United States   
Che Guevara’s revolutionary identity as a martyr and iconoclastic gadfly 
declares the United States so feeble it still concerns itself with the “miniscule” Cuba.  
Therefore, the Western analysis is critical because Palestinian laji’een have 
contextualized this revolutionary; the plastering of Che Guevara trumps any 
preoccupation with Jordanian national identity.  Che Guevara was martyred for the 
cause, one that challenged the United States the same way the Palestinian revolution 
challenges the United States’ geo-strategic interests in the Middle East.  His image is 
a testament to Palestinian transnational agency.   
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Al-laji’een could not address the question regarding the role of the United 
States in Jordan without examining the role of the United States in the greater Middle 
East, furthering the concept of a heightened transnational and global consciousness.   
JR: The problem lies not in the Jordanian-Palestinian, but in the 
Palestinian problem.  When it is solved, there will be no refugee 
problem left.  When we return back to Palestine, nobody will depend 
on anyone.  This is a natural thing.  In fact, whenever anyone is a 
refugee in any country; don’t you feel the same as we do in America?  
I am sure 100/100 that you suffer even more than we do.  When 
somebody is far from their homeland, they suffer, like being in 
America.  Imagine this, the Congress issued 2 weeks ago, a mandate 
calling for the rescue of animals during disasters and wars.  Imagine 
that while people in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine are killed with cold 
blood—people and children are killed with bombs [the Americans] 
make and send them to the Middle East.  The Arab is killed without 
any concern.  Our souls are generic. (Personal communication, August 
10, 2006) 
 
Handala’s hands behind his back encapsulate Palestinian defiance and rejection of the 
long history of non-Palestinians decision making for and on behalf of Palestinians.  
What JR discusses in our time together is the lack of regard for Arabs who suffer.  
The role of the United States has become one synonymous with imminent calamity.  
Her heightened consciousness of the United States and the issues before Congress, 
along with her observation of animal rights superseding Palestinian rights create a 
pan-refugee mentality of the United States harboring Islamophobia and anti-Arabism.  
MMM: What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with America? 
 
JR: It is a very good relationship [sarcastic].  Jordan is America’s 
spoiled child.  I think we are America’s followers.  We can’t do 
anything.  Whatever America tells us to do, we do it.  We do not have 
a personality.   
 
MMM: Is this something good or bad? 
 
 
 
168 
 
JR: No, it is undoubtedly not good.  To be a follower is not good. We 
want our independence as a people.  Even as Arab people we need our 
own personality, to be followers it’s not good.    
 
MMM: I spoke to Jordanians who say it is to be with America 
otherwise there will be too many problems, and we would be in a war, 
and all around us there is war.  So, they say it is necessary to stand 
with America, they say. 
 
JR: No.  It is not necessary.  Why should I be friends with America 
who is our enemy?  So, we shouldn’t befriend it.  We could become 
friends with the Arab peoples and become and integrated power, not 
followers. America will be afraid of us.  Why should we be followers?  
If I become a follower of somebody, my personality will diminish.  As 
long as I am a state that has all personality ingredients, then why 
would I become a US-follower? (JR, personal communication, August 
10, 2006) 
 
For JR as well as many other Palestinian laji’een, identity has so much to do with 
United States’ involvement in the Middle East.  In many ways, the conflict with 
Palestinians lies in Palestinian refusal to surrender and submit.  If they relinquished 
ties to Palestine, the conflict would no longer exist.  The truth of the United States as 
Israel’s major advocate in the occupation of Palestine and neo-Israeli fascism is not 
lost on any Palestinian or Arab for that matter.  Khaled, a 23 year old refugee, living 
in mukhayam Madaba majored in Computer Programming.  Khaled discusses United 
States-Jordanian relations:    
MMM: What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with America?   
 
Khaled: [Pause] The relationship with America, the relationship with 
America is a relationship frankly, that uh, that uh, what can I say?   
 
MMM: You can say whatever you want, you can relax. 
 
Khaled: No, no, it’s not that.  I just don’t know how to say it.  Of 
course it is a strong relationship.  But it is a relationship stronger than 
it has to be.  Meaning that if something happens, we might stand next 
to them, as a government as a country it is going to stand next to them.  
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But as people they reject this.  The people reject this talk.  They reject 
this strong relationship, meaning that America they are the ones who 
entered Iraq and this is rejected by all the people.  Notice that the 
government as a government gave an opportunity to enter, uh, uh, let’s 
say, the American army they train themselves on Jordanian land and 
they train before they enter Iraq.  This talk happened.  Who did this?  
The Jordanian government. (Khaled, personal communication, July 30, 
2006) 
 
Khaled’s observation indicates an unnecessarily strong relationship with the United 
States.  However, in his analysis of United States-Jordanian relations he also 
addresses the Jordanian Monarchy’s policies during the United States-Iraq war.  He 
continues: 
MMM: Does this bother you? 
 
Khaled: Yes, of course.  Of course, why? Because I reject something, 
why should I be forced?  The Iraqi people are the same as us.  Why 
should we, Iraq used to give us a lot of petrol to Jordan.  Why was the 
petrol here cheaper? Because Iraq used to provide for Jordan.  It used 
to provide to Jordan.  Why when Saddam Hussein used to say, give me 
a chance, oh Jordan, let me get into Israel through you?  Why did we 
reject?  Right?   (Khaled, personal communication, July 30, 2006) 
 
What Khaled speaks to is a seemingly hypocritical Jordanian relation with both the 
United States and Iraq.  Whereas at one time, Jordan had decent relations with Iraq 
and Iraq provided petrol to Jordan, it is Khaled’s perception Jordan has turned its 
back on Iraq.  In a discussion about Jordan and the Palestinian conflict, Khaled asserts 
once again Jordan’s apparently unrelenting support not only for the United States, but 
Israel as well. 
MMM: …Uh, what do you think of Jordan’s involvement with the 
Palestinian conflict? 
 
Khaled: They used to help.  They used help in the Palestinian conflict 
a lot.  They used to help and they stood with the Palestinian conflict.  
However, not in a way that would not result in, meaning they help the 
Palestinian conflict in a way that doesn’t harm the Israeli conflict.  
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Let’s say, why? Because look at history, Jordan stood by Palestinians 
in an unbelievable way.  However, if there is anything that might hurt 
Israel, then no.  [Inaudible].  They proceeded with the peace 
agreement.  The problem returned to who? To Palestine itself.  The 
needy, and those that were killed.  Israel kills and wounds, and etc. and 
mothers.  And above all that they force them to sign the peace 
agreement, but there is no real peace…Let me repeat my thought once 
again.  Meaning that Jordan now stands with the Palestinian people in 
a way that doesn’t harm Israel.   
Okay? It doesn’t hurt Israel. (Khaled, personal communication, July 
30, 2006) 
 
It appears wherein Jordan is unrelentingly supportive of Israel and the United States 
under the pretext of securing Jordan, it is simultaneously fickle in supporting both 
Palestine and Iraq.  Interestingly, whereas the Monarchy is covert in its support of the 
United States, its policies and actions are overtly aligned with the United States.  
Evidence of this is present dating back to the Israel-Jordanian peace treaty all the way 
to King Abdullah II’s meetings with President Bush.  However, Jordan is overtly 
supportive of Palestine, but its policies and praxis are not nearly as compelling.  
Evidence linking Jordan’s inconsistent support of Palestine is shown in signing the 
peace treaty with Israel in 1994.  Some might argue when Jordan signed the peace 
treaty in Israel it simultaneously signed a war treaty with Palestine, resulting in Black 
September. 
 What Black September ultimately did was plant the seed of Palestinian 
distrust.  Whereas Jordanians and Palestinians may have once lived together in 
harmony, the events of Black September carried longstanding implications for years 
to come thereby ingraining the notion of Palestinians as a group who could not be 
trusted in Jordanian psyche.  Palestinian refugees needed to be controlled and 
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monitored, and consequently a new unstable equilibrium was born (See Glenn, 2002, 
Chapter Two).   
 JR: Our family lived the days of the September war [Black 
September] between the Palestinians fedayees [freedom fighters] and 
the Jordanian army.  They have taken a huge stand against Jordanians, 
especially my mom and my dad. [They say] “These are Jordanians? 
Jordanians killed us!” And thus, our families they have still taken a 
stand since the war.  What did this do to me? They planted racism in 
me.  They witnessed the September war, and they witnessed when they 
came from Jerusalem too, and how they treated them, badly.  So they 
planted racism in us.  (JR, personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
Al-laji’een still pay the price for the events of Black September, and remnants of 
distrust ingrained in the Jordanian psyche create yet another unstable equilibrium—
that of Palestinian refugee resentment. 
Neo-apartheid and colonization have created anti-American and anti-Israeli 
sentiments, but simultaneously reaffirm many Arab stereotypes.  Support of this 
observation was everywhere and I heard of at least two instances of parents naming 
their newborns, “Jihad.”  Many Arabs, especially those living in poverty, believe and 
maybe rightfully so, a jihad is underway.  Jihad, as defined in Chapter Two, means 
the inner and outer struggles a person faces throughout their lives.  Inner jihad, the 
more important of the two is analogous with a person’s conscience and how they will 
live a pure life.  Outer jihad is the fight against oppression.  What may have started 
out a terrorist attack (mislabeled “jihad” by Osama bin Laden) has turned into jihad.   
JR: We ask from all leaders that they open the doors of jihad.  
Everyone in the refugee camp, we will all go, because we have nothing 
to fear.  There is no money, not our chairs [in government] to fear 
losing.  We are unemployed and instead of sit, why? Open the doors of 
jihad! Let us all go and support Hezbollah!   
 
MMM:  Would you go personally? 
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JR: I will go.  I have a nursing degree.  Maybe I can help with 
nursing, if there wasn’t, there are those who are wounded, those who 
are urbans. Right or wrong?  Maybe we can go to help. Yes.  Why not?  
Fayda, the Islamic nurse, where did she go?  Wasn’t she the first nurse 
in Islam?  Her jihad was nursing.  I think, even if I didn’t have nursing, 
maybe we can take courses in medicine, and help the ill there.  Why 
won’t they open the doors to jihad?  We are ready.  And our God 
allows it and it’s holy.  Right or wrong?  There is nothing for us to 
fear.  We believe that in the end death is inevitable.  There is no 
escaping it.  At then end, aren’t we all going to die, why don’t we die 
with pride? And move away from humiliation.   Why don’t we die 
with dignity and honor while fighting for God’s sake? (JR, personal 
communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
When JR calls to “open the doors for jihad”, she means to ask, why are they closed?  
On several occasions she wonders why the Jordanian government has not allowed al-
laji’een to go and fight, but rather, live amidst their poverty.  Hezbollah was giving 
Palestinians the chance to fight and the chance for victory.  Hezbollah had the guts to 
do what Middle Eastern countries did not; it challenged Israel and won. 
JR: I am saying that this is an opportunity now to rethink our 
calculations as Arabs.  What I meant by that is look at Hezbollah now, 
it showed that America is a big lie.  We made it so huge, we support its 
might.  And we are afraid of her, but why?  We have made it bigger 
than it has to be.  Israel said it will destroy Hezbollah in a week or so, 
and it has been a month since the beginning of the war, and they 
couldn’t do a thing.  So, if we, the Arabs, stand together like Syria or 
Egypt with 100 million people for example, if we all stood together, 
we would destroy Israel.  Why are we so afraid? Why are we afraid?  
Always afraid.  I don’t understand. (personal communication, August 
10, 2006) 
 
Once again JR’s frustration is not only with the United States, but Arab countries and 
their inability to stand united.  JR’s perception is that if pan-Arabism had succeeded, 
the United States would never have been able to strengthen Israel.  Further, because 
Pan-Arabism failed, Israel and the United States succeeded.  Inherent in both the 
aforementioned arguments is Arab inability to unite.   
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In addressing questions about Jordan and its relations with Palestine and the 
United States, Nour contends the King and the country are doing what they can.   
MMM: What do you think of Jordan’s relationship with America? 
 
Nour: I think it’s very good, better than any country’s relationship 
with America.   
 
MMM: Do you think this benefits Jordan, or no? 
 
Nour: Yes, of course.  I feel that our King is a King, truly who is 
successful with the way he deals with other countries.  I like that his 
relationship with America is very good.  
 
MMM: You don’t think that they are close in a way that is not good? 
 
Nour: No, on the contrary.  No, no. (Nour, personal communication, 
July 26, 2006) 
 
Nour’s account of Jordanian-American relations as a good undertaking is not the 
norm in al mukhayamat.  In her testimonies regarding Jordanians, Nour had nothing 
but praise for Jordanians.  She insists both are the same; both have Arab blood and 
possess Arab identities.  Whereas pan-Arabism failed, for Nour this is not the case.   
MMM:  Um, what are your attitudes towards Jordanians?  How are 
your relations with them?  
 
Nour: In terms of myself, I swear, I like them.  Really, and I sense that 
they are, like they say, what would have happened without them?  
They are the ones welcomed us, and they are the ones who helped us, 
and they are the ones who stood beside us, and they are the ones who 
gave us land, and we became just like Jordanians in terms of rights.  
And in, uh, there is no difference whatsoever between us.  But there is, 
you feel, [lowers her voice] with the older parents, and the older 
generations, they are the ones who have problems, not us. (Nour, 
personal communication, July 26, 2006) 
 
Nour is absolutely accurate in her statement about generations before and again, this 
reality stems from the events of Black September.  However, for Nour this was not 
the case.   
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Nour:  What can I tell you, I don’t feel that, what can I tell you um, 
um, that’s it, I was born here, lived here, and was brought up here, 
meaning I will stay here.  I don’t feel that I have a land, anyway.  For 
me, I mean it’s normal, it doesn’t matter, it’s normal, it’s normal.  
Because we aren’t going to go back, and we left it a long time ago, and 
our Prime Minister died, and it’s normal.  I feel that we are here, that’s 
it.  And our King is King Abdullah, and Jordan is our land.  That’s it.  
And our citizenship is Jordanian, that’s it. That’s it.  (Nour, personal 
communication, July 30, 2006) 
 
In Handala’s arms, we see Palestinian identity as non-negotiable.  Among 
non-refugee Palestinians, it is not the same, and in fact many have assimilated and 
pay no attention to al-laji’een living in Jordan.  This self effacing tendency among 
non-refugee Palestinians is a strategy many employ to fit in and succeed in the 
mainstream society.  It is for all intents and purposes, very effective.  For Palestinians 
in the mainstream society, one would assume hybridization is present; the social 
intermix of Palestinian and Jordanian identities.  I am sure this is true for many non-
refugee Palestinians, but not among any I witnessed.  Among the wealthy Palestinians 
observed, and the Palestinians many Jordanians referred to in order contest my 
observations, many considered themselves Jordanians.  For al-laji’een it is these 
Palestinians who have denigrated the Palestinian cause and abandoned their own 
people.   
MMM: let me ask you, do you get mad when these immigrants with 
millions and millions do not help you? 
 
JR: Yes.  Yes of course I am going to get mad, because I am a 
Palestinian, just like you.  You were lucky and you became rich.  My 
God didn’t give me this chance, and we are supposed to look to each 
other, and to help each other.  But here everyone is thinking of only his 
family, not others. (personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
175 
Sometimes, I can imagine Handala with his arms crossed, rejecting those who have 
abandoned the Palestinian struggle (including but not limited to both Jordanians and 
Palestinians) in attempts to gain access in the mainstream, dominant culture. 
Among al-laji’een, many find themselves living in competing systems; 
poverty/wealth, laji’een/non-laji’een, and non-Jordanian/Jordanian.  Again, many I 
am sure have found ways to live dual realities wherein both refugee life and 
mainstream life live in complete harmony, but per observations, this was not the case. 
These competing systems complicated the sociopolitical climate in which al-laji’een 
rejected the United States’ presence whilst mainstream society embraced it.  The lack 
of critical and national consciousness in Jordanians is arguably a result of privilege.  
For al-laji’een, there existed a heightened critical and national awareness of issues 
such as the living conditions of Palestinians living outside of Jordan, racism in the 
United States, and even the laws Congress passes.  Although many people kept 
saying: an issue between Palestinians and Jordanians does not exist, it does indeed 
and on all levels—personally, socio-politically, academically, and institutionally. 
Nour:  Frankly, all the problems here—there are many problems 
because of this topic.  Let me tell you something.  A problem occurred 
in the university from Al-Majali family from Karak [southern Jordan], 
a girl from Al-Majali Jordanian and a Palestinian young man.  The 
problem was not for her going out with a young man, rather, because 
he is a Palestinian and that’s it. 
 
MMM: Ah. I see. 
 
Nour: It was shown on TV, Muhammad il Wakeel showed it, and on 
video, and on the phones.  Imagine that.  That day, the relatives of the 
girl beat the guy severely and left him on the verge of death, but God’s 
mercy saved his life. It was a big problem that took place at Mu’tah 
University. Yes, it was a problem.  Oh yes, things like this reach this 
level. Oh yeah. (personal communication, July 30, 2006) 
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The assertion made by many to suggest harmonious commingling was not the case 
and I believe many were mistaking the fact that both groups coexist meant they exist 
in harmony.  A Palestinian presence, even a wealthy Palestinian presence, does not in 
and of itself denote harmonious coexistence. 
Handala’s Bare Footedness: Refugee Pride 
 My own ethnocentrism led me to think of the word “refugee” as one which 
warranted pity.  I expected to find al-laji’een hating their existence in al mukhayamat, 
fighting a losing battle with poverty.  What I witnessed instead was refugee pride and 
dignity.  For many of al-laji’een being a refugee meant connection to their land.  
Their existence as laji’een meant Palestine existed.   
 In my reflections about my interviews I realize that all of my 
participants were proud to be refugees; truly proud.  I am not just 
talking about the graduates, but also about Mr. Abu Ahmad and his 
family and the many little children I saw and spoke to.  I am sure they 
wish living conditions were different, but to them being a refugee is 
proof of something, but I am not sure what.  I think it is living and 
breathing evidence of Israeli occupation.  I also think that it is living 
breathing evidence of oppression, but I think the most important thing 
it symbolizes is survival of both the occupation and worldwide 
oppression. (Field notes, July 27, 2006) 
 
The word laji’een was so profound and held so much value, and they viewed being 
refugees with pride.  The word al-laji’een meant they had a homeland which they 
were forced to leave, and this place was Palestine.  The connection to Palestine can 
not be underestimated, insofar as refugeeness meant the existence of Palestine; the 
survival of the Palestinian struggle resulted in the physical presence of generations of 
laji’een.  In discussion with JR, I ask her perceptions of refugeeness, and her own 
generated themes become apparent. 
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 JR:  Of course we are mad.  We are mad first and most with our 
families.  Why did they leave Palestine?  Why didn’t they endure 
hardships there? It’s better than living in exile.  At least you stayed 
there and even if you are killed, you would die with honor.  It is better 
than coming here and being under the insult and oppression by 
anybody.  They say, “a word will scar even though you live in the 
midst” even though you are living, what is this life, really?  However, 
there it is different; one of our relatives currently lives there in the 
West Bank.  They live with dignity.  People there are better than us, 
even though they live with the Jews.  If I stayed there with the Jews 
and was killed, that means that I’ll become a martyr with dignity.  At 
least there, they are our enemy.  Right or wrong? [MMM: right]. Not 
Arabs.  An Arab insults me while they are the same as I am.  Muslims 
are far from you.  I am talking about Arabs, Arabs just like me, yes or 
no?  I do not think they are practicing Muslims.  Otherwise they 
wouldn’t treat us like that.     
 
MMM:   If there was the right of refugees to return to Palestine, if 
there was peace, would you return? 
 
JR: Yes, of course.  I will return.  There is nothing like one’s country.  
Whatever your job is, you still have your country, your land, even if 
you had to become a farmer that is still better than my college degree, 
better than my college degree.  (personal communication, August 10, 
2006) 
 
JR’s generated themes parallel people living in mukhayamat; she considers her life 
one of “exile”, wherein her own Arab counterparts are the source of oppression.  At 
least in Israel, “they are our enemy” (JR, personal communication, August 10, 2006).  
Even second generation laji’een that have never seen Palestine connect so profoundly 
to their homeland which created a heightened critical, national, and transnational 
consciousness.   
 MMM: What does being a refugee mean to you? 
 
Khaled: Frankly, there is no doubt that we are refugees.  This is 
something I shouldn’t forget.  This is the one thing that ties me to 
Palestine in reality, the fact that I am a refugee, that my name is 
refugee and that I live in Jordan.  Do I go to jihad, do I fight, do I do 
anything? No I don’t.  Why?  It is not my choice.  So, the one thing 
that ties me is that I am a refugee in Palestine, that I am a refugee, and 
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I am holding on to that, and that I am living in Jordan.  These are the 
two things that tie me to Palestine.  No doubt that I haven’t seen 
Palestine, no doubt that I miss it, no doubt that someone longs even 
though he hasn’t seen it. (personal communication, July 26, 2006) 
 
Their forced migration shaped their border identities and so refugeeness was a 
testament to their oppression, displacement, and occupation.   
JR: We are civilized and we have sophisticated things.  These things 
are supposed to support us.  We have to be proud, I don’t know, I think 
that there are times when we go out of Jordan, you are ashamed that 
you are an Arab.  Why?  On the contrary, I am not ashamed that I am 
an Arab.  Now, even now, from the point that I am from Baqa’a, you 
go to for instance to a high class neighborhood, like “ew”, as if Baqa’a 
is gross, as if it is gross. Why? Why? On the contrary, I am from 
Baqa’a, born and proud, and my financial position, is not that good.  
And I came from a self-made family, so why should I be ashamed?  
One the contrary, this I am very proud of it!  (Personal 
communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
 The existence of so many refugees is proof of the continued occupation of 
Palestine and the collective global denial of neo-colonial apartheid.  The very 
significant numerical presence of al-laji’een is undeniable and al-laji’een are proud 
of their refugeeness because their existence was proof.   
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Second Research Question:  
Handala’s Hair as a Weapon: Education as a Weapon 
I never carried a rifle 
On my shoulder 
Or pulled a trigger. 
All I have 
Is a flute's melody 
A brush to paint my dreams, 
A bottle of ink.  
All I have 
Is unshakeable faith 
And an infinite love 
For my people in pain. 
(Zayyad, Tawfiq, All I Have) 
It is critical to this study to deconstruct competing notions of martyrdom in 
the Jordanian and Palestinian refugee contexts.  Deconstructing the similarities and 
differences in both notions of martyrdom is instrumental in contextualizing the study.  
In the following analysis words such as jihad and martyr surface many times.  It is 
important not to identify these words through our own Western and ethnocentric lens.  
Rather, the words jihad and martyr carry with them a meaning we cannot understand.  
Seemingly radical fanaticism of a set of beliefs in this case is set in the context of day 
to day misery.  There is an indisputable dichotomy of the different orientations, and it 
is important to recognize, at least for the purpose of this study, all connotations of the 
words can coexist.  
 In this study, the word “martyr” for Jordanians carries a completely different 
implication.  Here, it has nothing to do with a sacrifice for Allah; in fact, the 
Jordanian participants never even used the word martyr to describe themselves.  
Rather, the notions of being burdened with the Palestinian struggle created a 
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framework of parallel notions of competing victimhoods.  In other words, the nuances 
attached to both Western and Palestinian refugee notions of martyrdom do not apply 
to the Jordanian framework.  For Jordanians, the subtext of the word martyr (a word I 
knowingly assign) connotes with the Jordanian burden of the Palestinian conflict.  
The figure below summarizes the meanings of martyrdom in all three contexts. 
Palestinian Refugee 
Martyrdom 
 
Western Martyrdom Jordanian Martyrdom 
 
Religious Ethnocentric  Economic 
Political  Radical Political 
Revolutionary Anti-Semitic Geo-strategic 
 
Inherent in all three associations with the word is the victim mentality, and all 
rightfully so.  However, I came to find that in both the Jordanian and Palestinian 
refugee contexts, both parties were so immersed in their own realities, they were 
unable to see the “other.”  The assumption of Palestinians as violent people willing to 
die for anything was one of my biggest sore points with critics of my study, and the 
general public for that matter.  The belief that Palestinian laji’een are so irrational and 
savage, they strap kids with detonators and convince them to blow themselves up for 
the Palestinian cause, is seeped in anti-Arabism and Islamophobia and the very 
assumption is riddled with ethnocentrism.  While I stated instances of reaffirmed 
stereotypes of Islamic fundamentalism, the reason is somewhat indistinct for the 
masses: rather than Palestinians by nature as untamed martyrs, the current situation 
has pushed many to believe Islam is under attack.  As a result, Palestinian willingness 
to die for their cause as martyrs seems extremist and militant.  When a United States 
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soldier dies in battle, he or she is considered an American hero for protecting United 
States democracy.  When an Arab dies and martyrs him or herself for protecting 
Palestinian freedom, he or she is considered savage and barbaric.  In Benedict 
Anderson’s (1999) testimony around the question of why people are willing to die for 
their nation, he asserts, “Dying for the revolution also draws its grandeur from the 
degree to which it is felt to be something fundamentally pure” and the idea of 
ultimate sacrifice or in this case martyrdom, “comes only with the idea of purity, 
through fatality” (Anderson, 1999, p. 144). 
 In any case, the vast majority of Palestinian refugees believed education to be 
the only weapon worth pursuing.  Many Jordanians would even agree Palestinians are 
great achievers academically, which for Jordanians is evidence of Palestinian equity.   
JR: Uh, you know that Palestinians are smart, they have a business 
mentality, they are economical…Um, I will tell you that the refugees 
why they are smart, because they have been through many tough 
situations and these situations forced them to be like that.  Yes, they 
are smart people, but the need justifies invention [or, necessity is the 
mother of invention]. (Personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
In answering the second research question regarding the role of education and the 
hidden curriculum, ample findings suggest Palestinian refugees view education as an 
avenue towards upward mobility.  In my attempts to address Jordanian national 
identity dissemination throughout schools, Palestinians seemed unruffled by this 
reality because for them, it was more important to obtain a diploma, graduate, and 
excel academically. Conceptual competing questions arise; are the Palestinian laji’een 
incapable or indifferent? Or does the state-sponsored marginalization create a 
seeming tolerance and indifference towards their national identities?  Or finally, does 
the internalization of the state-sponsored fear create a willingness to relinquish rights 
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to identity?  In our discussion about the physical presence of Jordanian identity JR 
comments: 
JR: There has to be, really. Yes.  The pictures of the King are hanging 
everywhere. Jordanian flags and so forth.  Every building, it should be 
there, it’s a government school.  
 
MMM:  Wherever I go in the camps, I have never seen a Palestinian 
flag waiving outdoors except one inside a house. 
 
JR: No.  These are Jordanian lands.  It is theirs and they have the right 
to raise the Jordanian flag, they are Jordanians.  Even on this, we are 
going to be stupid? (personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
For Palestinian laji’een the more pressing issue was the immediate need for access, 
and as such the notion of identity was futile when faced with issues of unemployment 
and poverty.  The more basic need had to be addressed before the dialogue of identity 
could be addressed.  Jordanian national identity in academia was second to academic 
capital which was the most important goal.   
 The supposition of Palestinians as intelligent is noteworthy for two main 
reasons: it lifts the responsibility of fostering and promoting Palestinian equity and 
equality, while concurrently embedding the notion of Palestinians as a possible threat.   
MMM:  What do you think people would you think about me studying 
this subject on Palestinians?  What do you think their reaction would 
be?  Would it be good, or would they be upset?  
 
Nour: Maybe they will be mad at you.  Jordanians don’t like us and 
would ask why you want to conduct this study about Palestinians? Or 
maybe they are jealous about us because most of the excellent 
achievers at university are Palestinians.  This is just my opinion, and is 
not based on fact.  (Personal communication, July 30, 2006) 
 
Similar to the Mexican immigration issue in the United States, the presence of 
Palestinians (more Palestinians than Jordanians live in Jordan) brings up issues of 
territory and rights.   The numerical visibility of Palestinians in Jordan elicits the 
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same type of sentiments expressed by anti-immigrant groups in the United States; that 
the minority group fraudulently drains valuable economic and social resources from 
their host country while hoarding and consuming a disproportionate amount of the 
host country’s economic and social resources. 
MMM: What do you think Jordanians think about Palestinians? 
Palestinian refugees? 
 
JR: Let me tell  you that all Jordanians, they think the same.  They say 
that Palestinians are taking over the Jordanian economy which 
indicates that Palestinians are smart.  What do they rely on? Their 
intelligence.  Really.   Extreme intelligence.  So, here we have all 
companies and capitals are owned by Palestinians.  Why are they 
Palestinians?  Did we tell you not to use your brains?  Not to work? 
(August 10, 2006) 
 
Although I assumed a Jordanian would hesitate to acknowledge Palestinian 
intelligence, Shadi reaffirms JR’s perceptions.   
Shadi: Well, uh the Doctors [Professors] okay, let us tell you about the 
Doctors.  Most of the Doctors for the faculty of engineering that I take 
are Palestinian.  They are Palestinians having those minds, Doctors 
minds, Professors minds, okay?  Uh, Jordanian Doctors are in Arabic, 
English, uh okay? That [kind of] education, not for engineering.  
Palestinians have their minds, open minded     
 
MMM: They are open-minded? 
 
Shadi: Oh yeah! Professors, their minds are unbelievable, the minds 
that we have are nothing, excuse me.   
 
MMM: Really? 
 
Shadi: Yes, our minds, we either use them or we don’t.  There is 
nothing. But we do have excellent minds. But Palestinians they know 
how to use their minds.   
 
MMM:  Palestinians are more overeducated?  They are overeducated?    
 
Shadi:  They are overeducated.  Why? Because they are out of their 
land 
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MMM:  Yeah 
 
Shadi: They need to, to, have a science as a weapon, okay?   
 
MMM: Yes 
 
Shadi: They need to have science as a weapon, that’s all. Where as a 
Jordanian, I am living in my home, watching tv, eating my breakfast, 
okay? (Personal communication, August 6, 2006) 
 
Explicit in Shadi’s statement is the presence of Palestinian intelligence, and implicit 
is the notion of Jordanian privilege.  In other words, Palestinians have to be intelligent 
in order to succeed, whereas Jordanians do not have the same level of necessity.   
 Early childhood education for al-laji’een is sheltered.  Many are brought up in 
UN schools, segregated by gender, and almost entirely Palestinian.  When they enter 
higher education, many find themselves in the midst of a culture shock.  This culture 
of shock manifests itself in various ways, ranging anywhere from violence to 
academic success.  Tensions on campus exist between Palestinians and Jordanians, 
and although a majority of students choose not to participate in the protests, they 
witness conflict and opposition that sometimes makes for a hostile environment.  The 
headscarves or kefiyyehs (black or white indicates Palestinians, red indicates 
Jordanians) arguably take the form of gang colors.  In the midst of the tensions 
students are expected to attend classes and become successful graduates of Jordanian 
public universities.  Al-laji’een leave completely sheltered and homogenous 
communities upon entering public universities.  This is particularly difficult for the 
women, who are sometimes forced to live outside the home, something many fear and 
dread.      
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 Among the university environment and education, a hidden curriculum exists; 
one revolving around issues of academic access, capital, and identity.  In many ways 
education in Jordan can be considered a microcosm of the greater community.  Wasta 
(bribery) is very common, and those with connections and money have the 
opportunity to live and lead very comfortable lives.  Wasta is exercised mostly in 
employment and governmental issues, but it exists in education as well.  Because 
wasta grants access to a few, it excludes many.  It is important to footnote Jordanians 
are not the only people privy to wasta, but the tribal nature of Jordanian families as 
historically clanspersons indicates a longer lineage of access and privilege as a result 
of wasta.           
MMM: What do you think is missing from education at university 
here? 
 
JR: As development, there is development in the universities, 
however, the one thing I would like to change, to really change, is that 
to eliminate wasta from the university life and the jobs.  Wasta 
shouldn’t interfere with employment and hiring.  Let me tell, my major 
is mathematics, and I was with three other graduates at the civil 
service council [court] to be hired.  You know what happened?  There 
they don’t go, by taking turns.  They hire the person who has wasta.  
Every time I go there, I find that my line is getting longer, and my turn 
is going backward.  Why?  From wasta. They bring a girl whose father 
is so and so, and she stands in line ahead of me.  For me, for instance, I 
have graduated a year.  So, why? Because I don’t have wasta.  I know 
there is no justice.  But why this meanness? Why? I know she doesn’t 
need the job, but maybe she wants to buy a car and so on, she wants to 
do her hair at the coiffeur, and wants to do makeup, while me, who is 
toiling to save food for my family is nothing.  As Maslow put the basic 
needs of people within hierarchical [pyramids] system, but if I want a 
job, I can’t find one, where this girl wants to buy a car or fix her hair, 
she wants makeup, so that she can shine? It shouldn’t happen.  
(personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
Even before entering university, access is an issue for al-laji’een.  Royal grants or 
makramehs, assign a handful of seats for al-laji’een, but at their expense.  Tuition is 
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expensive, especially when you consider the large number of children to a family, as 
well as approximately JD 120 per family from the UN.  Those who have good marks 
and are accepted to university still have to find ways to finance their education.   
 Khaled: The university, truthfully, let’s say is being used for different 
purposes by different people.  Meaning, politicians use it for politics.  
Let’s say that most of it is filled with political things to an abnormal 
way.  Okay?  So now, many people started to express themselves at 
university.  They want their thoughts to be carried out by people.  In 
addition, it [university] carries many people from different 
backgrounds meaning that some people they look at other people, 
meaning, I for example, my social circumstances are bad, I look at 
others, that hmm that person has a car, and he has this and this and this 
and his lifestyle is good, why don’t I become like him?  I begin to 
daydream and daydream based on what I am saying.  I graduate from 
university, and I get shocked from reality.  Right? I graduate from 
university, I am shocked that the reality is totally different because the 
university let me live a dream.  But with that, I found a great, 
competitive atmosphere, and one looks at himself and his status, his 
educational status, his social status in general. (Khaled, personal 
communication, July 31, 2006) 
 
Khaled is addressing what many of al-laji’een must confront once they enter 
academia; privilege.  The privilege they encounter provides a false sense of 
hopelessness which hypnotizes them into thinking they are capable of achieving 
wealth like their non-refugee counterparts.  Upon graduating, another reality sinks in, 
and the glass ceiling becomes even more opaque.  The notion of privilege is similar to 
the notion of false hope circling around good grades and academic standing; that a 
good tawjihi score ensures a university education.      
 On one of my visits to mukhayam Madaba, I met a very intelligent high school 
graduate with aspirations of becoming a doctor.  Her heartbroken father revealed the 
impossibility of her dreams ever materializing because of finances.  The only solution 
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was marriage, the possibility that someone could give her access to an education and 
a better life. 
This man has seven kids, and his fifth child just found out she got a 92 
on her tawjihi [very high and very rare] and her dad had to 
painstakingly tell her that he is sorry but she cant go to university—he 
simply cant afford to send her.  OC: When I look at her I think to 
myself—“what is the use: we tell them to keep hope, to educate 
themselves, to work hard, and it will pay off.  So, they keep hope, 
educate themselves, work hard, and find no hope for university.  And 
those that are able to attend, graduate, and are unemployed.  What’s 
the point?”  Her father begs us to take her with us to the United States, 
“maybe she will have a better shot at becoming the doctor she hoped 
she would become” he pleads.  When I ask him what will happen to 
her, he tells me, that she will have to get married—maybe then she 
will have a better chance.  OC: I wonder how hard it must have been 
for this man to tell me that he had failed his daughter, which he did tell 
me many times and in front of her no less.  I also wonder how hard it 
must have been to hear. (Field notes, July 30, 2006) 
 
Some university students make it into a Jordanian public university with a tawjihi 
grade half that of the woman above.  It is safe to say none of them are laji’een, 
because those who score in the 50s could only make it via wasta.   
 In almost every family I talk to—there are high school graduates who 
have gotten above a 90 on their tawjihi.  This is amazing.  I ask each 
one how this happened, and they almost all simultaneously say it’s 
their only weapon.  OC: I remember Prof. Zunes who told me 
Palestinians hold more PhDs than Israelis…These high scores give 
students a sense of false hope because soon they will come to learn the 
true meaning of wasta, and the true meaning of heartbreak.  It is not 
uncommon, I come to find for someone to get a 94 and yet for a 
Jordanian with a 52 to take the place of his or her counterpart.  Wasta.  
Bribery.  Wasta runs rampant in Jordan.  OC:  I recognize that my 
emotions are being triggered, and rage is flowing through my 
bloodstream.  I also realize now that when we talk of Arabs and all of 
the stereotypes that come to mind, so many are now the shadows that 
follow us…we think of their anger and their temper.  “No wonder” I 
think to myself.  Again, I remember Dr. Zunes who said something in 
class to the effect of: reactionary force usually holds legitimacy.  In 
other words it is the reaction that receives the attention, but the 
important questions of ‘why’ are never asked.  (Field Notes, July 30, 
2006) 
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During my time in Jordan I asked those uncomfortable “why” questions, and I 
consistently dreaded hearing the answers.  Success and access are so deeply 
connected, but this is a universal phenomenon, one not limited to Jordan, but the 
existing world.  My knowing that privilege and access are assigned did not make it 
any easier to accept, especially when it came to education.  Highly gifted laji’een 
denied access to higher education spoke volumes; their lives would from then on be 
dictated by their options, not their opportunities.     
 The flaws of higher education in Jordan are not entirely indicative of the 
university system.  For many, university was a way in which al-laji’een shed their 
racism.  Al-laji’een I spoke to were very hesitant to go to university, afraid of leaving 
their families and being exposed to too much.  However, after the first semester, they 
reported finding their niche and embracing university life.   
Nour:  In our family, the educated ones think differently, but the 
uneducated ones, they are the biased ones.  Education plays a role in 
that, I believe so.  For instance, my uncle he is an educated man and he 
doesn’t object, while my older uncle is not educated, disagrees with 
mixed marriages.  Any my grandmother is the same.  Education plays 
a huge role. 
 
MMM: Yes, yes. 
 
Nour: Before I enrolled at university, I had almost the same thinking 
like them, but after I enrolled, things became clearer to me and 
everything changed.  We are the same [Jordanians and Palestinians].  
They are not missing an arm or leg or anything else.  I have no idea 
why this is happening.  I talk to my sisters constantly about this, and 
say “I wish Marianne will solve all of this!” (Nour, personal 
communication, July 30, 2006) 
 
Nour and JR both attested to this transition.  The homogenous mukhayam reality 
sheltered them from Jordanians and they were only surrounded by people who lived, 
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worshipped, and thought the way they did.  In going to university they were exposed 
to Jordanians who did not fit the “oppressor” stereotype they were taught growing up.  
Both JR and Nour met Jordanian women with whom they grew a close bond and 
connection, which played a vital role in their assumptions about Jordanians and vice 
versa.  It is not the university system that allowed for the eradication of racism, rather 
what the university represented; a heterogeneous society wherein people of all 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds shared a common space.   
MMM: Did the university ever address anything about Jordanians and 
Palestinians living together? 
 
JR: No, there was not much talk.  I was living in the camp, they had 
an extreme racism. But when I went to university in the south of 
Jordan, most of my friends were young women from Karak and 
Tafileh [Jordanian].  On the contrary, I lived with them and it was 
never an issue.  Really, we never thought of these topics at all.  It was 
erased. (Personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
 
 I was told by both JR and Nour that I would find a lot of racism in the camps, 
and I did.  Many families forbade intermarriages between Jordanians and 
Palestinians.  When I asked someone why, he made the parallel between how White 
people in the United States do not like to marry Black people (personal 
communication, July 30, 2006).  This environment is the one many young laji’een 
grow up in, and they internalize the messages of Jordanians as oppressors.  Hence, 
some are pleasantly surprised when they find loyal and wonderful Jordanian friends. 
JR: I became racist during [high] school years, but when I went to 
college all my friends were Jordanians from Karak from Tarawneh, 
from Ma’an, and this is how I lived, and they were kind and why 
shouldn’t I deal with them?  Since those days, racism was erased from 
me since college. (JR, personal communication, August 10, 2006) 
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The intermingling between Palestinian laji’een and mainstream society (both 
Palestinian non-refugees and Jordanians) was sometimes met with hostility, but also 
with lasting friendship, and it is important to note the importance of the role of the 
university in enabling understanding to take place.  In an attempt to eradicate the 
tensions which do exist on campus issues such as wasta and coexistence must be 
addressed, otherwise the inevitability of continued tensions will reach heightened 
levels.  Although the act of entering higher education and sharing a common space 
with different people provided an opportunity for transformative change, this is not 
due to universities’ zero tolerance policy for tensions, but rather the exposure it gave 
many students.  In other words, the university should not receive praise if the result is 
breaking down barriers and speaking across borders, because many times university is 
the place where inequities are reaffirmed. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusions: 
What would Handala’s face look like? 
 
Revisiting the Theoretical Framework 
 
 I began my analysis from the point of view that Jordanian and Palestinian 
refugee coexistence was imperative.  The study crossed transnational boundaries in its 
attempt to highlight the direct effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Occupied 
Palestine.  My research questions about the roles of both sociopolitical and academic 
contexts guided my interview questions.  Next, the study was grounded in several 
theoretical frameworks: approach to liberation through critical consciousness; anti-
apartheid rights discourse; Omi and Winant’s (1994) war of position and war of 
maneuver and their notions of trajectory of racial politics, and finally, Glenn’s (2002) 
concept of unstable equilibrium.   
I triangulated my observations, field notes, interviews, personal notes, and 
other relevant data, to generate themes for each research question.  Critical reflection 
was essential to the study; I would write down possible ideas, themes, and questions 
and put them away for a day or two before revisiting them.   I reviewed my analyses 
with friends and colleagues, who guided me from different perspectives.   
 All of these exercises individually and collectively allowed me to identify the 
themes of the study, as well as the complex nature of sustained Jordanian-Palestinian 
refugee coexistence.  They also prompted me to add Chapter Four, entitled 
“Methodological Challenges.”  It is important to revisit the theoretical frameworks in 
order to ground the analysis of this study. 
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Critical consciousness is the resurrection of the soul that recognizes its current 
state and begins the active journey to transform and transcend its current reality 
(Freire, 1994; Freire, 2003).  In this practice of praxis, one is able to name the source 
of their oppression and rise above it.  In the Jordanian-Palestinian refugee context, 
this framework is idealistic given testimonies of pervasive fear, particularly 
circulating around the ever-presence of mukhabarat.  Moreover, the lack of critical 
consciousness in Jordanian participants and their ambivalence regarding the 
sociopolitical contexts coupled with the heightened consciousness of the Palestinians 
refugees impedes one’s ability to truly transcend oppressive existences.   
Zreik’s (2002) analysis of anti-apartheid rights discourse seeks to explore 
whether or not the South Africa-Israel analogy applies.  In attempts to deconstruct the 
tenets of apartheid, the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prove 
inapplicable on the grounds that human rights discourse undervalues the historical 
context which is so deeply connected to the ongoing struggle.  Further complicating 
the Palestinian case is the presence of so many refugees residing outside the country, 
thereby fragmenting the apartheid case.  Whereas the reality for Palestinians in the 
West bank fit the description of victims of neo-apartheid based on exclusion such as 
Israel-only highways, the reality of apartheid speaks only to those living within the 
country.  The dispersal of South Africa was mainly internal as opposed to the exile of 
millions of Palestinians.   
Therefore, what I sought to explore was whether or not the Palestinian refugee 
context in Jordan fit Zreik’s (2002) model of anti-apartheid discourse.  What I found 
was that while the anti-apartheid agenda watered down the Israel-Palestinian context, 
193 
it also exaggerates the Jordanian-Palestinian one.  Whereas exclusion is ever-present 
and tensions are sometimes palpable, many Palestinians have assimilated and are 
upstanding members of the community.  Moreover, the fact that many Palestinians in 
Jordan are wealthy highlights the importance of class as one of the determining 
factors of exclusion.  The immersion of so many Palestinians trumps the exclusion of 
Palestinian laji’een.  Therefore the anti-apartheid rights discourse model does not 
correspond with the Jordanian-Palestinian refugee context. 
While the anti-apartheid framework was not apparent, Omi and Winant’s 
(1994) racial formation and notions of war and maneuver and war of position were 
ubiquitous.  It is important to revisit the definitions of both war of maneuver and war 
of position.  War of maneuver articulates how underserved communities seek to hold 
on to their territories as alternatives to the dominant ideology.   
Specifically, al-laji’een were so entrenched in their war of maneuver, and as 
stated in the analysis above one such example is the meaning attached to the image of 
Che Guevara; zealous rebellion.  The images on cars and houses throughout Jordan 
were a testimony to the resilience and to the struggle.  Essentially the image of the 
martyr signifies the transnational revolution in the name of Palestine.  More 
specifically, indigenous Palestinian images like Handala speak to the transnational 
tragedy that has become the Palestinian struggle.  In Jordan, mukhayamat are 
intrinsically examples of war of maneuver in that they are more or less homogenous 
populations (majority Palestinian) on the margins of Jordanian society.  Unofficial 
leaders of the camps and Palestinian run organizations and centers provide the 
services al-laji’een might need without having to go outside the camp for aid.   
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War of position is another mode of resistance, but one that warrants political 
and national recognition.  Palestinians are present in both, though to what degree is 
debatable.  Further, Black September planted the seed of distrust, essentially 
restraining Palestinians from free reign.  Palestinian power lies mainly, but not 
entirely on numerical significance.  The presence of so many Palestinians in Jordan 
led the United States to believe Jordan would soon become Palestine and vice versa.  
In the years following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Fateh emerged as the vanguard of 
guerilla movements (Hudson, 1972).  When Fateh began to situate itself as a 
government within a government in Jordan, it was a clear illustration of war of 
position.       
The Palestinian Diaspora to Jordan held significant local, national, and global 
implications.  The displacement of Palestinian people became the displacement of the 
injustice, and the responsibility fell almost entirely on Jordan to rectify it.  The plan 
was inherently flawed in that it bypassed Palestinian autonomy, sovereignty, and self-
determination.  In September 1970, the Palestinians attempted to threaten King 
Hussein.  The PLO and factions of Palestinian guerilla groups throughout Jordan 
were taking part in guerilla attacks—essentially bullying the Jordanian government 
and people.  This war of position threatened the possibility of any significant war of 
position thereafter and the core of all distrust is traced back to the events of Black 
September.   
In the analysis of trajectory of racial politics, or racially based social 
movements, the understanding is seeped in sometimes competing interests inherent in 
racial ideologies.  Challenges to these ideologies result in crises which interrupt the 
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unstable equilibrium.  For Jordan, such instances are Black September, as well as the 
Hezbollah-Israeli war during my time there.  These occurrences interrupt the norm 
until a new unstable equilibrium is created implementing different strategies, in this 
case a strategy like the pervasiveness of mukhabarat.   
Central to unstable equilibrium is Glenn’s (2002) theory of citizenship.  
Citizenship, according to Glenn (2002) is fluid and changes over time, and depending 
on the political and social milieu.  Evidence of this in the Jordanian-Palestinian 
context is rich; in the analysis above, al-laji’een were seemingly unconcerned with 
Jordanian national identity indoctrination and the reasons are threefold; the most 
important goal was to attain and education, inherent fear of the ramifications, and 
finally their own ideas of martyrdom.                      
Conclusion 
 The overall themes found among the Jordanian participants were: lack of 
critical national consciousness, anti-immigrant and anti refugee sentiments, and 
finally blind-faith westernization.  Evidence of lack of national consciousness was 
found in Shadi who remarked that he does not like to bother himself, or Ibrahim who 
maintains he is not interested in such issues.  This finding falls in alignment with the 
claim of Jordanians as non-meddlers in politics.  Perhaps the strongest and more 
impassioned claims were made around the argument of the immigration and refugee 
waves.  While Osama was able to accept and embrace his Palestinian counterparts, he 
was not keen about the Iraqi refugees, those he called “another race” (personal 
communication, August 11, 2006).  Meanwhile, Ibrahim and Shadi both made claims 
about how Palestinians have more rights than they do.  Finally, an additional unifying 
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theme was generated around blind-faith westernization, particularly U.S.-Jordanian 
political relations.  All participants conceded the presence of the United States was 
imperative for sustained peaceful conditions in Jordan. 
 Among Palestinian laji’een, themes were generated and assigned to various 
parts of Handala.  His arms behind his back represented rejection of the United States, 
his bare footedness represented refugee pride, and his hair illustrated education as a 
weapon.  JR’s comments about the need for pan-Arabism as opposed to reliance on 
the west, as well as Khaled’s assertions about how U.S.-Jordanian relations are 
stronger than they have to be support Handala’s hands behind his back as a rejection 
of accepting solutions the American way.   
Refugee pride was also evident in explicit comments made by JR and Khaled; 
this ties into notions of this generation’s laji’een as agents of change for Palestine.  
Evidence of refugee existence was proof Palestine existed and was occupied.  
Moreover the presence of children in mukhayamat with over ten children to a family 
being the norm, it was brought to my attention these children were oftentimes 
considered warriors and soldiers in the struggle for victory.  Pride was a palpable 
feature of al-mukhayamat.  Finally, education as the weapon was substantiated not 
only testimonies from al-laji’een, but also Shadi who states that science is a weapon 
for Palestinians and education is necessary to succeed.  Nour discloses that perhaps 
the fact that Palestinians excel in higher education might be a factor or source of 
tensions. 
 The theoretical frameworks utilized reveal the complex nature of the 
Jordanian-Palestinian model.  While in the South African-Israeli model, anti apartheid 
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discourse oversimplifies the historical and fragmented nature of Palestinians, it is a 
significant over-exaggeration in the Jordanian-Palestinian paradigm.  However the 
trajectory of racial politics and war of maneuver and war of position so vividly 
capture Palestinian attempts to exist within the dominant ideology.  Further, Glenn’s 
notion of citizenship and Omi and Winant’s premises of the unstable equilibrium 
highlight the fragile nature of Palestinian refugees residing within and amidst the 
dominant culture, particularly surrounded by so much fear. 
 Perhaps above all, the concept of competing notions of martyrdom 
fundamentally ground both Jordanians and Palestinian laji’een so firmly in their 
positions making it very difficult for a new, more harmonious coexistence to take 
place.  Anderson (1999) tries to outline how nations come to be (imagined), and once 
they come to be, how they are developed, modified, and transformed.  As present in 
this dissertation, Anderson contends that such analysis has oftentimes been grounded 
in social change and consciousness; however he asserts social change and 
consciousness alone do not suffice in explanations for why people are attached to the 
invention of their imagination, and even more importantly why people are willing to 
die for their inventions.  Therefore, if social change and national consciousness are 
not enough to explain why one would die for an invention of imagination, what is the 
explanation? 
 Something of the nature of…political love can be deciphered 
from the ways in which language describe its object: either in the 
vocabulary of kinship…or that of home.  Both idioms denote 
something to which one is naturally tied….[I]n everything ‘natural’ 
there is always something unchosen. In this way, nation-ness is 
assimilated to skin-colour, gender, parentage, and birth-era—all those 
things one can not help.  (Anderson, 1999, p. 143)    
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 The competing rationales are further exacerbated by the sociopolitical context 
in Jordan, Israel and Palestine thereby crossing transnational borders.  All the while, 
Handala stands alone his back turned away, waiting for us to restore Palestinian 
human, ethnic, and transnational dignity.      
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Rather, they [critical researchers] need to locate their work in a 
transformative praxis that leads to alleviation of suffering and the 
overcoming of oppression.  Rejecting the arrogant reading of 
metropolitan critics and their imperial mandates governing research, 
insurgent researchers ask questions about how what is has come to be, 
whose interests are served by particular institutional arrangements, and 
where our own frames of reference come from.  Facts are no longer 
simply “what is”; the truth of beliefs is not simply testable by their 
correspondence to these facts.  To engage in critical postmodern 
research is to take part in a process of critical world making, 
guided by the shadowed outline of a dream of a world less 
conditioned by misery, suffering, and the politics of deceit.  It is, in 
short, a pragmatics of hope in an age of cynical reason [emphasis 
added].  (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000, p. 303) 
 
Given the analysis and the “critical” dimension of this study, it is imperative 
to ask questions regarding agency, activism, and critical education.  The sociopolitical 
context in Jordan is tense, but not hopeless.  Continued pan-Jordanian progress is 
evident, but it divides the country.  It was underestimated just how much of the 
tensions had to do with economic stratification.  Tensions were reported between both 
Jordanian and Palestinian refugee participants, and the underlying factors had to do 
with gentrification of Jordan, pan-Jordanization, and globalization.  The way Jordan 
in positioned in the Middle East means it has inherited an overwhelming amount of 
refugees from Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon.  The long legacy of Jordan as Palestine’s 
guardian and spokesperson is also worth mentioning because it created competing 
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notions of martyrdom; Jordanians shouldering the Palestinian burden, and Palestinian 
global, national, and local marginality and lack of autonomy. 
Action must be taken on several levels, as scholarly action is only a sliver of 
the solution.  Palestinians and Jordanians living in Jordan must act together and 
across economic, ethnic, and national identities to bridge the disconnect present in the 
social, political, economic, and academic realms.  Again, assuming this is the only 
solution not only trivializes the cohabitation of both groups, but minimizes the 
sociopolitical context within which people live.  Institutional initiatives and 
amendments are imperative regarding employment and mukhabarat.  Without 
addressing the fear mukhabarat instill on both Jordanians and Palestinians, all other 
recommendations are futile.   
This study aimed to address sociopolitical and academic implications 
regarding coexistence.  While the socioeconomic factors emanated as a major theme, 
future research questions can explicitly seek to address the implications of 
socioeconomic factors both in terms of globalization, as well as the gentrification and 
stratification of Jordan.  Resentment was expressed by some laji’een about the 
wealthy Palestinians who have seemingly deserted their own people.  Studies 
deconstructing the complexities of what it means to be a rich Palestinian and a poor 
Palestinian in Jordan would be beneficial to further understanding inter-ethnic 
struggles and tensions. 
Critical ethnographies on the Jordanian-Palestinian refugee reality are 
necessary because the apparent lack of qualitative analyses in the arena make it 
difficult to build on dated data.  The milieu in Jordan is difficult to explain because so 
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many different factors are converging to cause both great prosperity and devastating 
factions, among them, the wars in Iraq and Lebanon, and the Palestinian struggle.  
More transnational studies are necessary to understanding border identities.  
Continued study of Diaspora communities including Iraqi and Lebanese refugees 
would be very valuable; a comparative analysis of all three groups of refugees living 
in Jordan would further deconstruct their refugeeness.  Critical exploration around 
whether or not Iraqi, Lebanese, and Palestinian laji’een receive the same treatment 
and encounter the same difficulties is essential to the understanding the advantages 
and setbacks of pan-Arabism, particularly for those living in Jordan. 
Comparative studies between laji’een in relation to the dominant group are 
essential.  While a majority of refugee research focuses solely on refugees (or 
refugee-centered) some studies fall short of contextualizing refugees and refugeeness 
in relation to the host country and the dominant group.  A comparative analysis 
further strengthens refugee existence by paralleling it to the existence of the dominant 
group.  In other words, findings such a heightened critical consciousness among 
laji’een participants is strengthened in my representation of Jordanian participant 
ambivalence.  By employing this framework both the host group and the refugee 
group are privy to critically exploring for themselves the implications of coexistence. 
Pseudo nation-state organizations such as the PLO, grassroots organizations 
comprised of community members such as Hamas must ally themselves with each 
another in order to bridge the disconnect between what organizations want for the 
community, and what the community really needs.  Working from a top-down 
paradigm runs the risk of implementing initiatives and inappropriately allocating 
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funding.  In a community-centered environment, appropriate allocation of funds and 
aid are more achievable goals.   
Critical education in Jordan is imperative.  While education in Jordan is 
competitive and rigorous, ignoring the sociopolitical implications on everyday life 
will do nothing but exasperate reactionary tendencies and anti-nationalist sentiments. 
Additionally honoring and validating the reality faced by so many students helps 
foster a more inclusive and genuine educational experience.  This in turn would 
deflate the frustration shared by many individuals whose experiences and challenges 
are not recognized.  An integrated approach valuing all areas of study is direly 
needed.  Any rejuvenation of the educational system requires adequate recognition of 
the reality faced by all students, thus empowering disenfranchised groups that 
encounter numerous obstacles placed before them.   
Only by taking these preliminary steps may the educational system provide a 
holistic approach which does not merely perpetuate the status quo that burdens the 
majority and favors a selected few.  By decolonizing education in Jordan and 
implementing critical thinking the country will do what pan-Arabism has been unable 
to.  Whereas education is currently dictated by the sociopolitical context, perhaps 
education can be the catalyst for bringing about transformative change. 
It is simple to merely state that a shift in the educational paradigm in Jordan is 
necessary, but what would this education look like?  Perhaps a new paradigm that 
goes beyond simply subject matter, but rather is grounded in human rights discourse.  
Central to this human rights model is refugees.  Just as the United States is made up 
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of immigrants (other than of course, Native Americans), Jordan is made up of 
refugees and immigrants and this is not going to change any time soon.      
A New Paradigm: Human Rights and Refugee Education (HRRE)  
The Human Rights and Refugee Education (HRRE) paradigm encourages its 
participants to critically think about what it means to have human rights and be a 
refugee, and what it means to be a member of the dominant group.  HRRE stipulates 
and poses the following questions to laji’een: 
1. Why am I a refugee? 
2. How did I become a refugee? 
3. What will it take for my people to stop being refugees? 
4. Do I have the dignity, freedom, and unlimited right to pursue a  
            livelihood? 
5. Do I have the ability to believe in my people and their strife, free of 
fear and persecution? 
6. Can I publicly express these desires without the fear of retribution 
and oppression? 
7. Am I valued to the same degree as my counterparts in the global 
community? 
8. How can I transform and transcend my current situation? 
9. Can I ever emerge from refugeeness through political 
involvement, education, and measures of peace? 
 
Discourse about such inherent rights and what it means to be a refugee is a key 
element in peace and civic education, because “citizens express their power and fulfill 
their citizenship obligation by expressing their opinions on war and peace” (Ahmad & 
Szpara, 2005, p.14).  Even further, people can also express their opinions about what 
it means to be displaced.  Education is entrenched in political and social agendas 
reflective of dominant ideology; in addition, education is a direct reflection of the 
sociopolitical context vis-à-vis selection of curriculum, textbooks, administration, 
staff, and educators. At this stage in the research, Human Rights and Refugee 
Education will not be defined as basic education about the basic rights of a human, 
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but rather as a process of empowering to not only understand their surroundings, but 
also to shape them.  
 Just as important is the HRRE education Jordanians would receive.  
Oftentimes comparative research finds “solutions” and recommends education for 
either the disenfranchised group or the dominant group.  In this case, it is imperative 
to address the needs of both groups in order to transcend and transform the 
sociopolitical and socio-academic contexts together.  In any case, HRRE is a way in 
which romanticized or demonized ideologies can be deconstructed with the aim of 
moving towards inclusiveness.  As the dominant group, Jordanians can no longer 
passively collude because collusion, even silent collusion, enables and perpetuates 
oppression.   
But the truth is, that my silence, my inaction, and especially my 
passive acceptance, of the everyday privilege that goes along with 
group membership are all it takes to make me just as much a part of 
the problem as any member of the Klan. (Johnson, 2001, pp. 128-9) 
 
Critical education as a crucial element of social and radical change must pose 
questions of Jordanians as well; such questions would require critical examination of 
the sociopolitical context and the role university graduates play in transcending or 
perpetuating it.   
1. What does it mean to be a member of the dominant group? 
2. Am I a member of the dominant group? 
3. What privileges are afforded to members of the dominant group 
that are not accessible to disenfranchised groups? 
4. What is my responsibility to Jordan? 
5. What is my responsibility to my Palestinian and Palestinian 
refugee counterparts? 
6. Why are people refugees? 
7. What role does my country play in enabling or fighting injustice? 
8. What would it take for my Palestinian refugee counterparts to no 
longer be refugees? 
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9. Do any of my actions perpetuate refugee oppression? 
10. Do any of my actions counter refugee oppression? 
11. What are my human rights? What human rights do refugees 
possess? Are they the same? 
 
 The features of this comparative paradigm were designed to reflect this study 
and what it sought to understand; the voices of members of both dominant and 
marginalized groups.  Perceptions of host country-refugee reality in a constant 
sociopolitical state of flux were the foundation for understanding the role of 
academia.  The legacy of Jordan’s neocolonial ties to Britain also inherited a need to 
appease.  Since the days of King Abdullah I and his reign, his role as liaison between 
the British and the Arabs impressed upon the pan-Arab psyche, Jordan’s dualistic 
intentions.  Simultaneously, Palestine and the Palestinian struggle for autonomy and 
global recognition fell under the auspices of Jordan to once again facilitate and pacify 
the situation.  The converging of these two legacies is evident in every aspect of life 
in Jordan; the social, the economic, the academic, the institutional, and the political.   
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Handala’s Face 
 Jagged jaw line, olive skin, distinct nose, and black eyes staring out in the 
vastness cautiously optimistic, but indicative of a boy who has—despite oppression 
and occupation—endured and survived.  Handala’s paradox embodies death and 
revival, despair and faith, youth and maturity, victim and warrior, citizen of nowhere 
and citizen of humanity, exiled and transnational.  In Handala’s face, we examine 
every freckle and scar, with physical features composed of the genetics inherited from 
generations before.  He holds the physical and spiritual legacies of the men and 
women of Diaspora.  I beg the question: has Handala turned his back from us so we 
can no longer see his face? Or, have we turned our back from him so the collective 
guilt of having to look in his eyes no longer haunts us?  
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APPENDIX A 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT COVER LETTER 
 
 
My name is Marianne Maurice Marar and I am a doctoral student in the International 
and Multicultural Education program at the University of San Francisco.  I am doing 
a study on Jordanian and Palestinian coexistence in Jordan.  I am interested in 
understanding the experiences of Palestinian refugees and Jordanians university 
graduates.  You have given me approval to conduct this research. 
 
You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are either a 
Palestinian refugee, or Jordanian citizen graduates from a public university in Jordan.  
I am curious about your perceptions and experiences regarding Jordanian and 
Palestinian coexistence.  If you agree to be in this study, you will be observed, and 
interviewed. 
 
It is possible that some of the questions I ask may make you feel uncomfortable, but 
you are free to decline to answer any questions you do not wish to answer, or stop 
participation at any time.  Although you will not be asked to mention or state your 
name during the dialogue, I will know that you were asked to participate in the 
research because I sent you this cover letter.  Study records will be kept as 
confidential as possible.  Study information will be kept in a private location.  Only 
my dissertation chair, Dr. Katz and I will have access to the files and the tape 
recordings will be expunged upon completion of the dissertation. 
 
While there will be no direct benefit to you from participating in this study, the 
anticipated benefit of this study is a better understanding your perceptions and 
experiences of coexistence. 
 
There will be no cost to you as a result of taking part in this study, nor will you be 
reimbursed for your participation in this study. 
 
If you have any questions about the research, you may contact me at 001 415 990-
1955.  If you have any further questions about the study, you may contact the 
IRBPHS at the University of San Francisco, which is concerned with protection of 
volunteers in research projects.  You may reach the IRBPHS by calling 001 415 422-
6091 and leaving a voicemail message, by emailing IRBPHS@usfca.edu, or by 
writing to the IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 
2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117.  You may also contact my dissertation 
chair, Dr. Susan Katz at 001 415 422-2209. 
 
PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH IS VOLUNTARY.  You are free to decline to be 
in this study, or to withdraw from it at any point. 
 
 
215 
Thank you for your attention.  If you agree to participate, please complete the 
attached consent form, and return it to me at your earliest convenience. 
 
 
Respectfully, 
 
 
 
Marianne Maurice Marar 
Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
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Appendix B 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
CONSENT FOR STUDENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
Purpose and Background 
 
Ms. Marianne Maurice Marar, a doctoral student at the School of Education at 
the University of San Francisco, is conducting a research study that seeks to 
understand Jordanian and Palestinian coexistence in Jordan.   
I am being asked to participate because I am either a Jordanian or a 
Palestinian refugee graduate from a public university in Jordan. 
 
Procedures 
 
 If I agree to be a participant in this study, the following will happen: 
 
1. I will participate in interviews. 
2. I will be observed either at the refugee camp or at school for an extended 
period of time. 
3. I will be asked about my perceptions and experiences regarding 
coexistence of Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan. 
4. I will participate in the dialogues with knowledge that they will be taped, 
and transcribed. 
 
Risks and/or Discomforts 
 
1. It is possible that some of the questions will make me feel uncomfortable, 
but I am free to decline to answer any questions I do not wish to answer or 
to stop participation at any time. 
2. Study records will be kept as confidential as possible.  No individual 
identities will be used in any reports or publications resulting from the 
study.   Study information will be kept in a private file at all times.  Only 
the researcher, Ms. Marar and the dissertation chair, Dr. Susan Katz, will 
have access to the files. 
3. Because of the time required for my participation I may become bored or 
tired. 
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Benefits 
 
There will be no direct benefit to me from participating in this study.  The 
anticipated benefit of this study is a better understanding of my perceptions of 
Jordanian and Palestinian coexistence. 
 
Costs/Financial Considerations 
 
 There will be no financial costs to me as a result of taking part in this study. 
 
Payment/Reimbursement  
 
I will not be reimbursed for my participation in this study, because there are 
no financial considerations. 
 
Questions 
 
I have talked to Ms. Marianne Maurice Marar about this study and have had 
my questions answered.  If I have further questions about the study, I may call 
her at 001 415 990-1955 or Dr. Susan Katz at 001 415422-2209. 
 
If I have any questions or comments about participation in this study, I should 
first talk with the researcher.  If for some reason I do not want to do this, I 
may contact the IRBPHS, which is concerned with protection of volunteers in 
research projects.  I may reach the IRBPHS office by calling 001 415 422-
6091 and leaving a voicemail message, be emailing IRBPHS@usfca.edu, or 
by writing to the IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San 
Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080. 
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Consent 
 
I have been given a copy of the “Research Subject’s Bill of Rights” and I have 
been given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH IS VOLUNTARY.  I am free to 
decline to be in this study, or to withdraw from it at any point.  My decision as 
to whether or not to participate in this study will have no influence on my 
present or future status. 
 
My signature below indicates that I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________
___ 
Subject’s Signature      Date of Signature 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________
___ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent   Date of Signature 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ORGANIZATION CONSENT LETTER 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
CONSENT COVER LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS- 
REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO REFUGEE CAMP AND PARTICIPATION IN 
RESEARCH 
 
Department of Palestinian Affairs 
P.O.Box 2469  
Amman 11191  
Jordan 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
 
My name is Marianne Marar (Jordanian Passport # I989529), and I am a doctoral 
student at the University of San Francisco.  I plan to conduct a dissertation study that 
explores Jordanian-Palestinian coexistence in Jordan.  Specifically, I will be 
observing Jordanian graduates and Palestinian refugee university graduates.  I am 
conducting a qualitative study in hopes of gaining a greater understanding of 
perceptions and experiences of Jordanian-Palestinian coexistence.   
 
One part of this study requires me to understand refugee culture and to do so I request 
that I be allowed access into a refugee camp.  I am asking permission that I be able to 
explore the camp between July and August 2006 as well as between December 2006 
and January 2007- as this is a two phase study.   
  
This Consent Form is a request for your permission to allow me access into the 
camps.  All data collected in this study will remain confidential. Pseudonyms will be 
used to identify all individuals and all identities will remain confidential and will not 
be used in any reports or publications resulting from the study. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
In addition to your permission, certain members of the refugee camp will be asked to 
participate in interviews that cover the following issues: the experiences and 
perspectives of Palestinians regarding coexistence in Jordan; the role that politics 
plays in perceptions of coexistence; and finally, what role does education play in 
addressing coexistence? 
 
Data will be collected via interviews, collection of materials such as loose pamphlets, 
and field observation.   
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RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no known risks and/or discomforts associated with this study. 
 
BENEFITS 
 
While there may be no direct benefit to you as a result of giving me permission to 
access a refugee camp, the anticipated benefit of this study is a better understanding 
of Jordanian and Palestinian perceptions of coexistence. 
 
COSTS/FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
There will be no costs to you as a result of taking part in this study, nor will you be 
reimbursed for your participation in this study. 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
Do not hesitate to ask questions about the study before participating or during the 
study.  I would be happy to share findings with you after the research is completed.  
You may contact me at mmmarar@usfca.edu .  If you have further questions about 
the study, you may contact the IRBPHS at the University of San Francisco, which is 
concerned with the protection of volunteers in research projects.  You may reach the 
IRBPHS at 001 415 422-6091 and leaving a voicemail, or by emailing 
IRBPHS@usfca.edu, or by writing to the IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, 
University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080. 
 
You can also contact Dr. Susan Katz at the University of San Francisco at 001 415 
422-2209 or via email at katz@usfca.edu or by writing her at the School of 
Education, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 
94117-1080. 
 
Thank you for your attention.  If you agree to give me access and permission to a 
refugee camp, please sign and return the attached consent form. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
Marianne Marar 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ORGANIZATION CONSENT FORM 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
CONSENT COVER FORM TO DEPARTMENT OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS- 
REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO REFUGEE CAMP AND PARTICIPATION IN 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT 
 
I have been given a copy of the “Research Subject’s Bill of Rights” and I have been 
given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
I understand that my participation will always be voluntary. I understand that I am 
free to withdraw at any time. 
 
Name of Person and title giving consent at Department of Palestinian Affairs  
 
___________________________ (name) ________________________ (title)  
 
Signature of Person giving permission at Department of Palestinian Affairs  
 
__________________________ 
 
 
Name of Person Obtaining Consent Marianne M. Marar________________ 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent _____________________________ 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEE 
STUDENTS 
 
Background Information 
How old are you? 
Where were you born? 
What University did you attend? 
When did you graduate? 
What is your socioeconomic status? 
What is your parent’s education level? 
Do you work now? What do you do? 
 
1.  What is life as a refugee like? 
 
Research Question B- EDUCATION 
 
2.  What were your attitudes about University? 
 
3.  Did you engage in any protests at university? 
 
4.  Did your university ever address Jordanians and Palestinians living together? 
 
5. What was the university climate/environment like? 
 
6.  What do you think of politics in Jordan today? Do you learn about it in 
university? 
 
7.  What about the history of Jordan? Does it address J-P history? 
 
8.  Were there tensions at university? WHY or WHY NOT? 
 
Research Question A-SOCIOPOLITICAL CLIMATE 
 
9.  What are your attitudes regarding the rise of immigrants and refugees coming 
to Jordan? 
 
10.  Have you benefited—whether directly or indirectly from the economic boom 
in Jordan? 
 
11. What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with the United States?  
 
12. What do you think about Jordan’s involvement with the Palestinian conflict? 
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13.  What is your attitude about Jordanians? 
 
14.  What do you think Jordanians think about Palestinians? Palestinian refugees? 
 
15.  Where do you see Jordan in ten years? 
 
16. How do you see Jordanians and Palestinians living together in ten years? 
 
GENERAL ATTITUDES REGARDING COEXISTENCE  
 
17.  What does your family think about Jordanians? 
 
18.  What is it like not having your own land? 
 
19.  What does being a refugee mean to you? 
 
20.  Do you hold a Jordanian Passport? 
 
21.  Do you consider yourself a Jordanian or a Palestinian? 
 
22.  If there was peace in Palestine, would you move back or stay here? 
 
23.  Do you have loyalty towards Jordan? Why or why not? 
 
24.  Do you feel different when you hang out with a Jordanian versus another 
Palestinian? 
 
25.  Where do you see yourself in ten years? 
 
26. Why is this topic so sensitive? 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Palestinian Refugee Follow-Up Questions 
 
1. What have you thought about since our last interview? 
 
2.  Is there anything you wish you could have said? 
 
3.  Is there anything you regret saying? 
 
4. What is higher education lacking in Jordan? What would you change? 
 
5. Given your last interview, why do you perceive education to be different for 
Palestinians than for Jordanians? 
 
6. Is Jordanian national identity adoption a choice or an imposition? Please 
explain. 
 
7. How did Jordanian national identity come through in your education, if at all? 
(i.e. songs, teaching re: history) 
 
8. What would ideal Jordanian higher education look like to you? 
 
9. Palestinian political participation is very minimal.  Why do you think there 
should or should not be more of a Palestinian presence in government? 
 
10. What do you think are the positive and negative stereotypes of Palestinians? 
 
11. What do you think are the positive and negative stereotypes of refugees? 
 
12.  What, if anything did you and the other interviewees discuss about our 
coming to the camp? 
 
13.  What do you think about my desire to explore this study? 
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APPENDIX G 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR JORDANIAN STUDENTS 
 
Background Information 
How old are you? 
Where were you born? 
What University did you attend? 
When did you graduate? 
What is your socioeconomic status? 
What is your parent’s education level? 
Do you work now? What do you do? 
 
 
1.  What is life as a Jordanian like? 
 
Research Question B- EDUCATION 
 
2.  What were your attitudes about University? 
 
3.  Did you engage in any protests at university? 
 
4.  Did your university ever address Jordanians and Palestinians living together? 
 
5.  What was the university climate/environment like? 
 
6.  What do you think of politics in Jordan today? Do you learn about it in 
university? 
 
7.  What about the history of Jordan? Does it address J-P history? 
 
8.  Were there tensions at university? WHY or WHY NOT? 
 
Research Question A-SOCIOPOLITICAL CLIMATE 
 
9. What are your attitudes regarding the rise of immigrants and refugees coming 
to Jordan? 
 
10. Have you benefited—whether directly or indirectly from the economic boom 
in Jordan? 
 
11. What do you think about Jordan’s relationship with the United States?  
 
12. What do you think about Jordan’s involvement with the Palestinian conflict? 
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13. What is your attitude about Palestinians? Palestinian refugees? 
 
14.  What do you think Palestinians think about Jordanians?  
 
15.  Where do you see Jordan in ten years? 
 
16.  How do you see Jordanians and Palestinians living together in ten years? 
 
GENERAL ATTITUDES REGARDING COEXISTENCE  
 
17.  What does your family think about Palestinians? 
 
18.  What do you think about Palestinians not having their own land? 
 
19.  What does the presence of so many refugees in Jordan mean to you? 
 
20.  Do you think about Palestinians holding a Jordanian Passport? 
 
21.  Do you feel different when you hang out with a Palestinian versus another 
 Jordanian? 
 
22.  Where do you see yourself in ten years? 
 
23. Why is this topic so sensitive? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
227 
APPENDIX H 
 
Jordanian Follow-Up Questions  
 
 
1. What have you thought about since our last interview? 
 
2.  Is there anything you wish you could have said? 
 
3.  Is there anything you regret saying? 
 
4. What is higher education lacking in Jordan? What would you change? 
 
5. Given your last interview, why do you perceive education to be different for 
 Palestinians than for Jordanians? 
 
6. Is Jordanian national identity adoption a choice or an imposition? Please 
explain. 
 
7. How did Jordanian national identity come through in your education, if at all? 
(i.e. songs, teaching re: history) 
 
8. What would ideal Jordanian higher education look like to you? 
 
9. Palestinian political participation is very minimal.  Why do you think there 
should or should not be more of a Palestinian presence in government? 
 
10. What do you think are the positive and negative stereotypes of Palestinians? 
 
11. What do you think are the positive and negative stereotypes of refugees? 
 
12. What, if anything did you and the other interviewees discuss about our 
 coming to the camp? 
 
13. What do you think about my desire to explore this study? 
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